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Abstract
An Evaluation of Microfinance as a Tool for 
Poverty Alleviation: Case Study of SEPAS/FONCRESOL. Potosi. Bolivia
By Maria Urbina
In this study, I evaluate microfinance in regards to the role it plays in 
development. The essence o f the newest debate in the field is on how to carry out 
microfinance so it is more effective. There are two approaches: self-sustainability, 
committed to a market approach to microfmance; and poverty, which views microfinance 
as part o f a broader social perspective. Through the case study o f a small poverty- 
oriented NGO in Bolivia, I  attempt to determine the effect o f its microfinance project on 
poverty. The findings from this study suggest that this project does not reach the poorest 
o f the poor, has a limited impact on women’s empowerment and other aspects, but has, 
as perceived by the beneficiaries, a positive effect on their economic lives. It is the 
conclusion o f this study that microfinance has a limited effect on poverty reduction but 
that it has intrinsic value for the poor.
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In the past fifty years, development practitioners have striven to come up with 
solutions to alleviate poverty. Among these, microfinance (defined as financial services 
provided to the poor) has been thought of as a particularly creative, cheap and fast tool to 
improve the welfare of the poor (Gonzales-Vega et. al, 2000: 334). Microfinance 
promoters claim that it is a cost-effective, sustainable development model that reaches the 
poorest, increases their income, empowers women, and enables families access to better 
health care, education and nutrition (Drake and Rhyne, 2000: 5). These claims, supported 
by some of the biggest players in the international aid industry (USAID, the World Bank, 
Accion International, and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) among 
others), place microfinance as a panacea for development.
As a result of its popularity with funders and its rapid development in countries such 
as Bolivia, Bangladesh and Indonesia, more and more studies have been carried out to 
determine the real impact of microfmance on poverty. Many of these have found that the 
positive claims made about microfinance may be more optimistic than the reality they 
attempt to describe.
1.1 Applied Project Objective and Research Question
It is the objective of this applied project to evaluate microfinance in regards to the 
role it plays and can play in development. Through a specific case study, 1 seek to 
answer the research question: what is the effect o f microfinance on poverty?
1 have undertaken an evaluation of a microfinance project carried out by a small 
Bolivian NGO, which operates in the poorest city of Bolivia, Potosi. My evaluation is 
based on criteria that 1 have designed to determine whether the activities and outcomes of 
the project are desirable or not. 1 have based these criteria on three main ideas. Firstly, 
on the idea that poverty is beyond material deprivation, that it entails aspects such as 
participation, access to services, choices and vulnerability. Secondly, on the idea that for 
microfmance to be truly effective it needs not only to reach the poorest of the poor but 
also to offer them other services such as savings. Finally, 1 draw some elements from an 
evaluative framework, based on six aspects: worth to users, costs to users, depth, breadth, 
length and scope.
1.2 Rationale and Context
With a GDP per capita of $950 US and social indicators similar to Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries, Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and the poorest 
in South America. About two-thirds of the Bolivian population is poor, with low levels of 
education, health and nutrition. The average schooling completed is less than seven years, 
infant mortality stands at 60 per thousand live births, and 10 percent of the children under
five are malnourished (World Bank, 2003). According to the World Bank, 95% of 
Bolivia’s rural population is poor. These are generally wage-earners or peasants who 
own very little or no land and who lack access to credit and basic infrastructure. In the 
department of Potosi, the annual average income per family is $236 US, the poverty 
index is at 80%, and the illiteracy rate is 40%, of which more than half are women 
(FONCRESOL, 2003).
1.3 Summary of Methodology
1.3.1 Agencies
I will focus on the case study of a project carried out by Pastoral Social (SEPAS). 
SEPAS is a small NGO that works in the area of what it calls “human promotion’’,' 
through projects with children, the elderly, community leaders and women both in rural 
and urban areas. SEPAS has a strategic alliance with FRONCRESOL, an NGO “... 
specialized in the management of credit” (FONCRESOL, 2003) whose main purpose is to 
improve the living conditions of the poor, and to stimulate economic activity and food 
production, through access to credit for men and women. FONCRESOL has given 
SEPAS a loan of $50,000 US to administer a project called Yanapanaku (“Mutual help” 
in Queehua), which provides credit to 300 poor women through the group lending 
methodology called communal bank. This is the project I will evaluate.
‘ “Human Promotion” in this context means community empowerment and development.
Focusing on the work of SEPAS will allow an understanding of some of the real- 
life dynamics of microfinance and to learn from the organization’s experience: once 
determined which practices work and which do not in the project, it will be possible to 
draw out some insight towards the debate of the effects of microfinance on poverty in 
general. In turn, this knowledge will enable me to assist SEPAS in identifying key 
practices that will help the organization improve its program.
1.3.2 Research
I spent eight months in Bolivia, out of which I worked five in SEPAS carrying out an 
evaluation of the project Yanapanaku. I used both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods consisting of the following;
1. Semi-structured interviews with 21 of SEPAS’ participants as well as with 3 
SEPAS and FONCRESOL staff and relevant experts/third parties.
2. Participant observation of 66 communal bank meetings, systematically observing 
and making notes on interactions, discourse, and events to complement the results 
from the interviews. Also conducted participant observation within the 
organization.
3. Document Analysis of both SEPAS and FONCRESOL on their history, mission, 
mandate, and policies, as well as correspondence between both organizations.
4. 241 surveys in all 15 communal banks, to obtain economic and social information 
on the clients.
1.4 Structure of the Document
The next three chapters will provide the necessary background information and 
context for the study. In Chapter 2 I will focus on the review and analysis of the 
literature on the field of microfinance. I will first provide a summary of the evolution of 
subsidized credit provision into microfinance. I will then explore the major debates in the 
field as well as provide an analysis of the definitions and measurements of poverty. 
Finally, in this chapter, I will develop the criteria based on the literature with which to 
evaluate the project. In Chapter 3 I will provide the historical, political and economic 
context of Bolivia. I will begin with a short overview of the political, economic and 
social history of the country since the Chaco War. I will then review the current situation 
of the country, and finally, I will attempt to paint a clear picture of the poverty in the 
country and in Potosi. In Chapter 4 I will describe the microfmance landscape of Bolivia, 
highlighting its main characteristics such as the presence of private financial funds (FFPs) 
and the microfinance crisis in 1999-2000. Following, I will review the two most 
influential studies carried out in the country on the impact of microfinance. In Chapter 5 
I will review the case study and describe in detail the agencies and the project studied. 1 
will then give a detailed description of the study, its objectives, the methods used and 
some of the methodological challenges. Finally, I will explore closely the findings of the 
study. In Chapter 6 I will provide an analysis of the findings and attempt to link these 




All studies carried out in any field need to take into account the existing literature, 
as the evolution of concepts and arguments in addition to the current debates will frame 
the researchers’ work. I will attempt in this chapter to review the most important studies, 
arguments and debates in the field of microfinance. This is not an easy task because of 
the general lack of consensus in just about every aspect of microfinance; however, this 
very richness of views will make the challenge a lot more interesting.
I will first give a general overview of microfmance, its definition and how it has 
evolved through time. In this section I will also look at those institutions that have been 
equated with best practices in the field. Following this, I will look at the major debates in 
the field. Thirdly, I will explore the dimensions of poverty and how they are affected by 
microfinance. Finally, I will present the hypothesis of my study.
2.2 An Overview of Microfinance
Microfinance is defined as a broad range of financial services provided to the low- 
income segment of the population. The term evolved from the concepts of ‘microcredit’ 
and ‘microenterprise’ financing, to include the importance of savings as well as 
borrowing. Although the terms are used interchangeably, microfmance represents the
field as a whole, while the other two terms are more technical and refer only to credit 
provision. The emphasis is on micro because, in both savings and lending, the amounts 
of money are extremely small, ranging between $50 to $200 USD.
The World Bank defines microfinance as “...small-scale financial services -  
primarily credit and savings- provided to people who farm or fish or herd and who 
operate small enterprises or microenterprises where goods are produced, recycled, 
repaired, or sold; who provide services; who work for wages or commissions; who gain 
income from renting out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and 
tools; and to other individuals and groups at the local levels of developing countries, both 
rural and urban.” (Robinson, 2001: Presentation)
The notion of credit, as a tool for poverty reduction, has existed since the 1950s 
when governments and international donors provided subsidized credit to small farmers 
in the rural areas of developing countries. With the green revolution came the idea that 
small farmers needed to adopt new technologies, and that the way to facilitate this was 
through the provision of credit at a smaller interest than that charged by monopolistic 
money lenders (Rogaly et al., 1997:5). The promotion of government subsidized credit" 
was seen then as a means to economic growth and the reduction of poverty.
Credit was provided under the condition that it was invested in productive 
activities. These activities were expected to generate the incomes that would then repay 
the loan. However, the returns estimated by the lending organizations were often higher
 ̂National governments o f developing countries, particularly in South Asia, received in turn funding from 
international donor agencies for their poverty reduction programs.
than the actual yields and loans were often not repaid. In addition to this, “urban biased 
credit allocation, the poor’s lack of collateral, the higher transaction costs faced by small 
borrowers, interest rate restrictions on formal lenders and patronage, arbitrariness and 
corrupt practices’’ were other problems that prevented poorer farmers from benefiting 
(Matin et ah, 2002: 283). In general, this first ‘wave’ of credit provision was a failure.
In the 1970s the idea that credit to the poor should not be government subsidized 
but provided by independent private entities at market interest rates was presented in the 
academic circles by researchers from the Ohio State University. At the same time 
microfinance organizations (MFIs) around the world began to grow and prosper, 
providing the evidence to support the Ohio perspective^ New kinds of innovative 
financial institutions appeared in Bolivia, Bangladesh and Indonesia (Ibid: 284). These 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), designed new and creative methodologies to overcome 
some of the failings from the previous wave. They redesigned “access methods, 
screening of borrowers, and incentives to repay’’ (Johnson, 1998: 800) as well as 
intensified their loan collections methods which overall “helped to raise repayment rates 
and present poor people as credit worthy borrowers’’ (Ibid). The main differences 
between MFIs and their predecessors were four: First, most of these institutions became 
financially sustainable while keeping their subsidies to a minimum. Second, they 
introduced a very innovative lending methodology based on group lending which, 
through peer pressure, eliminated the need for material collateral. Third, they provided
' This is seen as the ‘second wave’ o f microfinance.
credit at market (or a little less than market) interest rates. Fourth, they were completely 
separate and independent from government (Matin et al., 2002: 285).
The success of MFIs inspired a massive influx of international funding oriented 
towards credit provision in developing countries because it was seen as the most effective 
vehicle for poverty reduction. “The initial focus of the donor community was to achieve 
scale or outreach, rather than seeking financial sustainability. However, ... declining 
donor funds in the 1990s^ contributed significantly to the shift in the donors’ focus from 
outreach toward financial sustainability” (Makoba, 2001: 353). Since then, international 
aid donors have given priority to those organizations that can ensure their own financial 
survival: “The real success of microfinance lies in its inherent attractiveness to donor 
agencies. Well-run microfinance institutions offer donors an opportunity to support 
organizations that will provide financial services to their borrowers on an increasingly 
cost-effective basis until in 5-10 years they become sustainable” (Drake & Rhyne, 
2002:35). For example the British donor agency DFID (Department for International 
Development) is “committed to only working with institutions which share [its] long term 
vision of sustainability and independence from donor support” (FOCCAS Uganda in 
Makoba, 2001:355). This donor pressure, and endogenous circumstances (such as the 
increase of competition among MFIs) in some of the countries where MFIs operated, led 
to a transformation of many of these into commercial entities operating on a “business-
" After the end o f the Cold War, the money spent by the former superpowers and their allies declined 
sharply. Because there was less aid money, international donor agencies began switching their attention 
from subsidized to market-based interventions (Jonson & Rogaly, 1997:5)
like model with a focus on profitability” (Makoba, 2001:355). This transformation is 
often referred to as the commercialization of microfinance organizations, a process that 
bas intensified itself in the last few years, turning microfinance from a donor-driven 
initiative into an industry.
A critical view of the process of commercialization sees it as another example of 
the shift from the state away from service provision, and the take-over of this by the 
market, ultimately transferring all responsibility to individuals. First, the state no longer 
provides the services, as it decided to do in the mid 1980s in Bolivia, so that the provision 
of these is carried out by NGOs and other institutions. Second, the state does not provide 
subsidies to these institutions because they are now self-sufficient. Third, the poor 
become the potential micro-entrepreneurs of liberal theory, which will then be the drivers 
of economic activity and growth (Johnson, 1998: 202). These notions run counter to a 
more socio-political perception of poverty, which deals with issues of powerlessness and 
societal, political and economic constraints.
Since the 1980s a broad global movement has been spearheaded to expand 
financial services to the poor. This movement, self-proclaimed as the microfinance 
movement comprises over 1,000 microfinance institutions and NGOs, to name a few: 
Action Aid, Ford Foundation, NO VIE, and Save the Children (Drake & Rhyne, 2002:5). 
The movement took on such force that in 2000 it began a campaign to raise international 
commitment to microfinance by hosting the Microcredit Summit, a large event, repeated 
in 2002, which placed microfinance as the key tool for development. The summit’s
10
perhaps over-optimistic goal is to reach 100 million of the poorest families hy 2005 
(Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2003).
2.2.1 The Big Players in Microfinance
Among the most important MFIs in the international microfinance fora are the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, BRI of Indonesia and BancoSol of Bolivia. Grameen is 
the most cited example of best practices in microfinance. As the mother of microfinance, 
Grameen is synonymous with microcredit. Grameen sees microfinance as a poverty 
alleviation tool and has designed its methodology to suit the particular conditions of 
Bangladesh. The bank designed an entire hanking system that was not based on collateral, 
but rather, on participation, accountability and trust. Grameen operates on the belief that 
the rural poor can generate productive self-employment for themselves if they are 
provided with appropriate amounts of credit along with proper counselling. This 
approach was developed by the Bengali economics professor Muhammad Yunus in the 
late 1970s, as a response to specific conditions in Bangladesh; the high density of the 
population, the poverty of landless labourers, the marginalized conditions of women, and 
the domination hy large NGOs of the development process (Wright, 2000:6). Since then, 
the Grameen Bank has loaned $2,591.78 million (Washid, 2000:160) to 2.4 million 
borrowers, 95 percent of whom are women, with a 98 per cent repayment rate (Hossain, 
2002). However, the bank’s expansion since the late eighties has caused extremely high 
operating costs. It has, therefore turned to borrowing from several international donor
11
agencies, including the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World 
Bank. Currently, the bank’s operating expenses are larger than its operating income, 
making it heavily dependent on international aid. This dependence is also seen 
throughout other NGOs in Bangladesh that follow closely the Grameen model.
The Bank Rakyat Indonesia is a state-owned commercial bank which in the mid 
1980s implemented a nationwide microfinance system, based on a network of several 
thousand village based units. In less than two years BRI turned a profit. At the end of 
1999, BRI had 2.5 million borrowers, with a portfolio of $848 million, and savings 
deposits of $2 billion (Rhyne, 2001: 9). What makes BRI special is its emphasis on 
savings, which separates it from Grameen or BancoSol which still focus mainly on credit. 
BRI demonstrated that savings are an important financial service for the poor, that the 
poor can actually save in a bank, and that a small base of savings can sustain a financial 
organization. It was because of the BRI experience that the term microcredit was 
changed to microfinance to include savings. BRFs focus on savings is shared with 
worldwide credit unions, which have always been savings-based institutions. Another 
feature of BRI that separates it from the rest of MFIs is that it was a bank before it 
entered the microfinance world and continues to operate as a bank while it also provides 
services for its poorer borrowers.
Banco Solidario of Bolivia, known as BancoSol “is the first non-governmental 
institution in the world to convert itself into a deposit-taking bank” (Mosley in Hulme 
and Mosley, 1996:1). In 1992, BancoSol became PRODEM (Fundacion para la
12
Promociôn y Desarrollo de la Microempresa, or Foundation for the Promotion and
Development of Microenterprise), an institution established in 1987 by local businessmen
and US AID (which together with ACCION International has focused on pushing for the
commercialization^ of microfinance institutions in Latin America).
“Although PRODEM was successful compared with most other microfinance 
organizations, its stakeholders believed that its NGO status constrained its 
potential breadth [number of users], length [sustainability] and scope [number of 
financial services offered]. For example, PRODEM was not regulated and thus 
could not mobilize savings. Furthermore, the founders of BancoSol hoped that 
its for-profit status would help to attract private investment; PRODEM had been 
frustrated by the slow, strings-attached processes required to get cheap funds 
from donors. Einally, the donors involved wanted to test whether an NGO could 
become a bank.” (Schreiner, 2002:597)
This change led to an increase in the number of borrowers from 23,000 in 1991 to 
81,000 in 1998 (Schreiner, 2002: 597). BancoSol generated performance indicators 
(assets, asset quality, and capital adequacy) that topped even those of corporate banks, 
drawing international attention to it (Rhyne, 2001:115). However, the bank was hit hard 
by the 1999 microfinance crisis in Bolivia, which I will explain later in Chapter 4, but it 
still retains its leading market position in the country.
As it can be seen, the first wave of microfinance was that of subsidized rural 
credit to poor farmers; the second has been that of microfinance institutions driving 
towards commercialization, which have proved that the “poor are bankable” (Matin et al., 
2002: 291). Some say that the third wave is near; however, there is much debate on the 
future evolution of microfinance. Let us explore the essence of this debate.
 ̂ The term commercialization refers to microfinance NGOs transforming themselves into for-profit 
financial institutions.
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2.3 Main Debates in Microfinance
The main discussion about microfinance has been on whether microcredit is a 
positive or negative tool for development. Promoters of microfinance claim that it is 
“reaching the poorest, increasing their income, galvanizing them into collective action to 
resist oppression, ... empowering repressed women so that they are enabled to take 
control of their lives, stimulating them to use modern contraceptive methods, ...enabling 
families access to better health care, education and nutrition, ... and providing a cost- 
effective, sustainable development model that is applicable not just in developing 
countries hut also among poorer communities in the developed world” (Drake & Rhyne, 
2000:5). On the other hand, those who dislike microfmance practices argue that they “ ... 
fail to reach the poorest, generally have a limited effect on income, address the symptom 
rather than the social cause of poverty, drive women into greater dependence on their 
husbands, and fail to provide the additional services desperately needed by the poor; 
health, edueation, etc.” (Wright, 2000: 6).
The first detailed study of the impact of microfinance was carried out by Mahabuh 
Hossain, who researched a Grameen Bank microcredit programme in 1983/1984. He 
observed that the most direct effect of the loans was the accumulation of capital by the 
poor. In the same way, the income of those who had loans with Grameen was 43% 
higher than those who didn’t (Drake & Rhyne, eds., 2002:14).*’ In Kamal’s 1996 study
 ̂ It is unclear from the manner in which the study is cited in Drake & Rhyne, whether the income of 
Grameen borrowers was higher than non-borrowers to begin with. As noted later in my study, one would 
need before and after data to effectively measure the impact o f microfinance on income levels.
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of the same programme it was also found that borrowers had a higher per-capita income 
than those who didn’t borrow. In 1991 Chowdhury et al. “asserted that women (and 
men) participating in BRAC sponsored activities have more income (both in terms of 
amount and source), own more assets and are more often gainfully-employed than non- 
participants” (Ibid). Many more studies have shown the positive impact of microfinance 
on income. However, it is important to note, as I will explore later in the section on 
poverty, that an increase in income does not necessarily mean there is a reduction in 
poverty.
In 1992, Wood was the first to criticize credit as a poverty alleviation tool saying 
that it was “pernicious, even when it includes participatory rhetoric, because it suggests 
solutions independent of the structures which produced the problems” (Wood, 1992). In 
1997, he again, this time with Sharif, commented that credit “...offers an alibi for donors 
as well as nervous host governments to withdraw from a broader analysis of poverty into 
a narrower, neo-liberal, conception based on people’s financial liquidity.” (Wood & 
Sharif cited in Drake & Rhyne, eds., 2002:20).
In 1997, Paul Mosley and David Hulme noted that the Grameen Bank and other 
NGOs were moving away from serving the poorest of the poor. They saw this as the 
result of the increasing search for institutional sustainability, which, in their view, is 
incompatible with depth of outreach (reaching the poorest of the poor). This finding has 
also been well studied and documented by other authors such as Hashemi (1997),
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Rahman (1997), Matin (1998), Zaman (1997), Rogaly (1996), and Rutherford (1999), and
will be explored ahead in more depth in the section on poverty.
The debate around the effect of microfinance on gender power relations is one of
the more contentious ones within the field. Although more and more studies show the
limited effect of credit on women’s empowerment (Goetz and Sen G., 1996; Rogaly,
1996, Mayoux, 1995, 1998, 1999; Mayoux and Johnson, 1996, 1997; Johnson, 1997),
microfmance is still generally regarded by the mainstream as a positive intervention for
women. Traditionally, microfinance has targeted women, mainly because women, in
most societies, manage the day-to-day household finances and because they have proven
to be better at repaying than their male counterparts (Hulme & Mosley, 1997; Hossain,
1988; Gibbons & Kasim, 1991). In 1986, R. Rahman carried out an important study on
the gender impact on Grameen members in which she concluded that the women in this
program were in a better situation (higher nutritional status, better clothing and medical
needs met) than the housewives of male borrowers (Rahman, 1986). In 1994, Mizan’s
study supported Rahman’s findings; Mizan found that;
“Grameen Bank participation has a positive and significant effect on 
women’s decision-making both in bivariate and multivariate context...
Bank participation benefits women by providing them with important 
monetary resources as well as non monetary. For example, more years of 
participation enable women to acquire resources, including income, 
negotiating skills, social network affiliations, and knowledge, helping 
them to gain more decision-making power” (Mizan, 1994).
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In the same year Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta set out to investigate 
whether women actually controlled the credit they received. They found that a significant 
proportion of women’s loans (63%) were controlled by male relatives (Goetz & Sen 
Gupta, 1996:45). They observed that this causes tensions within the household in many 
ways, but mainly through increasing the pressure on women to repay a loan that may 
have been badly invested by their husbands or sons. It also may have negative 
implications for “long-term changes in household decision-making and in gender 
relations” (Goetz & Sen Gupta, 1994). However, the authors also observed that even if 
women do not control their loans, their status within the household is enhanced “because 
they are acknowledged as an important new source of revenue” (Goetz & Sen Gupta, 
1996:53).
Some authors such as Todd, Drake and Rhyne criticize the works of Goetz and 
Sen Gupta and others such as Mayoux and Johnson, as Western-feminist interpretations 
of women’s reality in developing countries. They argue that these are issues irrelevant to 
the actual women in question and that most of their decisions are driven more by 
economic rational behaviour than by gender oppression. According to these authors, 
some of the economic reasons that women transfer loans to their male relatives are 1 ) 
attempting to increase the rates of returns on their investments, since it has been proven 
that men’s returns are higher than women’s (Matienzo, 1993); 2) attempting to diversify 
the sources of household income and reduce risk; and 3) awareness of their reliance on
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men in their own enterprises and the need to ensure that the men benefit from their access 
to loans (Kabeer, 1998).
It is a hard task to establish the clear impact of microfinance on gender relations. 
The majority of studies see microfinance as the tool for women empowerment. More 
studies like Goetz and Sen Gupta’s are needed to ask key critical questions. The fact that 
microfinance targets women does not mean that it automatically improves their situation; 
in this sense the fact that over 95% of microfinance borrowers are women does not make 
microfinance a gender oriented intervention; this percentage has more to do with efficient 
loan recovery than with women’s empowerment. As Linda Mayoux observes; “Simply 
increasing the numbers of women involved in participatory projects cannot therefore be 
seen as a panacea, or an easy alternative to addressing politically sensitive aspects of 
gender inequality. Serious questions need to be asked about which women are involved, 
what sort of participation is taking place, and who benefits” (Mayoux, 1995;251).
However, we cannot deny some of the positive effects that microfinance programs 
have in the lives of their participants. From my own experience with the women in the 
15 communal banks I worked with in Potosi, I was able to observe that credit did not 
change gender relations within the household, but what it did do was to provide a space 
(at the weekly meetings) for women to voice their opinions, discuss family problems and 
have legitimate reasons to move about outside of their households. This was crucial in 
helping the women strengthen their own identities outside their families.
In general, researchers have been able to complete enough impact studies of 
projects and programmes in numerous countries to allow a reasonably thorough 
assessment of the impact of microfinance in regards to all the above issues. Some still 
believe that microfinance is an effective tool for development (authors such as Elizabeth 
Rhyne, Deborah Drake, Marfa Otero and others affiliated with organizations such as 
USAID, the World Bank, Accion International, the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poorest (CGAP), as well as the general consensus of the Micro Credit Summit in 1997). 
Other authors, some of whom have been writing on microfinance for a very long time, are 
very critical of the claims made about microfinance while they still see it as a useful tool 
with intrinsic value for the poor (authors such as Paul Mosley, David Hulme, Ben 
Rogaly, Imran Matin, Susan Johnson, Stuart Rutherford, and Graham Wright).
In summary, although there is debate on the impact of microfinance on poverty, 
gender relations, and access to health and education, the evidence suggests that 
“microfinance interventions may increase incomes, contribute to individual and 
household livelihood security, and change social relations for the better. But that they 
can not always he assumed to be doing so” (Johnson & Rogaly, 1997:14). What 
determines whether microfinance interventions lead to positive outcomes or not is the 
way in which these interventions are carried out. Recently, the debate on microfinance 
has focused on defining what the best practices are and on shaping the meaning of 
effectiveness.
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2.3.1 The New Debate in Microfmance -  Self-sustainability and Poverty Approaches
Most of the authors mentioned above fall within two camps, the self-sustainability 
approach and the poverty approach to microfinance. The essence of the debate is on how 
to carry out microfinance so it is more effective; however, this debate also reflects 
different ideas about the purpose of microfinance, the meaning of being effective and the 
role that microfmance plays and can play in development. The heart of the difference 
between these two approaches is on their prioritization of the different inherent trade-offs 
in microfinance.
2.3.1.1 The Self-Sustainability Approach’
This is the mainstream of microfinance, the ideology of the big players in 
international development and some bystanders.* Just as the poverty-approach, it views 
microfinance as an effective tool for poverty reduction. However, the defining 
characteristic of the self-sustainability approach is its commitment to a “market 
approach” to microfmance (Drake & Christen in Wright, 2000:3). This involves 
“principles such as sustainability, professionalism, and efficiency in the provision of 
financial services” (Ibid). The highest value is placed on the financial sustainability of 
the institutions that attempt to reduce poverty. This approach replaces the traditional 
view of NGOs as ‘charitable’ organizations largely funded by international donors, with a 
view of NGOs as providers of a service that meets a demand in a “sustainable and
’A lso referred to as the Financial Systems Approach, Modernized Approach, or Minimalist Approach. 
**This mainstream is called by Otero and Rhyne ‘New World’ thinking.
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widespread manner” (Dunford, 2001:3). This switch also reflects an underlying belief
that the poor should not be dependent on charity but should be encouraged to become the
agents of their own well-being.
At the institutional level, within this approach, financial sustainability requires
profit-making, therefore, the essence behind self-sustainability is the idea that helping the
poor (if done in a certain manner) can be a profitable endeavour. The manner in which
microfinance organizations become more profitable is to scale-up. This means increasing
the size and scope® of operations in order to cut unit costs. In practice this refers to
lending larger sums of money to higher numbers of not-so-poor people. The formula is
simple: all else equal, the more borrowers an organization has, the higher its profit, both
from the increase in revenue and from economies of scale. Using the same logic, the
higher the amounts loaned, the higher the income earned on the interest charged to the
borrowers. However, this only works if the borrowers have a high return rate. This leads
profit-seeking microfinance organizations to choose their borrowers during the loan
approval process in such a way as to ensure that those who sign up for a loan can repay it,
in this process the poorer applicants are weeded out in favour of the less-poor.
2.3.1.2 The Poverty Approach
This approach views microfinance from a much broader social perspective, that of
most NGOs that work in community development. It has its roots in the community
 ̂The term scope is not meant here as the number o f financial services provided as defined by Schreiner, it 
is used instead for its English meaning as “that which is proposed to be reached or accomplished; hence, 
ultimate design, aim, or purpose” (Webster, 1913).
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organization and social development school based in Bangladesh. This school placed a 
high value in providing “conscientisation for social action, legal aid and awareness 
building programs, training programs to develop human potentials and occupational 
skills, etc.” (Drake & Rhyne, 2002:17).
The biggest organization in Bangladesh that represents this school of thought is 
Proshika, which believes that empowerment of the poor is achieved through raising their 
consciousness, training them with organizational and practical skills, supporting them 
with resources and “infusing them with the confidence and determination necessary for 
taking actions to improve both their social and economic lives” (Hedrick-Wong and 
Kramsjo, 1997 cited in Drake & Rhyne, eds., 2002:18). In 1999, Proshika moved from 
sole work in empowerment to include credit through the operation of a Revolving Loan 
Fund.
The poverty approach in microfinance has taken elements of the social 
development school and incorporated them to the provision of credit. The essence of this 
approach is to target the poorest of the poor while providing social services (training, 
legal aid, etc.) in addition to credit and savings. The poverty approach sees smaller 
NGOs working with small groups of the poor as more effective in doing the above than 
larger MFIs.
The poverty approach also sees microfinance as a way to increase social capital. 
Putnam defines social capital as the “networks, norms and trust that facilitate co­
ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1993). Microfinance activities
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that are user-owned or user-centered (those based on group lending or on indigenous 
systems) can create social capital'® through enabling and supporting the group process, 
whereby the resources are pooled together and the profit or income remains within the 
group, maintaining the ownership of the process within the users (Johnson & Rogaly
1997). Credit is therefore seen by the poverty approach as part of a broader set of tools to 
reduce poverty, therefore it is only part of a package of services, training and spaces that 
should be provided to the poor.
Perhaps the best way to understand both the self-sustainability and the poverty 
approaches is through a quick survey of the trade-offs that exist in microfinance. First, 
there is a trade-off between financial sustainability (scaling-up) and reaching the poorest 
(depth of outreach). This stems, as explained earlier, from the need to have borrowers 
who will be better able to repay a loan, therefore scaling-up weeds out the poorest. 
Second, there is a trade-off between reaching large numbers of people (breadth of 
outreach) and reaching the poorest (depth). “The poverty approach targets very poor 
clients who are very costly to serve” (Schreiner, 2002:591)", therefore it targets less of 
them. The self-sustainability approach targets less-poor borrowers, which are cheaper to 
serve, therefore, it targets more of them. Finally, there is a trade-off between the 
permanency of the institution (being around for longer than 10 years) and being donor 
funded.
Although a ‘dark side’ o f social capital, such as the fact that it ignores power relations, has been 
identified and discussed (Putzel, 1997:939), there is a general acceptance o f the concept as a useful tool for 
the analysis o f microfinance.
" They are more costly because they are charged less to use the service (for example, lower interest rate on 
a loan).
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Effectiveness is the measure by which microfmance is evaluated. However, being 
effective means different things to each approach. For the self-sustainability approach, 
being effective means helping “many less-poor people a little for a long time with a range 
of financial services”, while for the poverty approach effectiveness means helping “a few 
very poor people a lot for a short time with only loans [and other non-financial services]” 
(Schreiner, 2002:600).
In short, the main differences between both approaches are:
Table 2.1. The Two Approaches 
Self-Sustainability Approach: Poverty Approach:
Temporary funding to cover only start- - Donor supported throughout the life 
up costs of the project
- Only financial services provided - Financial services and social services
- Large number of participants - Small numbers of participants
- Less poor borrowers - Poorer borrowers
- More permanent (Stay on for a long time) - Less permanent (short-term projects)
- Higher amounts of money loaned  - Smaller amounts of money loaned_____
Source: Author’s own research.
While neither of these two approaches provides all answers to what are the best 
ways to carry out microfinance, it is my belief that there is a fundamental problem with 
the drive towards the commercialisation of poverty reduction activities. This drive 
underlies the assumption that donations should be eliminated and that development 
activities should be profitable and sustain themselves. I do not argue that financial 
stability is not something to strive for, however, the problem arises when the search for
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self-sustainability compromises the ability of the institution or program to meet its 
development objectives. If development becomes another profitable activity, driven by 
the discipline o f the market, then what shall be of social consciousness, of group action, 
of the transformation of societies, and of all the things that development strives for?
2.4 Schreiner’s Framework for Outreach‘S
In 1997, in an attempt to design evaluation criteria that would go beyond that of 
the poverty and the self-sustainability approaches. Dr. Mark Schreiner, of the Ohio State 
U n iv e rs ity , 's created a framework based on the social benefit of microfinance for poor 
borrowers. This framework was an adaptation of social welfare theory that would allow 
to “reconcile the jargon of microcredit with the standard tools of project analysis” 
(Navajas et al., 2000:335). In theory, any complete evaluation of a project requires a 
cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis; in reality it is extremely hard to measure social 
cost and value. Schreiner’s criteria offer an alternate way to estimate the net social 
benefits of microfinance programs. His framework is based on six aspects of outreach: 
worth to borrowers, costs to borrowers, depth, breadth, length, and scope.
Worth to borrowers: This is defined as how much a borrower is willing to pay for 
a loan. With everything else constant, the more worth, the higher the net gain. “Worth 
depends on the loan contract and on the tastes, constraints, and opportunities of the user”
This section based on Schreiner, M. “Aspects o f Outreach; A  Framework for Discussion o f the Social 
Benefits o f Microfinanace.” Journal o f International Development. 14.5(2002): 591-603.
Dr. Schreiner has moved since to Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri 
He defines this as the social value o f the output o f a microfinance organization
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(Ibid). Therefore worth is a pretty subjective matter and is hard to measure. However, an 
increase in business profits is usually used as an indicator of higher worth.
Cost to borrowers'. This is the cost of a loan to a borrower. It includes both price 
(interest rate) and transaction costs. Other costs are non-cash: time, and indirect cash: 
transportation, documents, food, etc. Net gain to borrowers is defined as worth minus 
costs.
Depth'. This is the value that society attaches to the net gain mentioned above. 
According to social-welfare theory society will give more weight to the net gain of a loan 
made to a poor woman than the same net gain of a loan made to a millionaire. Therefore, 
because of this preference for the poor, poverty is a good proxy for depth. Indirect 
proxies of depth are sex (women preferred), location (rural preferred), education (less 
preferred), ethnicity (minorities preferred), housing (small preferred), access to public 
services (lack of preferred), and size of the loan (smaller amount at a shorter term of 
maturity preferred). The poorer the borrowers of a microfinance program the deeper the 
outreach. Deep outreach increases not only the social value but also the social cost, 
translated into higher costs to the lender (access costs, higher risk, etc.) and to the 
borrower (shorter term and smaller loans with more frequent disbursements).'^
breadth'. This is the number of users and it is very important because the “poor 
are many but the funds are few” (Navajas et al., 2000:336). Schreiner gives an interesting 
example of the trade-offs played up by the poverty and self-sufficiency approaches:
This represents a cost to the user in the sense that s/he might prefer a longer term larger loan.
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“Suppose that a tenth of the clients of a self-sustainable lender are poor, that half of the 
clients at a poverty-oriented lender are poor, and that net gain per client is the same for 
both lenders. To have the same effect on social welfare, the self-sustainable lender must 
have 15 to 125 times the breadth of the poverty lender” (Schreiner, 2002:596).
Length: This is the time frame in which a microfinance organization provides 
loans. Length matters because society cares both about the loans made now and the loans 
made in the future. It is hard to measure length because it takes place in the future; 
therefore institutional profits are a good proxy because they signal some kind of ability of 
the organization to survive if donors leave.
Scope: This is the number of types of financial contracts offered by a
microfinance organization. This means offering both credit and savings, as well as 
individual and group credit and different terms on the loans. The more scope the more 
outreach.
In summary, depth is the social value of net gain, net gain being worth to 
borrowers minus costs to borrowers, breadth is the number of participants, length is the 
years of the program, and scope is types of contracts. “The social benefit of the outreach 
of a microfmance organization is net gain weighted by depth, summed across breadth of 
clients and across scope of contracts, and summed and discounted through length of 
time” (Ibid). Each aspect of outreach depends on the other five.
In Schreiner’s view, when it comes to the debate between the poverty and self­
sustainability approaches, the most critical of these six aspects is length as both
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approaches have different views on the effect of length on the other five aspects; 
“Microfinance organizations that do not aim for sustainability believe that the short-term 
increase in the net gain caused by low prices swamps the effects of reduced length from 
low profits. Lenders that aim for sustainability believe the converse.” (Navajas et al., 
2000:337). This means that poverty oriented organizations place priority on the present 
while self-sustainability oriented organizations place priority on the future. Schreiner’s 
framework is useful, because it allows us to analyse the social benefits of a microfinance 
program in regards to broader perspective rather than the narrow focus on net gain and 
length that the two main approaches to microfinance have. It would be rather ambitious 
of my part to attempt to carry out my evaluation following Schreiner’s framework. 
However, in designing my criteria for the evaluation of the SEPAS project, 1 have 
integrated elements of worth and costs to borrowers, depth, breadth, length and scope that 
will allow for a broader and more careful evaluation of their microfinance activities.
2.5 The Poor and How They Manage Their Finances
In order to have a complete picture of how microfmance truly impacts the poor, it 
is necessary to understand how poverty is conceptualized. I will first review three major 
dimensions, as identified by Wagle, that define and measure poverty (economic well­
being, capability and social exclusion). I will then follow with a brief discussion of some 
of the issues around microfinance as it relates to poverty.
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The most widely used definition of poverty is that of economic well-being. This 
definition, spearheaded by economists, attempts to define poverty in quantifiable ways, 
through measuring income, consumption and welfare; which are all interrelated and focus 
mainly on foods and goods. These three measures are defined absolutely, relatively and 
subjectively. The most fundamental measure of economic well-being is absolute 
poverty, meaning the lack of basic means to survive. These basic means are standards 
designed by economists to include the minimum amount of income required to acquire a 
certain minimum caloric intake, a minimum basket of consumption goods, and a level of 
individual utility'® needed to live a basic life (Hagenaars, 1991; MacPherson & Silburn,
1998). Following the absolute income approach, the World Bank, the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund), and less-often, the UNDP (United Nations Development Program), 
define the poverty line based on the earning of one dollar per day (Wagle, 2002: 156). 
The ILO (International Labour Organization) incorporates basic needs to an absolute 
measure of consumption, so it defines the poverty line as the minimum requirements for 
food, shelter, clothing and other important services such as transportation, education, 
health, etc (ILO, 1976). “These income or consumption-based absolute poverty lines 
have become a norm today in almost every developing country” (Wagle, 2002:156). 
While these two measures have become quite common, measurements of welfare or well­
being need to be developed further.
' Utility is an economic term that describes happiness or satisfaction.
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Relative definitions of income stem from the idea that one’s income, consumption 
and welfare are interrelated to others’ economic well-being in society, therefore, 
measurements of poverty should be based on relative poverty lines, that measure how the 
least well-off in a society compare to the societal average. Therefore, if measuring 
relative poverty, a person is poor if she lacks a certain amount of income, minimum 
consumption and well-being derived from a mean or median of the society.
The second dimension of definition and measurement of poverty is that of 
capability. This has facilitated the measurement of poverty beyond economic well-being 
by looking at “factors that make individuals unable to derive sufficient human well­
being” (Wagle, 2002: 158). The capability approach is then the evaluation of the ability 
of individuals to achieve human well-being. The UNDP has recently incorporated the 
capability approach to its measurement of poverty, therefore measuring illiteracy, 
malnutrition, life expectancy, poor maternal health, and illness from preventable deceases 
(UNDP, 2000).
The last definition and measurement of poverty is social exclusion. This 
definition measures how well a person is integrated into the mainstream economy, 
political and civic activities, and her society’s culture in general. It measures if 
individuals or groups are fully or partially excluded from participating in the societies in 
which they live.
As more work and research is carried out to define poverty more accurately, we 
can expect a higher integration of economic well-being, capability and social exclusion
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definitions into a broader and more holistic view of poverty. This study attempts to use 
this holistic view (focusing on capability and social exclusion approaches), as I define 
poverty beyond material deprivation, entailing aspects of participation, access to services, 
choices and vulnerability.
2.5.1 Poverty and Microfmance
What does the economic environment of the poor look like? First, the poor 
operate in small scale economies, in which trading, production, consumption, savings, 
exchange, borrowing and income-earning occur in very small amounts. This implies that 
the transaction cost of carrying out these activities is really high, as these costs come 
about per unit. In this sense, it is impossible to envision a microfinance program that has 
transaction fees as it would be unaffordable to the poor. Second, there is a high level of 
risk and insecurity, due to both bad timing of income earning and expenses (i.e. also 
known as cash flow problems), and external environmental factors. The consequences of 
these two characteristics are that they: limit the interaction of the poor with the formal 
sector of society; encourage the practice of risk-spreading by the poor such as 
diversifying their economic activity; and lead to the use of savings and credit mechanisms 
as insurance (Matin et. al. 2002: 275).
Among the many misconceptions about the poor that have shaped policy there is 
the idea that poor people do not and cannot save. Underlying this is the assumption that 
the poor are irrational, wasteful and unable to ‘better’ themselves to get out of their
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situation. The experience of authors such as Matin, Hulme and Rutherford (2002) is that, 
although aware of problems of alcoholism and gambling, the poor are actively and 
constantly seeking ways to improve their circumstances. The poor do save, but they do 
so in less conventional ways, and in very small amounts. As they deal with informal and 
semi-formal microfmance institutions (MFIs), the poor will usually use as many devices 
and services as they can. They will often belong to one or two different ROSCAS (small 
informal revolving group-lending schemes), as well as have a micro loan from an MPI 
while they retain their relationship with an old money-lender (these run for-profit, 
informal lending schemes). In 1997, Hulme and Mosley discovered that depending on 
prices, health, time of the year (seasons), the poor pursued a mix of activities that include 
growing their own food, working for others, running small informal businesses or 
production activities, and accessing loans from friends, relatives and NGOs. They 
observed that “in terms of economic behaviour, they are closer to the manager of a 
complex portfolio than the manager of a single-product firm” (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). 
The poor have a complex web of financial needs and transactions, and this fact needs to 
be recognized by practitioners and policy makers in order for microfinance to be an 
effective tool for poverty alleviation.
Two types of strategies for coping with risk can be identified. The first is income 
smoothing, in which the poor make conservative production or employment choices and 
they diversify their economic activities, therefore protecting themselves against income 
shocks before they occur. The second is consumption smoothing through borrowing and
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savings, eliminating and accumulating non-financial assets, and using both formal and 
informal insurance mechanisms (Matin et al. 2002: 286). If the poor do not have access 
to financial services, both these risk-coping mechanisms can in themselves be costly and 
further exacerbate poverty. Financial services can, therefore, positively affect the 
household’s economic stability through savings and income generation, allowing the poor 
to engage in perhaps more risky but more profitable economic activities. Financial 
services can also contribute to the reduction of the cost of consumption smoothing 
through eliminating the need for the households to get rid of non-financial assets and to 
have more liquidity.
As mentioned earlier on, one of the major issues in microfinance has been its 
apparent inability to reach the poorest of the poor. Many authors have determined that 
there has been a failure of financial services to reach down to the bottom of the poverty 
pool, as the majority of MFIs have concentrated around the poverty line, meaning the 
“predominately ‘moderately poor’ (top 50th percentile of households below the poverty 
line) or ‘vulnerable non-poor’ (households above the poverty line but vulnerable to 
slipping back into poverty)” (Woller, 2002:306). The exclusion of the poorest of the poor 
-whether it is through self-selection or through peer group selection- is a common 
phenomenon. Even those who do join a microfinance program drop out after several loan 
cycles.
Why does this phenomenon occur? Most MFIs do not specifically target the very 
poor (those within the self-sustainability approach), and the few that do target the very
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poor (those within the poverty approach), attempt to do this through mechanisms 
intended to weed out better-off borrowers such as low initial loan sizes, stepped loans,'^ 
and fixed interest rates and terms. The problem is that these mechanisms, while they 
exclude the better-off borrowers, do not necessarily provide the services that the ultra 
poor need and want and so they weed them out as well. In addition, MFIs’ staff and peer 
lending groups are biased against the very poor (stemming from concerns around 
creditworthiness, etc.) and their behaviour further discourages this group from joining in. 
The focus of MFIs on credit or repayment discipline lead the very poor to voluntary self- 
exclude or drop-out since they are a lot more vulnerable to external shocks that 
compromise their ability to repay within a set schedule. Other factors leading to the 
exclusion of the very poor from access to financial credits are the tendency of MFIs to 
locate themselves in urban areas as opposed to rural areas where there are higher indices 
of poverty, as well as their emphasis on the provision of enterprise loans as opposed to 
other loans for consumption or emergencies. Finally, a major factor in the discrimination 
of the very poor, is the focus of most MFIs on credit, rather than focusing on services that 
might be of more value to the very poor such as savings. Woller argues that this 
represents a marketing failure in microfinance in that MFIs have focused on the products 
and services they could produce (institutional needs) rather than on those that their 
customers (the poor) want them to produce (consumer needs) (Woller 2002; 307).
Stepped loans are loans that increase in amount after the previous loan has been paid. For example, the 
first loan a borrower receives is $100, once that is paid o ff in an established amount of time, then the next 
amount loaned will be $150.
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Hulme and Mosley’s influential 1996 study of 13 microfinance institutions 
showed that:
The impact of a loan on a borrowers’ income is related to the level of 
income...this finding should not be unexpected given that those with 
higher incomes have a greater range of investment opportunities, more 
information about market conditions and can take more risk than the 
poorest households without threatening their minimum needs for survival.
(Hulme & Mosley cited in Drake & Rhyne, eds., 2002:11)
Money loaned to the less poor is spent on productive activities, therefore, it is 
invested, and this investment - it is expected, yields a return and helps increase and 
diversify their income. On the other hand, a loan made to the ultra poor, if it does not 
come with the appropriate support services, will be spent on consumption (for example, 
food or medical expenses) and will most likely worsen the person’s economic situation 
through indebtness. This brings us back to Woller’s conclusions that if the ultra-poor are 
to be reached, then other services need to be designed, such as savings and enterprise 
support, which will be of use to them and not drive them into further poverty.
In general, the provision of microfinance has come a long way in recognizing 
those products and services needed by the poor, such as access to lump sums of money, 
regular and small amounts of repayment, the importance of providing incentives, and the 
value of sustainability. However, it remains weak in the design of high quality new 
products that ensure the sustainability of the institutions, while prioritizing in-depth 
outreach to the poor.
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2.6 Building Criteria for the Evaluation of a Microfinance Project
In attempting to answer my research question: what is the effect o f microfmance 
on poverty? I have decided to determine, through a case study, the effect that a small 
poverty oriented project would have on its beneficiaries. After analyzing the literature 
and debates on microfinance and poverty, I am able to establish criteria for evaluating the 
effects of a microfinance project. These criteria are tools to determine whether the 
activities and outcomes of the project are desirable or not, i.e. whether they are positive or 
not. Therefore these criteria are parameters to measure success.
I have based my criteria on three main ideas. Firstly, on the idea that poverty is 
beyond material deprivation, that it entails aspects such as participation, access to 
services, choices and social and economic vulnerability. In this sense, I am basing my 
criteria on the capability and social exclusion approaches to poverty, in addition to 
economic well-being. Secondly, I base my criteria on Woller’s idea that for microfmance 
to be truly effective it needs not only to reach the poorest of the poor but also to offer 
them services that may be more useful to them such as savings. Finally, I draw some 
elements from Schreiner’s framework of outreach, based on six aspects: worth to users, 
costs to users, depth, breadth, length and scope. The following are my criteria.
2.6.1 Does it Meet the Demand of the Participants?
Any development endeavour must have a demonstrated need for its service, in the 
same way that any commercial endeavour must have a demand for its product. From the
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analysis of the literature and the context in which Bolivian microfinance flourished,'^ it 
can be said that there is a large need in the country for microfinance services. However, 
this does not mean that the demand for certain types of microfinance is being met. 
According to several authors, there is a demand for savings services that is just as high as 
the demand for credit services (Rhyne, 2001; Matin, Hulme & Rutherford, 2002; Woller, 
2002). Therefore, in order for a microfinance project to be effective it needs to provide 
savings services as well as credit.
However, the difference between a development endeavour and a business, is that 
the provision of services needs to be done at the lowest possible cost to users. Therefore, 
whereas in a business practice the product will be offered at market prices, a development 
project, and in this case a microfinance project, will offer its products at below-the- 
market prices. This means that another measure of the effectiveness of a microfinance 
project is how affordable its credit and savings services are.
2.6.2 Does it Target the Poorest of the Poor?
After reading the literature one can say that microfinance rarely reaches the 
poorest of the poor and that in those cases where it does reach the poorest, it does not 
have a positive impact on this group of participants. Authors such as Woller argue that 
this is so because microfinance does not provide the types of services wanted by the ultra­
poor; services such as savings, non-cash loans, legal aid, small enterprise training and
' Explored in detail in Chaper 4.
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support, etc. An effective microfinance project will not only target the less poor, which 
have been proven to benefit the most from microcredit (Hulme & Mosley, 1996), but will 
also target the poorest of the poor offering the services they want. In this sense, it will 
have a two-prong strategy; credit plus savings for the less poor, and savings, non-cash 
services and some credit for the poorest of the poor.
2.6.3 Does it Empower Women?
This has been one of the most contested issues in microfinance. The problem is 
that different authors have different criteria and definitions for empowerment. To some it 
means access to resources as the result of an increase in income (Mizan, 1994), while for 
others it means control of the loan (Goetz & Sen G., 1996) and yet for others it means 
decision-making power (Mayoux, 1995). My own criteria for empowerment entail: 
control, information, participation, income generation and access to support services. An 
effective microfinance project will empower women in that it will: ensure that women 
control most or all of their loans; train women in social and economic aspects such as 
family violence, nutrition, accounting, community leadership, etc; encourage women to 
participate in their neighbourhoods and communities; support women’s microenterprises 
to ensure income generation; and, provide support in the form of a safe and comfortable 
space where women can discuss issues important to them and develop networks and 
strategies.
38
2.6.4 Does it Enhance the Capacity to Lead Social Change?
Credit is not a panacea for development, it is but one of the many tools that form 
part of a larger strategy for social change. Any microfinance institution that focuses only 
on the provision of financial services does not carry out development work. 
Development institutions need to define their own identity and purpose and share these 
with their participants. This should be an ongoing process in which the participants also 
shape the philosophy of the institution. An effective microfinance project will hold a 
holistic view of credit that will incorporate capacity building through the provision of 
support services such as legal aid, business, leadership, and health training, as well as 
through macro economic and social studies that will provide access to information to the 
participants. It will also support the group process through an emphasis on solidarity 
credit (group lending).
2.6.5 Does it Increase Income and Reduce other Aspects of Poverty?
As a poverty reduction tool, microfinance should have a demonstrated positive 
impact on the level of poverty of those it targets. A successful microfinance project will 
increase the income of its participants by an amount significant to the household, or at 
least an amount greater than the costs of having a loan. In the same way, an effective 
microfinance project will help to improve, directly or indirectly, other aspects of its 
borrowers’ poverty such as literacy, malnutrition, access to health and education and 
social exclusion. A project that delivers just credit will have a very limited or no effect
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on these aspects; therefore, a holistic approach that integrates empowerment, training, 
participation, and social change, is needed for the real reduction of poverty.
2.6.6 Is it a Long-Term Project?
There is very little value in a microfinance project that has a short-term life span. 
Being a short-term project runs counter to a good lending methodology, but most 
importantly, it denies an appropriate sustainable service to each of its borrowers such as 
long-term training and support services. An effective microfinance project needs to have 
a long-term vision and a strategic plan with clear objectives. It also needs to be 
financially stable. I would like to clarify here that being financially stable does not mean 
being financially self-sufficient. Schreiner sees profits as the best proxy for length, 
because they signal the ability of the institution to survive in the future. However, 1 
disagree with his view in that I believe that a strong donor base and relationship can also 
be a proxy for length. In the same manner, a credit program that produces some revenue, 
even if it is donor supported, can be financially stable.
In short, meeting beneficiary demand, reaching the ultra poor, empowering 
women, reducing poverty, being socially driven and having a long-term vision, are the six 
characteristics of a successful and effective microfinance project. I do not expect the 
project I will evaluate to meet all six criteria. Instead, my evaluation focuses on an overall 
assessment of the project in relation to these guidelines.
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2.7 Conclusion
An overview of the debates in microfinance helps build an understanding of the 
major issues within the field, but it also leads to further questions. For example: what is 
the real effect of microfinance on the people it targets? In order to answer this question I 
have designed some criteria based on the literature. In the next two chapters I will 
provide some further information that will help to place my study within the larger 
context of microfinance in Bolivia. I will then attempt to answer the above question and 






“Bolivia is the Tibet of the Americas” (Swaney, 2001:13). It is the highest, most 
isolated and most traditional nation of the continent. It is a landlocked country in the 
heart of the Altiplano (the South American High Plateau) with a population of 8.5 million 
that is 50% of pure Indian ascendance (INE, 2001). Bolivia is the centre stage of my 
research and therefore I aim in this chapter to paint a coherent picture of the history, 
politics and society of this country.
I will begin with an overview of the political, economic and social history of 
Bolivia since the Chaco War, giving a short review of the current situation of the country. 
I will then explore some data on the poverty of the nation, and finally, I will look at the 
city of Potosf, which is where I have conducted my fieldwork.
3.2 Overview of The Bolivian Political, Economic and Social landscape since the 30s
Between 1862 and 1932, Bolivia had lost half of its territory, including its only 
outlet to the sea, to Chile, Peru, Brazil and Argentina (Dawson & Fielding, eds., 
2003:326). However, the Chaco War (1932-1935) against Paraguay- a dispute 
spearheaded by Shell (which hacked Paraguay) and Standard Oil (which supported 
Bolivia) over oil concessions, marked a turning point in the history of the small
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landlocked country. In addition to the land losses, Bolivia’s loss of 65,000 young men 
discredited the traditional ruling elites and stirred up political awareness among the 
indigenous peoples (Swaney, 2001:19). These conflicting ideologies and the emergence 
of new demands by the cholos^^ in the next 20 years led to the 1952 revolution that 
changed Bolivian politics.
This mobilization played an important role in the political radicalization of the 
population. It was around this time that the now well-known Bolivian party, Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, National Revolutionary Movement) was formed 
(Ibid:20). In 1951 the MNR presidential cadidate, Victor Paz Estenssoro, won the 
elections but was not recognized by the ruling government and elites who, instead, gave 
power to a military junta. A revolution against the coup broke out in 1952 led by the tin 
miners and backed by the peasants, resulting in the first revolutionary government in 
Bolivia led by Estenssoro (Van Linder & Verkoren, 1994:18). His government 
undertook a series of reforms, which are still influencing Bolivia’s socio-political make­
up (Sanabria, 1999:537). Firstly, the old voting system, which excluded the majority of 
the population on the grounds of income and literacy, was transformed into universal 
suffrage for men and women alike. Secondly, large privately owned mines were 
nationalized and incorporated into the state-owned mining corporation COMIBOL 
(Corporacion Minera Boliviana, Bolivian Mining Corporation) (Sanabria, Ibid). Thirdly, 
the government implemented the Agrarian Reform of 1953, which eliminated the feudal
' “Indigenous people who dress traditionally but live in larger cities” (Swaney, 2001:20)
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relationships of rural Bolivia, expropriating large haciendas, and giving the peasants the 
right to own the land. Finally, Paz Estenssoro began a large programme for the 
development of a large private agricultural sector in the Oriente area (Van Linder & 
Verkoren, 1994:19).
Some of these changes, such as universal suffrage led to a real emancipation of 
the Indian population (Dawson & Fielding, eds., 2003:326). In addition to these 
measures, the government eliminated old decrees that discriminated against the 
indigenas, and instituted several laws that exulted the indigenous culture. These were 
times of massive social re-organization, as many indigenous people immigrated to the 
cities in spite of the agrarian reform. Miners, peasants and urban workers joined in 
together to form a powerful trade union organization called the COB {Central Obrera 
Boliviana, Bolivian Workers Federation). This organization originally worked very 
closely with the MNR, however the two organizations later on went on their separate 
ways (as the MNR moved to the right) (Van Linder & Verkoren, 1994:19). To this date, 
the COB still remains an incredibly strong and effective force in representing, channeling 
and articulating the demands of the Bolivian people.
1956 saw a change in the government to the centrist Siles Zuazo, since the 
Bolivian Constitution did not allow Paz Estenssoro to carry out two consecutive periods 
in office (Ibid). Zuazo’s term was hit by the decline in the world market price for tin, 
Bolivia’s main export (and therefore, most important source of foreign currency), and a 
rising inflation (Conaghan et al., 1994). He was forced to accept an IMF bailout to
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‘stabilize’ the country’s economy. As with all IFM stabilization packages, the hardest hit 
were the Bolivian working class, particularly the miners and the self-employed in the 
urban areas (Conaghan, 1994:245). Labour militancy increased and so did the 
government’s build up of a military force that could contain any social unrest if it needed 
to.
The next eight years saw a weakening of the MNR as a party as a strong division 
between its right and left wings, as well as its peasant and miner factions, became 
irreconcilable (Van Linder & Verkoren, 1994:19). The growing antagonism between 
peasants and miners fuelled an allegiance between the former and the military; this 
support proved to endure for various military regimes. In 1964, the armed forces took 
over the government, and from then on until 1980, myriads of coups d’état, overruled 
elections, and many short-lived military dictatorships characterized the politics of Bolivia 
(Dawson & Fielding, 2003:326). Not all military regimes were alike, they ranged from 
authoritarian and repressive to populist. Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez’ 7-year long 
regime (1971 to 1978) stands out as one of Bolivia’s most authoritarian dictatorships 
(Swaney, 2001:20). During this term, tens of thousands of Bolivians were imprisoned or 
went into exile. Banzer’s neo-liberal regime opened up Bolivia’s doors to foreign capital 
and US interests; this and the higher prices for tin allowed for relative economic stability 
but left the country with the legacy of an incredibly high foreign debt (triple its amount 
from 1971) (Linder & Verkoren, 1994:20). The last of the military dictatorships was that 
of commander Luis Garcia Meza (1980-1981). His reign of authoritarianism and
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violation of human rights was more violoaned than Bolivia had ever seen. Garcia Meza 
and his friends amassed large fortunes through the trafficking of coca and cocaine, which 
did not sit well with the US and other countries. International and national pressure 
finally brought down the last dictator of Bolivia (Ibid).
The 1980s proved to be a decade of profound change in Bolivia. The reinstitution 
of democracy, freedom of speech and civil liberties led to the revival of social 
movements and popular participation, while old traditional political parties weakened. 
The 80s were also, as with the rest of Latin America, witness to the sharp restructuring of 
the Bolivian economy and the harsh impact of SAPs for the peasantry and workers of the 
country (Sanabria, 1999:537).
Siles Zuazo became, once again, the president of Bolivia in 1982. However, this 
time his popularity declined sharply as he inherited a bankrupt economy ridden with 
hyperinflation, low world prices for tin, and a huge and increasing foreign debt. Protests, 
roadblocks, strikes and demonstrations were more alive than ever in the country as 
Bolivian’s living conditions sharply deteriorated and people’s purchasing power 
decreased by 46% (Van Linder & Verkoren, 1994:28). The consequence of this was the 
withdrawal in 1981 of the World Bank and the IMF, negative growth for the next six 
consecutive years, a public sector budget deficit of 21% in 1984, and a hyperinflation that 
reached 24,000% in August 1985, due to the government’s effort to finance the budget 
through the printing of money (Mosley, 2001:103). Victor Paz Estenssoro, who had 
become president again in 1985, decided that in order to rescue the country’s economy he
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would have to implement drastic measures that would further affect the general 
population. He sought out economist Jeffrey Sachs '̂*, who gladly took on the opportunity 
to experiment with radical shock therapy. This therapy was called La Nueva PoUtica 
Economica (New Economic Policy) and was implemented in 1985, reducing the 
government sector (in particular those who worked in it), cutting government subsidies, 
and closing the low-yielding mines of COMIBOL (firing thousands of miners who then 
moved to large cities such as La Paz, Santa Cruz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Potosi and the 
coca regions), and making Bolivia the star-child of neo liberalism (Conaghan & Malloy, 
1994:124). The government also set out to sell its oil and gas companies as well as more 
than 150 state-owned companies.
Two decades later, while macro-economic stability has been achieved, growth 
(albeit slow) taken place since 1987, inflation cut to levels lower than in Canada, and the 
debt greatly reduced, the results of this macro economic policy are quite negative for 
wage labourers, petty commodity producers and peasants, in that living standards have 
been deeply eroded through massive unemployment, wages freezes and cutbacks in 
subsidies (Sanabria, 1999:538-539). Structural adjustment hit hard, and of course, it hit 
the poorest the hardest.
In 1993, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, from the MNR won presidential elections 
and initiated his capitalizacion program to continue the sale of oil, mining, 
telecommunications, transportation, electricity and gas state owned-companies (Swaney,
American economist Sachs has been an economic advisor in Latin American, Eastern European 
Countries, and for the United Nations and the World Bank.
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2001:23). Overseas investors in formerly state-owned companies received practically 
half (49%) of the equity, total voting control, and profits. The other 51% of the shares 
were distributed to Bolivians as pensions through a program called Participacion 
Popular, which would, in theory, “channel spending money away from cities and into 
rural municipalities, to be used for schools, clinics and other local infrastructure” (Ibid: 
23-24). This ‘capitalization’ was‘strongly opposed by workers, coca leaf farmers and 
other segments of society, prompting frequent unrest from 1994 through 1996 (Sanabria, 
1999:539).
Colonel Banzer came back to the presidency in 1997. This time he committed 
himself to eradicate all illegal coca cultivation and narcotics trafficking by the year 2002. 
Like in the past, Banzer’s strategy, called the “Dignity Plan”, was financially supported 
by the US (Swaney, 2001:23). This plan led to an exponential increase of violence in the 
coca producing areas of the country between the coca leaf farmers and antinarcotic US 
military personnel and the Bolivian police (Ibid). Massive social discontent ensued with 
Banzer’s war on drugs, widespread police and government corruption, and a serious 
nation-wide water shortage, leading to increasing numbers of public protests, from large 
blockades due to soaring gas prices to the February 2000 Cochabamba’s famous revolt 




On October 17 of 2003, president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who had been 
sworn in office a year earlier, resigned the presidency of the country and fled to Miami. 
His resignation was the direct result of a nation wide protest begun in September that 
opposed tax increases and Sanchez de Lozada’s support of a $5 billion plan by a foreign 
consortium (the British company Pacific LNG) to export natural gas through Chile and 
Mexico to California. This plan ran against the population’s deep anti-Chilean 
sentiments -  the direct result of being ‘robbed’ of their only access to the sea by the 
former in 1879. In addition to this, Bolivians believed that the government’s long 
standing track record of corrupt practices would lead all the proceeds from the sale to the 
pockets of Lozada and his friends. However, the plan to export gas was only the spark 
that ignited a population already frustrated with the deep social inequalities rooted in race 
and ethnicity, and an “uninterested and incompetent government’’ (Schultz, 2003). 
Bolivians are known for their ability to massively organize and protest. The water war of 
Cochabamba of 2000, mentioned earlier, was a successful example of mass mobilization 
against the privatization of water. Under pressure from the IMF, the government gave a 
40-year cheap lease to the Californian company Bechtel. “Within weeks of taking over the 
water, Bechtel imposed huge increases on water rates. This triggered a regional uprising 
that kicked Bechtel out of the country” (Ibid). Ten people were killed by the army and 
over fourty were injured. In February 2003, Bolivians united again to oppose a tax
Based on my own observations o f the events taking place in the country while I was there.
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increase (part of an IMF package). After fierce confrontations between the protesters and 
the army, who killed thirty two people, the tax increase was halted. The gas revolt of 
October 2003 became the third time that Bolivians, at a great loss of 80 lives, won their 
battle. At the time of writing, after three months of Sanchez de Lozada's resignation, 
relative calmness has returned to the country. The current president, former vice- 
president and a journalist by trade, Carlos Mesa Gisbert, seems committed to recover 
democracy through peaceful means. Mesa faces a three-month deadline set by the leaders 
of the opposition; this deadline expires at the end of January. Although stability has 
returned to the country there is a great sense of expectation as it is impossible to tell what 
will unfold.
3.4 Poverty in Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and the poorest in South 
America. In 1999, Bolivia’s Human Development Index was 0.648, well below the Latin 
American average of 0.760, only surpassed by Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Haiti 
(UNDP, 1999). Although this index has increased to 0.653 in 2000, Bolivia’s HDl rank 
is still very low at 114 (UNDP, 2002).
The percentage of Bolivians living under the poverty line is 58.6%.^ As a point 
of reference, neighboring Chile’s percentage is 20.1% (Ibid). 41.6% of the population in
■ This number increases to 95% in the rural areas (Rivas et al., 1998:4)
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Bolivia is considered to live in chronic poverty (Ibid)/^ As can be seen in the table below, 
Bolivia’s rate of poverty bas been steadily declining, although NGOs and independent 
economists claim that these statistics are too optimistic and do not paint an accurate 
picture of poverty in the country (Campos, 1999).
Table 3.1. Trend in the Percentage o f  Bolivians Living Under the Poverty Line______
1976 1992 2001
_________ 85.5%_________________ 70.9%_________________ 58.6%
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadîstica (INK), 2001
The following table is a comparison of some poverty indicators between Bolivia 
and the Latin American average:
Table 3.2. Bolivian Poverty Indicators com pared to Latin American Average 2001
Indicator Latin America Bolivia
Life Expectancy (years) 70.5 63.1
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live 28.0 60.0
births)
Under 5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 34.4 77.0
children)
Illiteracy Total (% age 15 and above) 10.8 14.0
Illiteracy female (% o f age 15 and above) 11.8 20.1
GNI per capita. Atlas method (current 3,555.0 950
US$)
Source: World Bank Group, Website, w\nv.worldhank.ore. accessed January 2, 2004
“  Cbronic poverty is defined by David Hulme as those who have experienced poverty for long periods of 
time, or perhaps all o f their lives (Hulme, 2003:404).
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The structural adjustment that has taken place in the past 20 years has deeply 
affected the livelihoods and coping strategies of the poor. Macroeconomic gains have 
come at the expense of the dislocation of the majority of the population, as the state’s role 
in the economy has been reduced and massive industrial closures have taken place 
(Agadjanian, 2002:259). It is estimated that over 50,000 people have lost their jobs as the 
result of privatization in the past 20 years (Campos, 1999). This has led to the most 
notorious consequence of SAPs in the country: the rapid increase of the informal sector. 
This sector was already predominant in the country, but with massive lay-offs in the 
formal sector and an increase in unemployment, the informal sector absorbed large 
numbers of Bolivian men and women. Today, 63% of Bolivia’s labor force works in the 
informal sector, the majority being women. This makes Bolivia the Latin American 
country with the largest informal sector.
Table 3.3. Informal Employment in Non-Agricultural Employment, by Sex 2000
Country Ranked Informal Employment 








Employment as % of 
Non-Agricultural 
Employment
Bolivia 63 74 55
Brazil 60 67 55
Honduras 58 65 74
El Salvador 57 69 46
Guatemala 56 69 47
Mexico 55 55 54
Dominican Republic 48 50 47
Venezuela 47 47 47
Costa Rica 44 48 42
Colombia 38 44 34
Chile 36 44 31
Source: Jacques Charmes, IIX), 2002
“  Authors such as Charmes (1998), Sethuraman (1998) and Alter Chen (2002) have empirically proved a 
relationship between being poor, working in the informal sector and being a woman. It is not surprising 
then to see how Bolivia, being one o f the poorest countries in Latin America, also has the largest informal 
sector, o f which most labourers are women.
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3.5 Potosi
With indicators close to those of Sub-Saharan eountries, the department of Potosi, 
located in the southern region of the country, is the poorest department of Bolivia (INE, 
2001) with an annual per eapita income of $236 US (FONCRESOL, 2003).
Table 3.4. Trend in the Percentage o f  Potosinos Living Under the Poverty Line com pared to the
_______________ Awerggg_________________________________________________________
1976 1992 2001
Bolivia 85.5% 70.9% 58.6%
_________ Potosi_________________ 92.8%_________________ 80.5%_________________ 79.7%_______
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadîstica (INE), 2001
UNESCO World Heritage Site Potosi, the department’s capital, is the poorest city 
of the country. Located at 4,090 meters above sea level, Potosi is also the highest city in 
the world. It has a total of 140,000 inhabitants, 80% of which live in poverty.
Four hundred years ago, Potosi was the wealthiest and largest city in Latin 
America. Its riches flowed from a mountain of silver, Cerro Rico, which crowns the city. 
“Silver from Potosi underwrote the Spanish economy -  and its monarchs’ extravagance -  
for over two centuries.” (Swaney, 2001:362). Today, an air of melancholy fills the city as 
remnants of a grand eolonial past are found every couple of blocks. Cerro Rico’s silver 
has been nearly depleted, making tin and lesser minerals the new drivers of the slow 
recovery of the local economy.
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The Municipal District No. 12 of the City of Potosi is the area in which I carried 
out the fieldwork for my research. It is the poorest district of the city with a per capita 
income of less than $730 USD per year (much lower than the national average of $950 
USD).^  ̂ Located on the Northwest side of Potosi, it is considered a peri-urban area as it 
is located on the outskirts or periphery of the city. It began to grow quickly after the 
implementation of the 1985 New Economic Policy, to a total of 6,000 people, 50.2% of 
which are women and 49.8% men (INE, 2001). It is a young population with an average 
age of 25 years old. 53% of the District’s inhabitants are immigrants from the rural areas 
who came to Potosi in search for jobs. However, Potosi’s economy has not been able to 
provide employment for this influx of peasants. Therefore, the inhabitants of the District 
No. 12, like the majority of Potosinos and Bolivians, work in the informal sector (in 
particular women) in commercial activities such as petty trade in fairs and markets, street 
vending, maid work, laundry washing, small shop keeping, etc.
In Chapter 5 I will take a closer look at the conditions and livelihoods of the 
people of this district.
However, it can be seen that this average is much higher than the average o f  the department ($236 US) 
which includes the rural population.
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3.6 Conclusion
Bolivia is a small, isolated and poor country with a complex history and a strong 
tradition of social mobilization against oppressive regimes. 60% of its people live in 
poverty and drive the economy’s largest segment: the informal sector. Within the poorest 
country of South America, Potosi is its poorest city. Once the largest city of the 
Americas and an important commercial centre, Potosi now struggles to recover its 
economy after the depletion of its silver supplies.
Against this backdrop, microfinance has developed widely in the country, 
including Potosi, leading us to ask; what particular conditions does this small landlocked 




EVOLUTION. CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE IN
BOLIVIA
4.1 Introduction
Before 1985, the Bolivian banking sector was characterized by its inefficiency and 
its inability (or unwillingness) to reach smaller borrowers as these represented high-risk 
projects. The SAPs of 1985 led directly to the collapse of the already weakened Bolivian 
financial institutions since good borrowers were unable to re-pay their loans. This 
collapse in the formal banking sector, together with the high urban population density, 
deregulated interest rates and growing economy of the late 1980s were the conditions that 
led to the emergence of the microfinance industry (Hulme, 2001:105).
Since then, microfinance in Bolivia has advanced the fastest and farthest from any 
other country. In doing so, Bolivia has been a test ground in the field. First, the country 
created a microfinance industry, encompassed by many (some argue too many) well- 
functioning institutions -  this industry is now extremely complex, consisting of 35 MFIs, 
with over 260,000 borrowers and a portfolio of almost $300 million (6% of the national 
total). Second, the Bolivian example is the case-sample for the self-sustainability 
approach to microfinance. This approach, as explained earlier, sees that microfinance 
should be provided solely on a fully commercial basis.
In this chapter, I seek to describe at some length the characterizing features of 
microfinanee in the country. I will do this in two ways. First, I will provide an overview
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of the development of microfinanee in Bolivia, as well as the type of organizations that 
now exist and a brief review of the 1999-2001 microfinanee crisis. Secondly, I will 
explore two influential studies carried out in Bolivia to determine the effects of 
microfinanee on poverty in the country.
4.2 The Microfinanee Landscape of Bolivia
Bolivia began experimenting with microcredit as early as the 1950s through credit 
unions, rural revolving funds, and village banks. However, it was not until the 80s that 
Bolivia’s poor began to be regarded by financial institutions as viable borrowers. The 
relevance of the Bolivian case is that is has become the star-child of the self-sustainability 
approach to microfinanee. As explored in the literature review, this model views 
financial support from government and international agencies, as temporary, as it is 
interested in drawing profits from the market. The main expression of this model is the 
transformation of NGOs into formal financial institutions. This ‘commercialization’ has 
become so widespread that microfinanee in Bolivia has become an industry as opposed to 
a donor-driven initiative.
The transformation of PRODEM into Banco Solidario (BancoSol) -  the single 
largest provider of microfinanee services and until recently the most profitable bank in 
Bolivia^^ -  led many other NGOs to imitate this process.^^ The Bolivian government has
^ For more information on BancoSol, refer to the section 2.2.1 “The Big Players in Microfinanee” in 
Chapter 2
Mainstream banks, in particular Banco Economico, have also followed on the footsteps o f BancoSol by 
providing some microfinanee services.
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heavily regulated the transformations through the creation of a special category of
institutions; Fondos Financieros Privados (Private Financial Funds) (FFPs), which I will
describe below. However, NGOs, in their traditional form, still play a role in the
microfinanee fora of Bolivia. The only two large microfinanee NGOs are ProMujer and
Crecer, the rest of the NGOs are very new and small and most aspire to become FFPs.
ProMujer and Crecer are village banking programs that aim to reach the poorest possible
borrowers, specifically women. They follow the poverty approach to microfinanee,
offering other services in addition to financial ones, such as training on nutrition and
health, and working towards the empowerment of women. Another category of
microfinanee institutions that is worth mentioning is that of the credit cooperatives,
which, much like credit unions, include both small localized institutions as well as large,
sophisticated organizations based mainly in the eastern area of the country.
Although the self-sustainability approach is the mainstream, there are a myriad of
technologies and methodologies used within Bolivian microfinanee that represent both
the poverty and self-sustainability approaches. Just to mention a few, MFIs in Bolivia
represent examples of:
“individual lending, solidarity (small) and co-operative (large) group 
lending; targeted and untargeted loan operations; voluntary and 
compulsory savings; mission-based and heavily secular organizations; 
‘minimalist’ (credit only) and loans blended with business training or with 
complementary technical assistance in the health, education, extension or 
research areas; and infinite varieties of loan size, repayment periods and 
incentives to repay” (Mosley 2001: 108).
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4.3 Fondos Financieros Privados (Private Financial Funds -  FFPs)
Fondos Financieros Privados (FFPs) are an exclusive Bolivian phenomenon. 
FFPs, as a category, were created in 1994 by the Bolivian government in response to the 
desire of NGOs to become commercial within the microfinanee industry. Bolivian 
microfinanee NGOs grew so quickly that they soon came to realize the limitations of 
being a donor-funded non-profit-organization. Not only were the donor agencies not 
prepared to hand out large amounts of funds, they were also slow and bureaucratic. 
NGOs wanted fast, easy flowing credit that they could make available to borrowers at all 
times, but most importantly, they wanted independence from funding agencies, self- 
reliance and autonomy. Thus, a changeover began in the structure of these NGOs. 
NGOs in their conventional form have no owners with capital at risk. Because they lack 
owners, their accountability is not as high as a company or commercial organization, 
therefore, they are not allowed to accept deposits or participate in money markets (i.e. 
they cannot be part of mainstream financial markets). Bolivian NGOs used some or all 
of their capital to purchase shares in newly created financial institutions, making 
themselves the main owners, among others, of these institutions. The new financial 
institutions were licensed by the banking authorities to “accept deposits from the public 
and ... to raise funds in money and capital markets. The NGOs’ staff, operations, and 
loan portfolio.. .move[d].. .to the new institution, leaving the NGOs as owners/investors” 
(Rhyne, 2001: 106). In theory, this would mean that the NGOs were also able to carry 
out other development activities, because they had more assets to do so, or at least to
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back them up. This process of commercialization continued on as more and more NGOs 
transformed themselves into FFPs. This progression began to be known in the worldwide 
microfinanee sphere as the Bolivian Model and began to be copied in countries such as 
Kenya, Senegal, Uganda, Ecuador, Peru, Dominican Republic and Cambodia, showing a 
demonstrated shift towards market-driven microfinanee within the sector.
So, what are FFPs? FFPs are formal for profit financial institutions whose 
minimum capital requirements are lower than those of the commercial banks, and who 
cannot provide other services that banks provide such as current accounts or foreign 
exchange services. FFPs are not owned by private investors, but owned by NGOs. 
Some authors such as Rhyne and Drake argue that the NGOs in these cases are led by 
people who are deeply committed to microcredit as a social project, and that although 
there are always expectations for these institutions to become profitable, ‘investors’ take 
a very high risk of losing their cash, and most view this up-front contribution more as a 
donation ratber than as an investment per se (Drake & Rhyne, 2002). Moreover, the 
authors believe that the process of transformation of these NGOs was highly regulated by 
government authorities to ensure that the NGOs did not have sole ownership of the 
institutions (and therefore sole control), but that there were a variety of people involved 
that could place checks and balances on the NGOs (Rhyne, 2001). However, authors 
such as Schreiner are more skeptical. When describing PRODEM’s transformation into 
BancoSol, Schreiner explains, “Managers with experience in big, impersonal banks 
slowly replaced many of the visionaries and social workers who had founded PRODEM.
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With most growth financed with loans and deposits from private sources, the cost of 
liabilities rose.” (Schreiner, 2002: 597).
It is clear that FFPs in Bolivia are not corporations, however, they are not 
altruistic organizations either: they want to make a profit. This search for profit may lead 
FFPs to decrease the depth of their services.^* However, in the end, profits are re­
channeled back into the FFPs for their own functioning and for the provision of more 
loans. The fact that there is a widespread commercialization of NGOs in Bolivia is not 
necessarily in itself a negative phenomenon. However, it is important to determine the 
effectiveness of these in meeting and satisfying consumer demand and reducing poverty.
4.4 Crisis in Bolivian MicroBnance
In the late 1990s almost anyone in Bolivia who wanted a loan could have one. 
Competition in the country among microfinanee providers had become fierce as the 
microfinanee institutions expanded, new microfinanee entrants appeared and new non­
microfinance institutions such as consumer lenders joined in. This saturation of the 
market caused a serious problem of over-lending (and therefore over-indebtness), falling 
profits and high rates of default. This, together with the 1999 economic recession in the 
country, which began in Brazil and expanded throughout Latin America and the rest of 
the world, created a general crisis in microfinanee that continued throughout 2001. 1999 
was a turbuloaned year in Bolivia as it suffered from the biggest economic setbacks in
^ As explained earlier, I use Schreiner’s Theory of Outreach. For a refresher on depth see the section “A 
Framework for Outreach” in Chapter 1
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fifteen years (Rhyne, 2000:123). As the deep recession struck, the informal sector was 
hit especially hard, in particular, textile producers and other trading entrepreneurs who 
saw their markets dry up. In the year 2000, Bolivians began protesting the lack of basic 
social services, such as water and electricity. Social unrest took place within the 
microfinanee sector as borrowers were unable to pay their loans. This led to a ‘debtors 
revolt’ in 2001, in which members of debtors’ associations protested against MFIs and 
their loan collection methods and sought full forgiveness of their loans.
The 1999-2001 crisis left the legacy of a weakened microfinanee sector in the 
country. It stopped the growth in numbers of borrowers, it led to the highest default rates 
in the history of microfinanee in the country, and it caused a sharp and profound fall in 
profits. During 1999 and 2000 none of the MFIs grew, BancoSol lost 25% of its 
borrowers and PRODEM 45% (Rhyne, 2002:126).
Three years later, the economy has somewhat recovered from both the Brazilian 
and Argentine economic crises.^’ Both the mainstream financial and microfinanee 
systems have shrunk, reducing over-competition and over-lending. It is hard to predict in 
which direction microfinanee is heading in the country, but although the 1999-2001 crisis 
was a ‘wake up call’ for the industry, it seems intent on continuing its expansion.
’ These neighbouring economies are among Bolivia’s biggest trading partners.
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4.5 Two Important Studies of Microfinanee in Bolivia
The predominance of the microfinanee industry can be seen and felt everywhere 
in Bolivia: on the streets large placards advertise 24 hour access to loans; modern FFPs 
have huge line-ups of cholos at their entrance waiting for a disbursement or approval of 
their loans; and TV and radio adds sell how easy it is to get a loan with no collateral. 
There is no doubt that microfinanee is embedded in the economy and culture of Bolivia. 
But, is it doing what it professes? Is it reaching the poorest of the poor and reducing 
poverty? Very few studies have been carried out at an extensive level in the country. 
The two most influential and encompassing are those of Paul Mosley in 1999, and Sergio 
Navajas and a team from the Ohio School in 2000.
I believe that it is important, when reviewing the evolution of microfinanee in 
Bolivia to also attempt to determine its level of impact in the country. Therefore, I have 
decided to include these studies in this section, with a brief discussion at the end that will 
hopefully ease the ‘entry’ of the reader into Chapter 5 -  The Case Study.
4.5.1 Paul Mosley’s study of Microfinanee and Poverty in Bolivia
In his influential study Microfinanee and Poverty in Bolivia, Mosley studied 
closely four well-performing MFIs, BancoSol, PRODEM, ProMujer, and SARTAWI.™ 
BancoSol and PRODEM belong to the commercialized dominant mainstream Bolivian
SARTAWI is a special case in that although it is an NGO that follows the poverty approach, it is 
financially sustainable. M osley categorizes it as a poverty approach organization while Navajas et al. place 
it closer to the self-sustainability approach.
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model. ProMujer (the largest microfinanee NGO) and SARTAWI work within the 
poverty approach. His methodology included both quantitative (questionnaires) and 
qualitative (focus groups and key informant interviews) research. His focus on 
qualitative research reflects his interest in finding out what the perceptions of poverty, 
risk and vulnerability were. Mosley discovered that all four institutions examined had a 
positive but limited impact on reducing poverty levels. Between 10% and 20% of the 
borrowers he studied crossed the poverty line^' between 1993 and 1999 “as a 
consequence of microfinanee, that is, they would have not crossed the poverty line in any 
case (Mosley, 2001: 115).^  ̂ He also found that the two NGOs, ProMujer, and 
SARTAWI, had the deepest outreach of the four MFIs (the poorest borrowers) through 
their acceptance of very small savings deposits and their delivery of very small loans, as 
well as extending their outreach to the rural areas, therefore minimizing the barriers of 
entry for the poorest. However, in terms of income, Mosley found that neither the 
poverty nor the self-sustainable oriented MFIs had a bigger impact than the other (Mosley 
defines this impact as the number of people crossing the poverty line).
Mosley’s most important finding was that microfinanee in Bolivia has been 
somewhat effective in lifting some people out of poverty (increasing the income of those 
just below the poverty line), but has not been successful in increasing the income of the 
extreme poor to above-poverty line figures. Mosley’s conclusion from this preliminary
^'Mosley used a poverty line o f $72/Bs 410  
None o f the borrowers studied lived in extreme poverty before.
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data is that microfinanee organizations are relatively effective in helping the poor but not 
the poorest and that other forms of poverty alleviation need to be brought in.
4.5.2 Navajas et al’s Study on Microcredit and the Poorest of the Poor in Bolivia
The second study I will look at was carried out by Sergio Navajas and a team 
from the Ohio State University, which included Mark Schreiner, in 2000. They studied 
four self-sustainability approach MFIs that function in urban and rural La Paz, BancoSol, 
PRODEM, Centro de Fomento de Iniciativas Economias (FIE) and Caja Los Andes, as 
well as one poverty oriented NGO, SARTAWI. They had three main research questions 
they set out to answer: 1) whether microfinanee organizations reach the poorest of the 
poor; 2) whether group loans reach the poorest better than individual loans; and 3) 
whether rural lenders reach the poorest better than urban lenders. As their methodology, 
they compared the income of a sample of people who borrowed from the five lenders 
against the income of all the households in La Paz. This study is directly based on 
Schreiner’s theoretical framework of Outreach, which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
“describes the social worth of a microfinanee organization in terms of the depth, worth to 
users, cost to users, breadth, length, and scope of its output” (Navajas et al., 2000: 333).
The team found three main results: First, the organizations tended to serve not the 
poorest but those close to the poverty line. They derived from this finding that most 
microfinanee institutions will “probably serve this same niche” (Navajas et ah, 
2000:344). Second, group lenders had deeper outreach than individual lenders. “In
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general, group technologies have more potential for deep outreach since they substitute 
joint liability for physical collateral” (Ibid, 345). And third, rural lenders had deeper 
outreach than urban lenders because rural borrowers were most likely to be among the 
poorest.
This study does not offer one theory of why these five MFIs have these
characteristics. Instead, it provides two alternative explanations:
“On the one hand, perhaps the drive for length [permanency] and breadth 
[large numbers of borrowers] is what prompted these lenders to grow and 
to have some depth. On the other hand, perhaps these lenders would have 
reached more of the poorest had they stayed small and unprofitable with a 
single-minded focus on depth” (Ibid).
In order to properly summarize and reconcile both studies we need to know the 
difference between reach and impact. To reach the poorest of the poor does not mean 
that there is an impact on poverty. To reach means to include people in the loan process 
(i.e. to offer a loan to someone and have that loan accepted by the person). In this sense, 
reaching the poorest of the poor means offering loans to the poorest of the poor and 
having those loans taken by them. It cannot be automatically assumed that making loans 
to the poorest of the poor will lift this group out of poverty. This is where impact comes 
in. Impact is the measure of the results of these loans. Therefore, it measures the final 
outcome of reach. Different authors have different definitions of impact, for example, 
Mosley defines it as the crossing of the poverty line by the participants of a microfinanee 
program.
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Although both studies focus on different aspects of microfinanee, they both come 
to the conclusion that it does not reach the poorest of the poor in the country. Navajas et 
al’s study proves that although MFIs’ rural and group programs have more depth of 
outreach than urban and individual programs, neither focuses on the poorest of the poor 
but on those just below the poverty line (reach). Mosley’s study is much broader in that 
it specifically compares MFIs from both the poverty and self-sustainability approaches. 
It argues that those MFIs within the poverty approach have more depth of outreach than 
those from the self-sustainability approach (reach). However, he also proves that both 
poverty MFIs and self-sustainability MFIs have the same impact on poverty of 10-20% of 
borrowers crossing the poverty line (impact). He does not provide an explanation for the 
fact that the poverty focused MFIs reach poorer people but do not have a bigger impact 
on poverty than the self-sustainable MFIs.
In summary, both studies support that microfinanee in Bolivia has not been 
effective in increasing the income of the poorest of the poor and has only had a limited 
positive effect on the less poor. In the following chapter, I will look at a third study, my 
own. Although less extensive than Mosley’s and Navajas’ et al., it may provide evidence 
to support some of the things that they have argued.
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4.6 Conclusion
The collapse of the formal banking sector in 1985, together with the high urban 
population density, deregulated interest rates and growing economy of the late 1980s led 
to the emergence of the Bolivian microfinance industry (Hulme, 2001:105), an industry 
that today has a portfolio of almost $300 million US. The relevance of the Bolivian 
experience is that the country has become the star-child of the self-sustainability approach 
to microfinance through the commercialization of microfinance institutions. Few studies 
have sought to evaluate the real impact of microfinance on poverty in Bolivia, and those 
that have done so, have found that microfinance has had a very limited effect on poverty. 





This chapter is the heart of this document. It highlights the knowledge gained in 5 
months of fieldwork, during which time I coordinated a study for a small Bolivian NGO 
called Pastoral Social (SEP AS) Potosf. SEP AS Potosi asked me to carry out an extensive 
baseline study of their microfinance activities. The organization lacked statistical 
information of their participants, and it hoped that with the information gathered by me, 
they would be able, in the future, to conduct an all-encompassing comparative impact 
study. In the meantime, they asked me to do a preliminary evaluaciôn de ajuste, meaning 
an assessment of their activities and methodologies and the level of satisfaction of the 
participants with the microfinance project. The study was conducted successfully and a 
report produced (which is attached in the appendices). For my Applied Project Report, 1 
will use this research and its findings to attempt to answer my research question. Below, 1 
will provide some background information on the agencies involved, the microfinance 
project and the participants. I will then focus on the study and its findings.
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5.2 The Project and How it Works
5.2.1 The Agencies
As mentioned above, I worked for five months in the evaluation of a project 
carried out by SEP AS Potosf. This project is jointly coordinated by SEPAS and another 
organization called FONCRESOL (Solidarity Credit Fund). The two organizations have 
formed what they call a ‘strategic alliance’ in which FONCRESOL provides funds and 
SEPAS administers these funds and carries out the project.
As can be seen in Chart 1, SEPAS Potosf and FONCRESOL Potosf, are both part 
of a larger network of organizations. The national umbrella organization that coordinates 
all activities within this network is CEPS-C (Comision Episcopal de Pastoral Social -  
Caritas), a church based organization. However, there is a great deal of autonomy of the 
organizations under the umbrella, and that is why SEPAS Potosf functions as its own 
small NGO. In the hierarchy of things, SEPAS Potosf is above FONCRESOL Potosf, but 
in the project I worked in, FONCRESOL Potosf provided the funding. It is a complex 
and interesting relationship and tensions are certain to be present.
SEPAS’ Potosf has existed for more than twenty years. With an operating budget 
of $425,000 USD^  ̂per year it works in four areas: 1) Children, through special projects 
that deal with street children and child labour; 2) The Elderly, through legal aid and 
empowerment projects; 3) Community Leaders, through training of these and support in 
their demands to the municipal government; and 4) Women, through microfinance.
SEPAS receives funding from the German NGO MBSEREOR and the Canadian NGO Catholic Relief 
Services, as well as from the National Church organization CEPS-C.
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SEPAS Potosi has a very progressive vision of development; in fact, it is the most 
progressive of the chapters of CEPS-C. As an institution it does not believe in 
asistencialismo, instead, it strives to provide the people with tools for their own 
betterment. Its fourteen staff are deeply committed to social action and work incredibly 
hard for their participants. There are few formalities in the office. I remember important 
meetings with funders or government representatives being interrupted to give legal aid 
to a farmer who had just arrived by foot from el campo\ or a credit officer staying until 
11pm with a group of women attempting to reconcile their accounting books. It was 
certainly inspiring to work in such an environment and it is the hope of this project to 
help the organization realize its full potential.
EONCRESOL, founded in 1997, provides micro credit to groups of small-scale 
producers, to individuals, associations and to women’s groups. It has a total operating 
budget of over 2 million USD. EONCRESOL Potosf lends only to women’s groups and 
has a small budget of approximately $65,000 USD. FONCRESOL National (and 
therefore FONCRESOL Potosf) is clearly a microfinance institution that follows the self­
sustainability approach. It has set the year 2006 as the target to become fully financially 
self-sufficient “ ...therefore, it will keep moving away from the poorest clients as it needs 
to improve its repayment rate.’’̂ '* Conversely, SEPAS works within the poverty 
approach: it is highly dependent on external funding, it has smaller operations, reaching 
less people but attempting to reach the poorest.
‘ Informal interview with FONCRESOL National’s accountant, January 2004.
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Being a microfinance entity with a more financial and economistic vision of 
development, FONCRESOL Potosf often criticizes SEPAS Potosf s approach. SEPAS 
sees microfinance as one of many tools for development; conversely, FONCRESOL sees 
it as the best possible intervention to reduce poverty. Luckily, within the conflicts that 
their different philosophies around microfinance may cause, these two organizations 
work surprisingly well together and hope to continue their partnership on a long-term 
basis.
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Chart 5.1. Institutional Relationship between SEPAS and FONCRESOL
Comision Episcopal de Pastoral Social -  
Caritas (CEPS-C)
A commission of the Bolivian church that focuses 
on development activities at the national level 
through chapters. It also has under its wing 
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Programa de Estudios 
y Apoyo a la 
Produccion (PEAP)
A program of the 
CEPDS-C that focuses 
on assisting small 
farmers and poor urban 
entrepreneurs in their 
production and 
commercial activities. It 
also carries out research.
Source: Author’s Own Research.
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5.2.2 Project Details
In 1999, SEPAS Potosf and FONCRESOL Potosf came together to start a project 
called YANAPANAKU (“mutual help” in Quechua). FONCRESOL provided $50,000 
USD^  ̂plus a full-time credit officer.^® SEPAS provided administration and delivery of 
the project plus two full-time credit officers. They called this partnership a ‘strategic 
alliance’ because SEPAS would receive financial support and FONCRESOL would gain 
experience that would allow it to add a social dimension to its lending programs.
The YANAPANAKU project administered by SEPAS is a microfinance program 
that targets women. It uses the technology of communal banks (which is explained in 
detail below), reaching out to approximately 300 urban women. Its general objective is:
• To improve the conditions of life and income of the poorest families of Potosf, 
and spearhead economic and productive activities.
Its specific objectives are;
• To increase the income and savings of organized groups of women, through the 
establishment of communal banks.
• To strengthen the capacity of organization and action of the women involved in 
the communal banks so that they can develop self-sustainable income generating 
activities.
35 This amount is loaned not donated to SEPAS Potosf, however it has been loaned under very relaxed 
terms (no interest and indefinite term to repay).
^ This person is paid with the interest earned from the project.
74
Some of its expected outputs are:
• To consolidate and spread the methodology of communal banks as an economic 
alternative that will revitalize the local economy.
• To promote the creation of microenterprises.
To train and empower the women involved in the communal banks in economic, 
social and organizational areas.
The rationale for the project is the following:
Potosf is the poorest city of the country
• Most of the poor are women and their children
• Women are not integrated into the formal sector, therefore they carry out informal 
economic activities
In order to develop their economic activities women need a small start-up capital, 
which they usually don’t have
The program therefore, aims to break the cycle of low income, lack of savings and 
capital and poverty. It attempts to do this through the methodology of communal banks 
(cajas comunales or cajas). This is a model based on the experiences of a group of 
Bolivian, Peruvian and Salvadorean institutions. The emphasis of this model is on three 
aspects: 1) Flexibility; 2) Respect for the decision-making ability of the members; and 3) 
Replicability. A communal bank or caja is an organized group that makes available to its 
members loans on an individual basis with no collateral, guaranteed by their fellow
75
members. It is integrated by between 12 and 30 women who live in poverty and who 
carry out economic activities. These women are called sodas, which means partners. A 
communal bank should offer four services:
Credit to start and support profitable economic activities
• Incentives to save
• Support of women to elevate their self-esteem and empower themselves
• Training and capacity-building of its members
Each communal bank is considered a credit and savings organization, with the 
potential to become self-sustainable. The members elect their own board of directors, 
usually integrated by a president, a treasurer, a secretary and a member at large. The 
members themselves carry out their own bookkeeping and manage the income of their 
fundraising activities.
SEPAS Potosi administers 15 cajas following very closely the model described 
above. In 2000, SEPAS carried out an extensive recruiting campaign targeted to groups 
of women that already existed (mother groups, arts and crafts groups, political party 
groups, etc.). Three communal banks were formed then and since more joined as the 
word of the lending program spread in the villas^^. Most groups now are between their P' 
and 4'*’ cycle. In addition to the loans, SEPAS communal banks carry out fundraising 
activities in order to save as a group. These savings are kept in the cuenta interna 
(internal account), which vary in size according to each group.
' Neighbourhoods
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Communal banks at SEPAS usually start with a capital that equals the amount of 
the first individual loan (600 Bs)̂ * multiplied hy the number of members as all sodas 
receive simultaneous loans. Each soda’s individual loan can be invested in her business 
or in her home/family. This loan is given again in the next cycle and is increased if: 1) all 
previous credit has heen repaid; and 2) the rest of the members approve that loan.
The following is the lending process:
_________ Table 5.1. Lending Timeline o f a SEPAS Communal Bank_____________________________________
cle ’̂ Length of Cycle Amount loaned to Each Soda’*'̂
1 6 months Up to 600 Bs ($77 USD)
2 6 months Up to 900 Bs ($115 USD)
3 8 months Up to 1200 Bs ($154 USD)
4 8 months Up to 1500 Bs ($192 USD)
5 10 months Up to 1800 Bs ($230 USD)
6 10 months Up to 2100 Bs ($ 269 USD)
7 12 months Up to 2400 Bs ($ 308 USD)
8 12 months Up to 2700 Bs ($346 USD)
9 12 months No Credit. Support to the Communal 
Bank so it becomes Self-Sustainable
Source: Author’s Own Research.
One US dollar is equivaloaned to approximately 7.8 Bs. 
A cycle is the term o f the loan
This amount can vary a little according to each member
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The following is a comparative table of aspects of the SEPAS methodology 
versus that of BancoSol, the largest microfinance institution in Bolivia:
Table 5.2. Comparative Data on BancoSol’s and SEPAS’ Lending Programs
BancoSol





Individual within “Solidarity 
Group” of four to seven 
individuals
60%
Compulsory deposit, 5% of 
value of loan






Criteria for Loan Approval Existing business willing to 
________________________join solidarity group______
SEPAS Potosi
Monthly at group meeting in 
participants’ neighbourhoods
Individual within “Communal 
Banks” of 12 to 30 individuals
30% (or 2.5% per month)
None. But 0.5% compulsory 
savings returned to participant 
at the end of loan cycle
No
Yes. “Graduation” to a higher 
loan. Peer pressure.
No
Existing group willing to join 
communal bank
Source: M osley (1996: Table 10.2) plus Author’s Own Research.
SEPAS methodology is one that focuses on the follow-up and support of the 
women. Although payments are made once a month, meetings are carried out religiously 
every week. Each credit officer (3 in total) is responsible for 5 communal banks, 
meaning that she has a meeting with a caja every day of the week and sometimes on the 
weekends. This year SEPAS made the conscious decision to not accept more
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applications for new communal banks, as it realized that it would not have the same 
capacity of follow-up and presence in the villas with more than 15 cajas. FONCRESOL 
Potosf did not like this because it would mean that about a third of the capital destined to 
loans would sit idle without returns.
This projeet is a new process for both SEPAS and the communal banks, and as 
these cajas aim for financial sustainability in the 9* cycle, they are faced with many 
challenges. However, the experience has overall been considered a success, as default 
rates are less than 1% (the best default rate of all of FONCRESOL National’s lending 
programs), and the sodas are generally satisfied with the project.
5.3 The Study
5.3.1 Objectives of the Primary Study
Between July and December 2003, I coordinated an extensive baseline study for 
SEPAS Potosf. The study had three objectives:
• Collect statistical data on the participants that could then be made into a 
comprehensive database for future comparative studies
• Measure to what extent the specific objectives had been met
Provide evaluation tools for the follow-up and systematization of the project 
All the objectives of the study were met. However, the real essence of the 
evaluation project was that it was a pilot, a first step towards more comprehensive studies
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in future. In this sense, the study was very valuable because it laid out tools, 
methodologies and strategies for future evaluations.
5.3.2 Objectives of the Secondary Study
While carrying out the above research, 1 had questions of my own. These were 
beyond the requirements of the study and dealt more with the broader issues of 
microfinance. Therefore, as 1 conducted the research for SEPAS 1 also integrated my 
own research interests. Both SEPAS and FONCRESOL were aware of my secondary 
study and will both receive copies of this report. The purpose of this research was to 
determine the effect of the Yanapanaku project on poverty.
More specifically, 1 aimed to answer the following questions:
Does it meet participant demand?
Does it target the poorest of the poor?
Does it empower women?
Does it address macro structures that perpetuate poverty?
Does it reduce poverty in its broader definition?
5.3.3 Methodological Aspects
5.3.3.1 Detailed Description of Methodology
1 used both qualitative and quantitative research methods, through four techniques: 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, document analysis and surveys.
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The timeline of the research was the following:
Table 5.3. Research Timeline
Mid July and August September and October November Mid December
Research Design Implementation o f Interviews and Data transcription Creation o f a
Surveys and analysis comprehensive
ACCESS database
Attendance to two Participant Observation in 4 weekly Production o f with all statistical
meetings o f each o f Communal Bank meetings (36 Report for information
the 15 Communal meetings in total attended -  9 o f Primary Research
Banks (30 meetings in each Communal Bank)
total attended)
Participant observation: In the first month and a half of my fieldwork, I attended 
two meetings of each communal bank. This was done to get an idea of how the groups 
worked and the dynamics of the cajas. I was then able to pick four Communal Banks with 
differing characteristics, and for the next two months I carried out participant observation in 
these four groups. The fact that I attended these meetings for three and a half months, that I 
was myself Latin American and that I was a woman, allowed me to build trust with the 
sodas. However, this process took time as Bolivians are very reserved. I am certain that if 
my fieldwork would have been only a month or two, I would have not been able to obtain 
the information I wanted.
In a more subtle way I also carried out participant observation within SEPAS. I was 
constantly exposed to the organization's strategic planning, the implementation of its 
mandate, its interactions with participants and the interaction between staff. I was therefore
able to systematically observe and make notes on interactions, discourse, and events to 
complement the overall research.
Semi-structured interviews: I conducted semi-structured interviews with 24 of
SEPAS’ participants as well as 2 SEPAS and 1 FONCRESOL staff. I also conducted 
many informal interviews with experts and third parties. Interviews were by far the best 
way to obtain first-hand information from those directly involved with and affected by the 
cajas. Bolivian women are strong and intelligent, however, they are not very outspoken. It 
took a great deal of work and relationship-building to interview the sodas. I am grateful 
that they took the time from their busy lives, put aside their shyness and opened their 
thoughts to me.
Document Analysis: I have had much access to SEPAS’ and FONCRESOL’s
documents on their history, mission, mandate, and policies. As well, I had access to many 
memos, e-mails and letters exchanged during my stay, between the two organizations. I 
was also able to analyze the few data that SEPAS had on its participants.
Surveys: These were key in obtaining large amounts of statistical data on the 
economic and social circumstances of the sodas. My objective was to have an 80% 
sample, meaning, at least 240 women surveyed. Originally, I had planned on conducting 
individual and confidential self-administered surveys. However, it became very clear very 
soon that these surveys would not work for three reasons: 1) 20% of the women do not 
know how to read or write; 2) In one communal bank, the majority of the sodas spoke only 
Quechua; and 3) Those women who spoke Spanish and who could read and write still had
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difficulty filling out forms on their own. The only way a survey could be administered to a 
soda would be if the surveyer wrote the answers down herself. Because SEPAS wanted a 
large amount of information, the surveys were quite long'" and it was estimated that it 
would take about 30 minutes per soda. This meant at least 120 hours of survey work that 
the team just did not have."*̂  It was then decided to conduct the surveys in groups of four to 
eight sodas. They were then carried out in the regular meeting time of the communal bank 
so that the sodas did not take extra time away from their commitments. Depending on the 
size of the caja, the group was divided in three to five groups of four to five women. Each 
group had a surveyer (either a credit officer, a volunteer or myself). In this manner only 15 
surveys were carried out by each surveyer, each lasting between 2 and 3 hours.
The surveys proved to be an interesting experience in themselves. They worked 
well because a high level of trust was already established between the group members and 
so the sodas were not afraid to tell the truth about their incomes or other sensitive 
information. In fact, social control took place in some surveys, for example, in one 
instance a group pressured a woman who was overestimating her expenditures to tell the 
truth. The surveys also provided a space for women to tell stories, laugh and get to know 
each other more. As a surveyer, it was easy to grow impatient with the time it took to get 
the questions answered, but the realization that these group surveys were also allowing me 
to do participant observation helped me relax me quite a bit.
Eacti survey trad 76 questions. Please refer to the appendices to read a sample survey.
The survey team was integrated by myself, the 3 credit officers, who spoke Quechua, plus 3 part-time 
volunteers. However, most o f the team members, in particular the three credit officers were overloaded 
with other work and had very little time to work in this study.
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All the information gathered through the surveys was entered in an extensive 
ACCESS database created with the help of computer engineers. This database will give 
the organization access to the raw data. SEPAS will be able to produce monthly reports, 
analyze trends, do projections, searches and queries, and compare data.
Table 5.4. Summary o f Research Methods Used 
Quantitative Research Qualitative Research
241 surveys of all 15 communal banks • Participant observation of 4 communal
banks
• 21 semi-structured interviews with 
members of the 4 communal banks above
• 3 semi-structured interviews with SEPAS 
and FONCRESOL staff
• SEPAS and FONCRESOL Document
_______________________________________ analysis___________________
5.3.3.2 Methodological Challenges
Lack o f Baseline Data: The biggest challenge in carrying out this evaluation was 
the lack of statistical baseline data of the sodas. There was very little information 
collected on each soda at the formation of the cajas, and this information was never 
entered in a database, it was just left on paper. It was surprising to see that no data on 
income, capital, level of poverty, etc. was collected, only information pertaining to the 
identity of the soda, such as name, ID, address, age, name and ID of husband or relative, 
mother tongue, literacy, number of children; and information on her income-earning 
activity, amount borrowed, and destination of the credit. SEPAS had been meaning to
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collect broad statistical data that would then be accessed through a comprehensive 
database, but it had not had the human resources and the capacity to do it. In terms of 
evaluating a program, not having data to compare my results with, posed a challenged 
because I was not able to evaluate the impact of the program on aspects such as: the 
change in the level of income of the sodas, their access to health and education, their 
literacy, their intra-family relationships, etc. I just had my own data to work with. 
However, even if I would have had preliminary baseline data, the oldest cajas are only 
four years old, with the majority being two or three. This is a very short time to study the 
impact of a project, “you would need 5 to 10 years to determine the impact of the 
communal bank program, what we need now is a study of adjustment, something that 
would let us know if we are on the right t r a c k . I  am unsure of whether I would have 
been able to do a serious comparative study within a four-year span.
Measuring Poverty. Using the criteria of broader definitions of poverty, the 
information needed to determine the level of poverty of a household would be: income, 
illiteracy, malnutrition, life expectancy, maternal health, illness from preventable 
deceases, access to education and social exclusion. In my research, I was not able to 
obtain much health information such as life expectancy, maternal health and illness from 
preventable deceases. However, I did obtain data on access to health care, which I use as 
a proxy.
' Interview with SEPAS director Jaime Bejarano, August, 2003.
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Accuracy o f the Information-. Because most of the data obtained in this study came 
from the sodas themselves, either through interviews or surveys, I have assigned a high 
margin of error of 5%. For example, in one instance a soda told me she could read and 
write, however, when I handed her a form upside down, she did not notice and went on 
“reading.” In the same manner, other sodas may be inclined to lie about their income or 
destination of the credit, however, as explained above, I believe that much of this was 
deterred by group pressure to tell the truth in the surveys. In any case, it is important to 
be aware that not all answers given to a researcher’s questions are always truthful, and 
that it is necessary to build this into one’s analysis of the results.
5.3.4 Findings
The following section will describe in detail the findings of the evaluation with 
respect to the criteria laid out earlier on. I will first provide an overview of the target 
group and the communal banks for the better understanding of the results.
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5.3.4.1 The Target Group
“I ’m sitting in a room filled with Bolivian women and their children. They are beautiful 
and witty. They are self-confident in a quiet way. These are the women I  buy popcorn 
from in the street, the women that sell me orange juice and who do my laundry. These 
are the Cholitas. They are here, in this room, with their braids and their rugged hands, 
their missing teeth and silver earrings, their bowler hats and their big colourful skirts... 
behind those smiles there is insight, those eyes show intelligence and a lot o f patience; 
hardship lived with diligence and decorum.
• Who Are the Sodas and What do They Do?
There are approximately 300 participants in this program. 99.2% of them are 
women."*  ̂ The typical member of a SEPAS communal bank is between 25 and 46 years 
old (58%), married (69%), with children (95%) and literate (80%). Most likely she was 
not born in Potosf (60%), migrating from a rural area, but has lived in the city between 6 
and 20 years (58%).
The most common economic activities that the sodas carry out are: knitting 
(14%), sale of food and beverages in the street (10%), sale of clothes in street markets 
(8%) and small neighbourhood grocery stores (6%). Other activities are: sale of fruits 
and vegetables, sale of smuggled canned goods, sale of make-up, laundry and maid 
services, pluming, and hair dressing, among others."® These types of economic activities 
and their tiny capital of less than 500 Bs ($64 USD) (34%), indicate that these women
Participant Observation notes from August 2003.
There are 3 men that have been allowed to join the communal banks by their fellow members. 
However, none o f them attend the meetings, sending their female relatives in their place. “He does not like 
our yapping,” says a member of Buena Vista communal Bank, explaining why the male socio  does not 
attend the meetings (interview, Sept. 2003).
Over 60% o f the money borrowed goes to the .sodas income-generating activities. The rest is mostly 
used for house repairs and purchase o f household items.
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own very small business that operate within the informal sector, which is a perfect 
competition market (one in which supply is larger than demand, so there are many similar 
products and therefore, a high level of competition).
Chart 5.2. Income-Earning Activity



















Source: Author’s Own Research.
• What are Their Costs of Participating in the Project?
Time: Most sodas work between 21 and 50 hours a week in their economic 
activities (50%). 100% of them also work at home, doing household chores. For most 
sodas, this means working an additional 21 to 50 hours a week in their homes (40%). 
This results in a large percentage of the sodas working between 42 and 100 hours in total
(adding both work at home and economic activity) per week; leaving them with very little 
free time. Communal bank meetings are mandatory and mn weekly for about 3 hours. 
Sodas sacrifice income or time at home to attend these meetings, and they expect these to 
be fruitful and productive, but it is not always the case. In one interview, one of the 
sodas expressed; “A lot of times we meet to look at each other’s faces, we get bored 
without activities...”'*’ I also observed this phenomenon in many of the meetings 1 
attended as there were no structured or programmed activities. Most meetings (except for 
those when disbursements were made or payments collected) seemed more like social 
gatherings than credit meetings. Most women chatted, knitted, ate and took care of their 
children. There is a demonstrated need for free time and a space like this, however, as 
will be seen below, the sodas want much more training and much more activities for 
their time at the meetings to be really worth it.
' Anonymous interview with member o f the communal bank Nazareth, September 2003.
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Chart 5.3. W eekly Hours Worked at Home and in Economic Activity





Source: Author’s Own Research.
Interest. The most obvious cost for the socias of having a loan is the interest -  as 
well as other minor transaction costs. Interests rates in Bolivia are extremely high due 
to the volatile characteristics of the economy. Most commercial bank rates are between 
30% and 60%. The rates of FFPs and larger MFIs are usually about 60%. They can 
afford to have larger rates than the commercial banks because they do not require 
collateral for loans, therefore they have a higher demand for their products. SEPAS’ 
interest rate is then regarded as quite low at 30%. When asked if they thought the interest 
rate was good, too high, or too low, 70% of the socias answered that it was good.
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However, the majority insisted that it should not go up. SEPAS has a clear policy on this, 
it will keep its interest rate at 30% as long as it can.
Hidden costs o f loans: These are much harder to measure, however, they are 
present mainly in the form of pressure to repay the loan. This pressure usually comes 
from the group itself causing friction between the members and a high degree of stress to 
the borrowers. “Other moms'*  ̂have made us lose money. We have lost 100 Bolivianos 
from our internal account, Hilda and Fell have lost it. There are many moms that are very 
abusive and when you ask them [to repay] they get mad. Then everyone is quiet and they 
ask me to go and collect.”"*® For the borrower who owes money, her reputation, and the 
reputation of her husband, is at stake in the neighbourhood.
5.3.4.2 The Dynamics of a Communal Bank
Each one of the fifteen Yanapanaku communal banks has particular 
characteristics. Some groups are small and very active, while others are larger and 
disengaged. Some groups have a religious character in addition to the credit, while others 
clearly meet just because of the loans. However different each communal bank may be, 
overall they share some aspects in common. The first is that all the members of a 
communal bank are neighbours. They all live in the same villa, have been to each other 
houses for weddings and baptisms; they have usually been in previous groups together
'** Most o f the socias refer to their fellow socias as moms. As they were originally part o f mother’s groups, 
where mothers gathered and received milk for their children and educational health talks from the 
government. The government stopped running these groups in the 90s.
Anonymous interview with the treasurer o f the communal bank La Pastoral, September 2003.
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and know the circumstances of each other really well. It is this which allows them to join 
in a group together and guarantee each other’s loans. Secondly, they meet every week 
religiously. Some groups meet at one of the sodas' house, others meet at schools or 
churches or any other locales in the neighbourhood loaned to them by the priest or local 
leader.
Thirdly, all groups carry out fundraising activities and save the proceedings in 
their internal accounts. Most of these activities take the form of cooking meals for the 
meetings: each soda takes a turn in cooking a meal which she then sells to the other 
socias for one or two Bolivianos. This is a form of mandatory savings that the groups 
have developed. Another form of fundraising is cooking or selling arts and crafts at fairs 
or special events organized by SEPAS. The money saved in the internal account is often 
used to lend to members with an interest rate of 3%, to buy wholesale supplies such as 
flour, sugar, pasta, etc; and to buy the socias Christmas, birthday and mother’s day 
presents.
I always found meetings fascinating, even when the socias did not have much to 
do; there was always a decision to make, food to eat a lot of laughter. Throughout my 
attendance to different group meetings I witnessed the dramatic dismissal of a member of 
the group, the support given to a soda who had just been beaten and left by her 
husband,^" and even a severe seizure of a member to whom I had to perform first aid. Of 
course, not all meetings were this intense, but I was able to see and partake in a lot
’ He took with him their two children and the computer she had bought with the credit money.
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throughout the four months of my fieldwork. I also became very close with several 
groups.
Communal banks exist both because they offer credit to its members and because 
they offer them a space where they can be themselves, where they can chat, fight, plan, 
cry and laugh in a safe environment. These groups would not exist if there were not a 
form of incentive or economic gain (the credit); in this sense much of the benefit form 
these groups for the women is well beyond that of the credit.
5.3.4.3 Results with Regard to Criteria
The research question: What are the effects o f microfinance carried out by a 
poverty approach organization? can only be answered through the close observation of 
the SEP AS project with regard to specific criteria. These criteria, as established earlier 
on, are my own, based on a broader definition of poverty, on Woller’s analysis of the 
failure of microfinance and on Schreiner’s framework of outreach.
In this section I have formulated the criteria as questions that I will attempt to answer 
with empirical data. The idea behind this is that I can use the data as a proxy to the 
criteria. Sometimes the data comes from the statistical study, others from the information 
obtained from the interviews with the sodas and the institutions staff, and others, from 
participant observation and the analysis of the institutions’ documents.
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1) Meeting Participant Demand
a. Does it provide financial services in addition to credit, such as savings?
Yes. SEPAS communal banks offer two types of savings services. First, each 
soda  is required to pay 0.5% in addition to the 2.5% monthly interest. This 0.5% is a 
form of mandatory savings that is then returned to the soda at the end of her stay with the 
caja. The majority of sodas (92%) think that mandatory savings should continue, which 
demonstrates their interest in increasing their capital not only through debt but also 
through their own contributions. The second way that communal banks provide savings 
is through group savings. All sodas carry out fundraising activities and the money 
collected from these goes into an internal savings account of the group. The purpose of 
this account is that eventually it will grow to a certain amount that will allow the 
communal bank to carry out its own lending program. However, many of the sodas do 
not share this long-term vision with SEPAS and would prefer that this amount be divided 
and distributed evenly among members at the end of each cycle.
b. Does it provide services that are not too costly for the poor ( i.e. low interest rates, 
etc.)?
Yes. As mentioned earlier on, SEPAS’ interest rate is among the lowest in the
market and the sodas are aware of this. One soda said, “I used to take a credit with
PRODEM but both the loan and the interest are in dollars, so my sister told me about this
group and I decided to join in, the interest rate here is much better and is in Bolivianos.” '̂
She makes a good point: both the loan and the interest in SEPAS are in the national
currency, which is better for the borrowers because they do not have to worry about
devaluation. Other transaction costs of getting a loan are absorbed by SEPAS, as the 
Interview with member o f communal bank La Pastoral, August 2003.
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institution allows the women to photocopy all their documents, type letters and print for 
free in its office. In terms of the amount loaned, 65% of the sodas believe this amount is 
good, however a large percentage of women (30%) would like larger loans.
2) Service Provision to the Poorest of the Poor
a. Does it give credit to the poorest women for commercial activities or for life 
investments?
No. SEPAS provides loans to women that live just below the poverty line.^' It 
purposely seeks to do this because it believes that credit will be of more help to the less 
poor. The average income^^ of the women in the program is $654 USD per year, which is 
less than a $100 lower than the average of the Municipal District No. 12 ($730).
The World Bank provides two poverty lines, the first is the original $1 dollar per person per day. The 
second, $2.16 dollars per person per day is a new estimate created in 2001 (World Bank, 2001). According 
to the World Bank, this second standard reflects a higher estimate of the extent o f poverty (Chen & 
Ravallion, 2003:7) and therefore it is the one I choose to use for this project because I believe it better 
conveys the level o f poverty in the country. According to this measure, the poverty line is $769, therefore 
the average income o f the so d a s  is $115 less than the poverty line.
Their total household income (which includes the income o f the soda , plus the income o f her spouse 
and/or any other income-earning family member, plus any other income from rent, etc.) is $1,656 USD per 
year. However, I will use p er person  measurements o f income in order to standarize my figures to those of 
the INE and the World Bank (who use per person  figures).
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Chart 5.4. Monthly Income o f the Socias




































Source: Author’s Own Research.
b. Does it provide savings, non-cash loans, and non-financial products such as training 
to the poorest participants?
No. SEPAS does not provide savings or non-cash loans to the poorest of the 
poor. It does have a comprehensive program of technical support and legal aid for the 
rural population, who are the poorest. '̂* However, these services are outside of the project 
Yanapanaku.
‘ As mentioned in Ch 3, 95% of the rural population lives under the poverty line.
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3) Empowerment of Women
a. Does it ensure women control their loans?
No. SEPAS has no mechanisms in place to ensure that the loans are controlled by 
the women. It is widely regarded among the socias that their loans are an important 
contribution to their families, yet, all the economic decisions are made by the male family 
member (husband, father, brother or eldest son). “My husband told me to get the loan 
because it would help us buy parts for the g a r a g e . . . s a i d  one soda in an interview 
illustrating how the decision to get a loan was made by the male relative.
In 64% of the cases the loans were invested in the soda's income earning activity. 
The remainder 36% was split between family expenditures (house repairs, children's 
schooling) and husband's/male relative's business. This suggests that in many cases 
women were channelling credit to their husbands/male relatives, having no control over 
their loans.
b. Does it train women in economic, legal, social and family aspects/issues?
No. Although this has been one of SEPAS’ more important objectives, it has not 
been successful in carrying it out extensively and systematically. 63% of the socias have 
received some type of training, however almost half of this group received training only 
in their very first loan cycle. An interesting finding is that although SEPAS has wanted 
to focus on economic and social training, most of the actual training that has been given 
has been on arts and crafts by request of the women.
’ Anonymous interview with member o f communal bank Virgen de Urkupina, September 2003.
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Chart 5.5. Types of Training
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99% of the socias surveyed said they wanted more training, in particular in arts
and crafts.
Chart 5.6. Type o f Training Wanted
Kinds of Training W anted by th e  Socias
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Source: Author’s Own Research
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c. Does it encourage women to participate in their communities?
No. 64% of socias participate in their neighborhood committees, however only 
5% of them are part of the directives of these. Only two communal banks participate 
actively in their neighborhood committees but do not carry out concrete work or projects 
in common. 58% of the socias who are not involved, said that they would like to 
participate actively. SEPAS has not been able to work with these women towards 
participation.
d. Does it support women in the start-up o f new microenterprises?
No. Although the ultimate goal of the SEPAS project is to support the creation of 
microenterprises, the institution has not developed a specific plan of how to achieve this. 
Perhaps the reason is that its communal hanks are still relatively new, the oldest groups 
being in their fourth cycle.
e. Does it provide a space where they can network, discuss family problems and 
strate gize?
Yes. This is by far the aspect in which the communal bank methodology excels. 
A soda in her fourth cycle says: “I am part of a communal bank because we share and we 
help each other; I trust that if something happened and I needed support I would be 
helped. We go to the meetings because we get bored at home working or being with our 
husband and children; going to the meetings helps us forget for a little bit about our 
worries: in the meetings with talk, we laugh, it’s good for our health.”^̂
As I have stated before, the meetings are a legitimate space where the women 
provide support networks to each other.
’ Anonymous interview with member of communal bank Buena Vista, August 2003.
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f. Does it provide child-care services when the women are in meetings?
No. This has not been discussed within SEPAS. However, most women showed 
interest in having some form of childcare, which could perhaps earn income for the 
group. For example, at every meeting one or two socias could care for the children of the 
rest and receive a small pay that could either go back to the internal account or be kept by 
the child minders.
4) Social Change Agent
a. Does it share a progressive and socially driven philosophy with its participants?
Yes. SEPAS sees credit as part of a holistic framework driven towards social 
change. This vision and identity is shared with its participants.
b. Does it provide legal aid and educational workshops?
Yes. Free legal aid is provided to the socias. As well, outside of the Yanapanaku 
project, SEPAS has an extensive training program for neighborhood leaders and farmers, 
and it provides free legal aid to all its participants.
c. Does it carry out macro-economic market studies that would help the participants 
better choose their economic activities?
No, but the organization plans to carry out these studies in the coming months as
it has determined that in order to assist the women with the start-up of microenterprises it
needs to find out the characteristics of the markets for the products that the socias would
want to sell.
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d. Does it stress the solidarity aspect o f the loans (group lending) as opposed to an
individualistic market driven approach to credit?
Yes. Although loans are made to individuals within groups, it is the groups that
are viewed as the key players. Each group has its own identity, all decisions are made 
democratically and the role of the credit officers is stressed to be as that of facilitators of 
the group process. The group lending methodology is inherent to the philosophy of 
SEPAS.
5) Poverty Reduction in the Broader Sense
a. Does it raise income?
Because I did not have previous data to which to compare my current information 
to I cannot categorically answer this question. However, when asked if the credit had 
improved their economic situation, 97% of the socias answered yes. It is hard to tell 
whether this improvement was a real increase in income or a perceived betterment in their 
economic well being from a temporary increase in their capital. It is my belief that in this 
experience income did go up because the majority of the socias invested their loans in 
their own businesses, instead of using them for consumption purposes. The question that 
remains unanswered is by how much did their income increase.
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b. Does it improve other aspects o f poverty such as literacy, malnutrition, life 
expectancy, access to health and education, social exclusion, etc?
Once again, this question cannot be answered properly with my data. However, I
would expect an increase in income to increase the soda’s access to education and health
for her children; therefore, having a positive effect on malnutrition and the life
expectancy of herself and her family. I did have baseline data on illiteracy that I was able
to compare with the current data; I found that the project has no impact on the literacy
level of its participants.
6) Long-Term Project
a. Does it have a long-term vision and planning?
Yes. The Yanapanaku project finished last year its first four years of operation 
and it is now entering a second phase that will also last four years. In this second phase, 
the project is beginning to rethink its objectives in the sense that it wants a clearer 
direction and strategy.
b. Is it financially stable?
Yes. The SEPAS run Yanapanaku project began with a loan of $50,000 USD. 
From this amount, only a third was invested in the portfolio for the communal banks, the 
rest was left to earn interest. The third that is loaned to the communal banks earns an 
interest of about $5,000 UDS per year. This income is spent on one full-time staff and on
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administration costs related to the project such as workshops, correspondence, telephone, 
transportation, etc.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to bring to life the setting in which the study took 
place, as well as the characteristics of all the actors involved. I have then highlighted the 
main findings of the study, based on the criteria established earlier on. These findings 
illustrate those things that SEPAS does well, and those that need improvement in order to 
deliver a more effective project. It is my hope that in the next chapter I will be able to 
bring it all together and draw some lessons from this experience that will contribute to the 





If last chapter was the heart of the study, this chapter is the brain. It is here that 1 
will attempt to analyze the findings with relationship to my criteria and answer my 
research question. I will first explore the findings by criterion, then, I will bring it all 
together and draw some conclusions that can be linked to microfinance at the grand scale.
6.2 Analysis of Findings
The purpose of this study is to determine the overall effect that a small poverty 
oriented project has on its participants. The rationale for answering this question is to 
learn from SEPAS’ experience: once determined which practices work and which do not 
in the project, it will be possible to draw out some insight towards the debate of the 
effects of microfinance on poverty in general. The following criteria were designed based 
on a broader definition of poverty, on Woller’s analysis of the failure of microfinance and 
on Schreiner’s framework of outreach.
6.2.1 On Meeting Participant Demand
On a basic level, the Yanapanaku project meets demand in two ways. First, it 
provides savings services in addition to credit, and second, it provides financial services
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at a below-the-market price. However, moving beyond the services it offers, it can be 
seen that there is a further demand for savings that it is not being met. The first is 
mandatory individual savings. Currently, socias pay 0.5% of their loans per month into 
an individual mandatory savings account. This account remains untouched until the 
soda  retires from the group; for example, if she has been in the communal bank for four 
cycles borrowing the usual amounts, she will receive 150 Bolivianos (about $20 USD). 
The socias are aware that every month they contribute to a savings account, however, 
they are unaware of the exact percentage, usually confusing 0.5% with 5%. When told 
the right percentage, many socias seemed disappointed and quite upset because they 
thought the percentage was a lot larger. 92% of the socias like the idea of mandatory 
savings as they think that otherwise they would not put aside the money spending it on 
minor things, however, the majority of this percentage wishes that the savings to interest 
ratio was higher. Many suggested that it should be 1% savings, 2% interest per month as 
opposed to 0.5% savings, 2.5% interests per month (the way it is now).
The second savings service that does not fully meet demand is the group savings, 
or internal account. This money is shared by the group and collected through group 
fundraising activities. SEPAS views this money as a group investment that will allow the 
communal bank to lend, in the future, to its own members as well as to outside 
community members, or to start a business.^’ Because the idea is that the capital of the 
communal bank needs to grow, SEPAS only allows the money in this account to be
SEPAS is not fully clear yet on the methodology to be used in future loans, but most likely it would lend 
small amounts towards income-generating activities on either a group or individual basis.
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invested in fundraising activities or to be loaned to members (both being income 
generating activities) with the purpose that by the time the 9* cycle comes, the capital 
will be significant enough to lend or to start a microenterprise. On the other hand, given 
the volatile economic reality of the majority of the women in the cajas, more value is 
placed by these rational economic actors on the short to medium term rather than on the 
uncertain long term; therefore, many of them believe that the money in the internal 
account should be divided evenly among all members at the end of each cycle.
While in the first case (individual savings) there is a discrepancy between what 
the socias want and what SEPAS is economically able to do (SEPAS cannot afford an 
interest lower than 2.5%), the second case presents a point of divergence between the 
SEPAS vision and that of its borrowers. In the first case, SEPAS can attempt to meet 
demand through an increase in the mandatory savings rate, say to 1%, while it maintains 
the interest rate at 2.5%, as it might prove possible for the socias to pay a higher total 
percentage if they place more value on the savings they will have at the end of the cycle, 
than on the extra money ‘lost’ monthly. However, in the second case, what SEPAS 
wants and what the socias want is different. SEPAS wants the long-term commitment of 
the women to turn their communal banks into income generating organizations in three to 
four years. The women want to receive their share now of their fundraising activities. 
This is a matter hard to reconcile. The socias follow the policies of SEPAS because they 
want access to affordable credit, however they envision something else for the money that
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they have. There seems to be then, in this case, a power-relationship between SEPAS and 
its borrowers, in which SEPAS “knowing what is best for the socias” imposes its will.
In spite of these tensions, SEPAS does meet basic participant demand in that it 
provides savings in addition to credit and in that both services are affordable and below 
market prices. What it needs to do now is improve on its methodology so it can 
appropriately reconcile its vision with the needs and wants of its participants.
6.2.2 On Targeting the Poorest of the Poor
Before discussing this aspect I need to re-state the difference between SEPAS and 
Yanapanaku. SEPAS is the NGO that administers Yanapanaku, the microfinance project. 
In this study I only evaluate the project Yanapanaku and SEPAS’ action within it, but not 
SEPAS as an organization. Obviously, the vision of SEPAS deeply influences the 
project, however, some activities carried out by SEPAS in other of its areas may not be 
part of Yanapanaku.
The project certainly targets the less poor. However, it does not target the poorest 
of the poor. Here is where the above differentiation is relevant: While SEPAS carries out 
projects that target the rural poor and the ultra poor, it does not undertake this within 
Yanapanaku. This is important because according to my criteria, for a microfinance 
project to be effective it needs to target both types of poor. It is interesting to look once 
more at the main objective of project: To improve the conditions of life and income of the 
poorest families of Potosi, and spearhead economic and productive activities. This
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objective implies that it should reach the poorest borrowers, but why does it not? There 
are two main reasons; First, the ultra poor are a lot more vulnerable to external shocks 
that compromise their ability to repay within a set schedule, therefore they are not able to 
join a group where payments are made religiously every month, and even if they join 
them, they leave after one or two cycles. All those who have defaulted in the project 
have had total incomes less than $450 USD per year (the average income of the socias is 
$654 USD per year), which illustrates the positive relationship between higher poverty 
levels and default rates in a project that does not have an effective support system for the 
poorest. In this context, the poorest of the poor do not benefit from a loan the way the 
less poor do, if anything, they become highly indebted and even more vulnerable. The 
second main reason why Yanapanaku does not reach the poorest participants is because 
the members of the communal banks exclude their poorer neighbours. When a communal 
bank is formed, it is usually integrated by a group of friends who know each other well 
and trust in each other’s capacities to repay; they then expand the group recruiting 
suitable members. Some of their requirements are that the soda be married and that she 
owns her home. These requirements are not of SEPAS’ liking (who claims to have an 
open entrance policy) but because the institution attempts to empower the group by 
allowing it to make its own decisions on membership, etc., it does not interfere in the 
membership selection process. It can be said then that the communal banks are biased 
against the very poor because of concerns about their creditworthiness.
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In addition to these two main forms of exclusion of the very poor, the project also 
excludes them through certain practices. First, Yanapanaku operates solely in an urban 
area of Potosi, where the concentration of the very poor is a lot smaller than in the rural 
areas.^* In this sense, the project is choosing to target less poor urban borrowers. 
Secondly, and more important, Yanapanaku does not have a set policy on the urban 
poorest of the poor. It seems that the project is willing to work with the very poor but 
does not have the resources to design a lending methodology that may be best suited for 
this group.
6.2.3 On Empowering Women
The project’s discourse is one on economic empowerment of women, through 
their integration into the labour market. In this sense, the project equates empowerment 
with increased access to resources as the result of an increase in income. Although the 
project also incorporates ideas on intra-family gender relations, self-esteem, and 
leadership, it has not been able to translate them into action. My perception on
the project’s approach is that it does not have a clearly formulated policy on gender 
(beyond some statements in its proposal), confusing poverty reduction with the 
empowerment of women. The project, and its staff, has a clear notion that women are 
marginalized economically, however there is no acknowledgement that women are 
marginalized in their households as well. For example, as mentioned earlier, there was a
' However, FONCRESOL operates in the rural area.
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case of a soda who was severely beaten by her husband, who then left her and took their 
children with him. Although emotional support was provided to her at the communal 
bank meeting followed by legal aid to help her get her children back, there was no further 
reflection on the issue. The opportunity was not taken to carry out an in-depth workshop 
on family violence, or on mother’s rights. Furthermore, her case was seen as an isolated 
unique scenario that was out of the ordinary, instead of acknowledging that family 
violence is a reality for a large percentage of Bolivian women.
The SEPAS project staff does not have knowledge of the current debates in the 
field with relation to women’s empowerment and, therefore it is not aware of issues such 
as; targeting women because of their higher repayment rate, the aspect of who controls 
the loans, women’s economic coping mechanisms, aspects of women’s participation, etc. 
This leads SEPAS to operationalize its own blurry interpretation of women 
empowerment. However, even in practice the project does not meet its own objectives. 
For example, a main objective of Yanapanaku is to train women in economic and social 
aspects such as: accounting, business administration, community leadership, identity and 
self-esteem, health, among others. But somehow it has strayed from these topics and 
focused on arts and crafts. The project staff admits that they have not invested the time 
and the resources to develop useful, participative and valuable workshops on these topics 
and that it has been a lot easier for them to hire arts and crafts teachers to teach the 
women how to paint, sew, and knit. The main problem with this is that once again the 
identity of the project is undefined. The project states as its main objective to spearhead
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economic and productive activities, but painting, sewing and knitting are hardly income 
generating activities. Only 20% of the socias that paint, sew, and knit, do it as an 
economic activity and the majority of this percentage does it as a secondary or 
complementary activity, because, as they express, these activities do not bring enough 
income. Training in these activities is valuable for the women in that it allows a space for 
personal growth, relaxation and self-esteem building; however, if SEPAS continues to 
deliver this training it will have to change its objective from spearheading economic 
activity to spearheading leisure activities. The majority of women, when asked what kind 
of training they wanted to receive, said that they wanted more training on arts and crafts. 
This reflects, once again, a discrepancy between what SEPAS wants and what the 
participants want. But perhaps in this case some of the arts and crafts training could 
continue while other social, economic and technical training are incorporated into the 
program. SEPAS is aware of this and has placed economic and social training as a 
priority for this next phase.
Another objective that SEPAS needs to look closely at is that of supporting 
microenterprises. This is something that it should have begun working on about a year 
ago; however, it has been hard for the institution to design a plan of action since it is not 
its area of expertise. It has then left it for the second phase of the project but it is still 
uncertain on how to go about carrying it out. For the moment it has designed a macro 
economic market study to determine which products are profitable and which not; it plans 
on undertaking this study in the first semester of this year.
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The two most valuable things that the project does towards the real empowerment 
of women are: informally training women to assume leadership roles and providing them 
with a space to express themselves, participate and network. Being part of a communal 
bank is in itself an empowering experience for its members. The women jointly manage 
their finances and make all the important decisions in the caja. Every cycle a new 
directive is elected providing opportunities to all socias to be part of the board. Women 
learn leadership and public speaking skills and they develop their facilitating and team 
building skills. They learn to manage their internal account through basic accounting 
methods and sharpen their business management skills through investment decisions, etc. 
Several cajas have treasurers who do not know how to read and write, however, they 
have proved very competent in carrying out their appointed tasks.
I have discussed in several sections of this document the value of the space that 
the communal banks provide for their members. I will not repeat myself. In summary, 
while SEPAS views this project as one for the empowerment of women, it does so for the 
wrong reasons: income generation and training. While the credit seems to have a positive 
effect on the sodas' income, the project has failed in supporting them in their business 
endeavours, in the same way that it has not provided adequate training. However, 
whether planned or unexpectedly, the project has been very successful in empowering 
women through capacity building and support networks.
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6.2.4 On Social Change
SEPAS’ vision is “to promote human dignity and rights through its support of 
grassroots organizations, so that people can lead their own destiny in a more just world” 
(SEPAS, 2003). The institution has a very progressive mandate driven towards social 
transformation by providing spaces for the people to empower themselves and effect 
change at a macro level. SEPAS, as a church organization, is heavily influenced by the 
religious principles of social justice, peace, equality, etc. but it does not impose its 
religious beliefs on its participants and partners. Yanapanaku is a poverty reduction 
project that certainly shares the institution’s vision. In this sense, it views credit only as 
part of a bigger strategy for social change. Although it still needs to improve its 
methodologies, Yanapanaku aims at reducing poverty not just through the provision of 
loans, but also through training and education, encouraging participation, supporting 
microenterprises, stimulating the group process, and providing spaces for women to 
network and learn skills. Credit provision is only a part of this.
6.2.5 On Poverty Reduction
SEPAS’s view of poverty is broad. It sees it as the result of macro and 
international economic, social and political structures as well as endogenous conditions. 
It does not share the economistic definition of poverty of most of the organizations that 
work in the field (such as FONCRESOL) and therefore, as pointed out above, it does not 
see credit as the only tool for poverty reduction. SEPAS’ main problem is translating this
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view into action within Yanapanaku, and this is the key area in which it needs to build its 
capacity as an institution. According to the sodas' subjective perception, the project is 
doing one thing very well: its credit methodology and delivery work towards income 
increase. The project provides small loans at low interest rates with a long time for 
repayment and an open policy on loan use. This allows the sodas to receive a small 
capital that they can invest in their small businesses, without compromising their ability 
to pay it back. As one socia explains, “this credit is helping a lot of people, a lot of 
people that have very little; they can take a loan, buy a couple of things, sell them, pay 
back the loan and get a bigger loan, and so on so forth, this way they can build their little 
houses and move forward in life..."^^ This perception that the credit helps one ‘move 
forward’ in life is shared by 97% of socias, who believe that the credit has helped them 
improve their economic situation. It is harder to measure the impact of credit on other 
aspects of poverty such as illiteracy, malnutrition, life expectancy, access to health and 
education, and social exclusion. In terms of illiteracy, I did have baseline information on 
it and I was able to compare the before-and-after rate; this rate of 80% literacy in the 
client group did not change. A few socias (2% of total surveyed) suggested receiving 
literacy courses as part of the training, specially since the project has such a long term life 
span that would allow it to take the time needed to teach people how to read and write; 
SEPAS has received this idea positively and is exploring the possibility of implementing 
it this year. It was hard to measure health indicators such as malnutrition, life expectancy
’ Anonymous interview with a member of communal bank Buena Vista, September, 2003.
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and access to medical services. First, I lacked baseline data on these. Second, I was only 
able to measure access to health but not malnutrition or life expectancy. All the women 
in the project have a medical insurance provided by the government that covers their 
children’s vaccinations and other basic medical expenditures. However, they have to pay 
for their own medical needs; most women rely on home remedies and traditional 
medicine for their ailments, spending very little per year on health (under 100 Bolivianos 
on average). This information does not tell much about whether the credit has improved 
their access to health services or not. However, it would be expected that an increase in 
income would cause an increase in access to medical care. In terms of social exclusion, it 
can be said that this and other microfinance projects have provided a space for the ample 
participation of the poor in financial activity, making the poor important economic actors 
in the country.
It is unfortunate that SEPAS does not have baseline information in order to carry 
out a comparative study on the effect of the credit on income and other aspects of 
poverty. However, being in the project is regarded by the vast majority of the socias as a 
very positive experience. When asked if SEPAS should keep the project one socia said: 
“I would keep this program because people need it, because nobody else wants to give us 
cash. With this loan, people move forward, without this loan we wouldn’t be able to do 
anything...” "̂ Another socia added: “SEPAS should keep it, especially for new people 
and for those who live outside of district 12. They should keep it for those who need the
’ Anonymous interview with member of communal bank Nazareth, September 2003.
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money, the poor people, not for those who make a lot because the banks approve their 
loans. They should keep it for those who need the money and can only put their work as 
collateral.. .”®‘ Both responses hint at the value of credit as a poverty reduction tool.
6.2.6 On Long-Term Planning
SEPAS has worked in Potosi for over twenty years, and Yanapanaku is on its 
fourth year, planning on operating for another four. It is safe to assume that the 
institution has a plan for the project for the long-term. Financially speaking, although the 
project is stable, it barely covers its expenses. If it plans on extending its training 
component it will need to find extra sources of funding. Another financial aspect in 
question is the issue of how to use the money that is not being loaned to the socias (about 
two thirds of the 50,000). According to FONCRESOL, SEPAS is wasting a good 
investment opportunity by letting the money sit in the bank. FONCRESOL believes that 
SEPAS should use this amount in loans so that the money can earn a higher interest rate 
that what it currently makes in the bank. In this sense, FONCRESOL thinks that SEPAS 
should either increase the amount of money loaned to the current socias and/or increase 
the number of communal banks that it has. SEPAS wants to do neither. It believes that it 
does not have the institutional capacity to increase its number of communal banks and 
that the socias benefit the most with small loans and not larger ones. This ongoing 
debate clearly illustrates the debate in the field between the self-sustainability approach
Anonymous interview with member of communal bank La Pastoral, August 2003.
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and the poverty approach. FONCRESOL prioritizes breadth and scope of outreach, 
while SEPAS favours depth.
My main recommendation for the project is that it defines its lines of action more 
clearly. It needs to answer questions such as:
• Is it a poverty reduction or a women’s empowerment project? Or both? What would it 
mean to be either?
• How does it feel about the participation and decision-making power of its borrowers? 
Is it willing to sacrifice its objectives (such as long-term group savings, and training 
on social and economic aspects) for the real wants of its participants, therefore 
changing its original objectives? Or, does it believe that the participants should 
comply with its requirements since they would, in the end, benefit more this way than 
if they determined themselves the project lines?
• Is there space and interest in the project for microenterprise creation? Does the project 
have the capacity to promote and support these?
How much time and resources does the project want to invest on training and 
education? In which areas is it going to train the socias!
As I have mentioned earlier, the project is entering an important phase in which 
the communal banks are maturing and begin to ask “and now what?’’ Although the cajas 
have their own identities, I sensed that a deeper group identity is missing and perhaps this 
may be the reflection of the lack of a clear vision of the project in general. It is necessary
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that SEP AS define clearly its vision for the future and that it works with this vision in 
mind. Furthermore, a project cannot have a vision without having a strategy on how to 
accomplish it. This project needs to rework its proposal and design, not only activity 
timelines, but also expected results matrices, verifiable indicators, means of verification, 
risk analysis, inputs, etc. Once such strategic plan is designed in consensus, it must be 
followed closely, adhering to dates and using it as a reference during the 
operationalization of the project.
6.3 Bringing it all Together
The case study of SEP AS, a small poverty oriented NGO, and its microfinance 
project Yanapanaku, has been enlightening in understanding some of the real-life 
dynamics of microfinance. The effect of the project on its participants has been generally 
positive, providing low cost financial services to women with small business, giving them 
a space where they can network and develop leadership and administrative skills, sharing 
with them a progressive and socially driven philosophy, and raising their income. 
Some of the challenges that the project faces are: expanding its savings services, reaching 
the poorest of the poor, ensuring that the women control their loans, providing training on 
economic and social aspects, and defining its own long-term vision and identity.
Thinking in terms of the most important debates in the literature, the three main 
issues discussed are: the ability of microfinance to reach the poorest, to empower women, 
and to reduce poverty. The findings from this study suggest that microfinance, poverty
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oriented, does not reach the poorest of the poor, has a limited impact on women’s 
empowerment and other social aspects, but has, as perceived by the participants, a 
positive effect on their economic lives. How does this translate into an overall impact on 
poverty? Using the broader definition of poverty, one that incorporates measurements of 
material well-being, capabilities and social exclusion, it can be said that microfinance has 
a limited effect on poverty reduction but that it has intrinsic value for the poor; and that it 
has a real potential, if carried out in a certain manner, to have a much greater impact.
Microfinance’s approach should be people centred, attempting to meet the needs 
of the poor. It should meet participant demand, providing low cost financial services 
beyond credit. It should target and reach both the less poor and the poorest of the poor, 
effectively impacting the later. It should empower women ensuring that they control 
most or all of their loans; training them in social and economic aspects such as family 
violence, nutrition, accounting, collective ownership, community leadership, etc; 
encouraging them to participate in their neighbourhoods and communities; supporting 
their microenterprises to ensure income generation; and, providing support in the form of 
a safe and comfortable space where women can discuss issues important to them and 
develop networks and strategies. It should hold a holistic view of credit that incorporates 
capacity building, supports the group process through an emphasis on solidarity credit 
(group lending), and generally works towards social change. It should have a 
demonstrated positive impact on the level of poverty of those it targets and help to 
improve, directly or indirectly, other aspects of its participants’ poverty such as literacy,
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malnutrition, access to health and education and social exclusion. And finally, it needs to 
have a long-term vision and a strategic plan with clear objectives, as well as be 
financially stable.
The key issue is the perception and interpretation of the purpose of microfinance 
by international donors, implementing institutions and some authors in the field. Those 
within the self-sustainability approach view microfinance as an effective poverty 
alleviation tool. But their criteria of what effective means derive from a supply side 
perspective, as opposed to a demand side one. This means that they see microfinance as 
the best poverty alleviation tool there is, based on limited funding as the main criterion. 
Because of the diminishing funds in the international aid industry there is a push for cost- 
effective development activities and microfinance is seen as the most cost-effective 
development tool (although authors such as Mosley have proved that this is not always 
the case - Mosley, 1999). So, from the supply side or institutional needs analysis, 
microfinance is the best activity to carry out in order to alleviate poverty. However, 
viewed from a demand side criterion, that of the poverty approach, microfinance is not 
the best poverty alleviation tool; at best, it is one of many tools for poverty reduction. 
Trough this perspective one can see how, as Matin et al. point out, microfinance meets 
most of the financial needs of the poor but does not meet other social needs (Matin et al., 
2002). Therefore, microfinance needs to be accompanied by other development 
strategies, strategies that may prove to be less cost-effective than microfinance but better 
suited to meet the demands of the poor. Microfinance has intrinsic value in itself in that
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it provides an important service valued by the poor, and therefore it should continue to 
exist and improve. However innovations in the field need to be made according to the real 
needs and wants of the poor and not according to institutional needs or the market.
The important players and thinkers in the field need to shift their view on 
microfinance. They need to stop seeing its purpose as ‘providing financial services to as 
many people as possible using the least amount of funding’ and change it to ‘providing 
financial services that are valued and needed by the poor and that will result in a real 
improvement in their lives.’
6.4 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this study was to determine the effects of a small poverty oriented 
microfinance project on its participants, in order to draw some insight on the more 
general effect of microfinance on poverty. I carried out a five-month evaluation of the 
activities of a small NGO that works in the poorest city of Bolivia and targets about 300 
urban poor women. This evaluation was both qualitative (participant observation, semi­
structured interviews and document analysis) and quantitative (surveys). I then 
constructed a framework for evaluation based on six criterions: meeting participant 
demand, reaching the less poor, empowering women, reducing poverty in its broader 
sense, striving for social change, and having a long-term vision. With this criteria I was 
able to assess the activities and outcomes of the project, coming to the conclusion that, in 
this case, microfinance, poverty oriented, does not reach the poorest of the poor, has a
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limited impact on women’s empowerment and other social aspects, but has, as perceived 
by the participants, a positive effect on their economic lives. As mentioned in the 
beginning of the study, I did not expect one project to meet all these criteria and I would 
like to commend the work of SEP AS for its achievements.
This study had several limitations, for example, I only studied one microfinance 
project instead of comparing two or more, which would have allowed me to have a 
broader vision of the subject. Second, I did not have baseline data that would enable me 
to assess the ‘before’ and ‘after’ situation of the participants. Finally, my fieldwork only 
lasted five months, while some of the most influential studies in the field take several 
years to complete. However, I see the real value of this study as that of ground laying 
work that has helped build the capacity of the institution, as well as drawing important 
insight from a small microfinance NGO that will hopefully be useful to further studies in 
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economica?
8 N 8 N 8 N 8 N 8 N 8 N 8 N 8 N
Que le parece ios montes dei prestamo? A B B N A B B N A B B N A B B N A B B N A B B N A B B N A B B N
Que le parece ia duracion de ios cicios? L C B  N L C B  N L C B  N L C B N L C B N L C B N L C B  N L C B N
Que le parece ei numéro de cicios? M P B N M P B N M P B N M P B N M P B N M P B N M P B N M P B N
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PARTE V - Caja Comunal
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Quisiera que sus ahorros siguieran siendo 
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GUION DE LAS ENTREVISTAS A LAS SOCIAS PE LAS CAJAS
COMUNALES
Maria Urbina
Obietivo de las Entre vistas
Obtener informacion de mas profundidad que aquella recogida por las encuestas. A 
través de la confianza establecida con las socias se espera sobrepasar respuestas 
superficiales y “apaciguadoras” e indagar motivaciones, razones y circumstancias 
reales.
Parte 1- Familiarizacion
El objetivo de estas preguntas es tanto como recaudar un poco de informacion sobre 
las familias, circumstancias y realidad social y cultural de las socias, como también 
hacerlas sentir un poco mas comodas al hablar de sus vidas antes de entrar en temas 
mas objetivos.
Explicacion de que la entrevista es anônima, confidencial y voluntaria y que sera 
grabada.
Es usted de aqui de Potosi? De donde es? Porqué se vino? Hace cuanto 
tiempo? Le gusta aqui?
- Esta casada? Tiene hijos? Tiene al resto de su famiiia aqui? Quiénes viven en 
su casa?
Parte 2 -  Historia Economica
El objetivo de estas preguntas es conocer la actividad comercial de la persona en 
detalle.
Que actividad o actividades economicas reaiiza? (importante saber las dos 
actividades principales)
- Desde hace cuanto tiempo?
Que hacia antes?
- Por que decidiô comenzar a hacer la actividad/es econômica/s que ahora 
reaiiza?
Cômo évalué usted el que ésta/s pudieran ser actividades viables 
econômicamente?
Como le va con su actividad? Vale la pena? Tiene mucha competencia? Va a 
quedarse trabajando alH?
La ayuda alguien de su famiiia en esta actividad?
(Si tiene esposo) Que actividad reaiiza su esposo? Esta empleado o trabaja por 
cuenta propia?
Cuales piensa usted que son sus destrezas? (tejer, reposteria, contabilidad, 
pintura en tela, cosido a maquina, etc.)
- Si no esta trabajando usando estas, piensa que podria usar sus destrezas para 
proveerse de ingresos econômicos?
Parte 3 -  Credito Como Herramienta para la Reducciôn de la Pobreza
El objetivo de estas preguntas es entender las motivaciones de las mujeres a tomar
credito y si este ha ayudado en alguna manera a su condiciôn socio-econômica.
Por que decidiô usted pedir crédite?
Por que ha optado por una caja comunal en vez de pedir crédite individual? 
Piensa que sin el crédite usted hubiera podido realizar la activad economica 
que ha hecho?
- Dentro de su famiiia, ha este crédite ayudado a que usted tenga un poco mas 
de independencia de su esposo? O ha causado problemas en su casa?
Piensa que vale la pena endeudarse para poder tener acceso a dinero/capital? 
Cômo maneja usted les pages que debe de hacer mensualmente? Es mucho 
estrés cada mes?
- En general, piensa usted que el crédite es la soluciôn a la pobreza?
Parte 4 -  Experiencia en la Caia Comunal
El objetivo de estas preguntas es comprender las razones que mantienen a las socias 
dentro de las cajas comunales y les problemas con les que se enfrentan ellas.
Cuanto tiempo tiene en la caja? Cuântos cicios?
- Cômo se formô su caja? Quién, Por qué, Cômo?
- Por qué se reûne usted con su caja?
Qué le ha parecido la experiencia de la Caja Comunal?
- Ha tenido usted problemas con su caja? O ha tenido su caja problemas en 
general? Por ejemplo cuales? Cômo los resolvierons?
Se ha invoiucrado su caja con su Junta Vecinai?
Su caja ha hecho alguna obra o servicio social en su comunidad?
- Cual dirîa usted es el principal interés de su Caja? Capacitaciôn, Participaciôn 
o Crédite?
Conoce lo que es la cuenta interna de su Caja? Sabe cuanto dinero bay en esta? 
Para qué quisieran ustedes usar este dinero en un future?
Qué actividades reaiiza su Caja para producir ahorros para su cuenta interna?
Parte 5 -  Evaluaciôn de Metodologfa e Implementaciôn de SEPAS
El objetivo de estas preguntas es conocer las percepciones de las clientes de SEPAS
en relaciôn a su trabajo y metodologfa.
Qué conoce de la organizaciôn que le esta proveyendo crédite? Sabe su 
nombre, etc.?
Qué le ha pareeido el trabajo de su promotora y de la organizaciôn en general?
Qué le ha parecido la frecuencia de las reuniones, el numéro de cicios, y los 
regiamentos générales de los estatutos? Cambiaria algo?
Cômo vé el area de capacitaciôn? Quisiera mas capacitaciôn? En qué areas y 
por qué?
En el gran esquema de las cosas, si usted estuviera encargada del Programa de 
las Cajas Comunales en Potosi, lo mantuviera o lo eliminaria? Por qué?
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INTRODUCCION
Este reporte es el producto de mi trabajo con SEPAS de Julio a Diciembre del ano 2003, 
auspiciado por la agencia Canadian Crossroads International. El objetivo de esta 
cooperaciôn ha sido la realizaciôn de una evaluaciôn del aspecto de Economia Solidaria 
del proyecto de “Continuaciôn del Apoyo a la Participacion Ciudadana, Control Social y 
Economia Solidaria en la Diocesis de Potosf.” Este proyecto tiene como objetivo general 
“mejorar las condiciones de vida y de ingresos de las juntas vecinales de los distritos 10, 
11 y 12 del Municipio de Potosf y de las comunidades campesinas del Canton Esquiri del 
Municipio de Puna; mediante el apoyo a la participacion ciudadana, el control social y la 
economia solidaria.”' En particular, mi evaluaciôn se ha concentrado en el distri to 12 del 
Municipio de Potosf y se ha enfocado en las cajas comunales.
De acuerdo a la propuesta del proyecto, los objetivos especfficos de este en el ârea de 
Economia Solidaria son:
• Consolidar y difundir la metodologia de cajas comunales como una alternativa 
econômica y organizativa que dinamice la economia local y las juntas 
vecinales.
• Apoyar las iniciativas econômicas de grupos organizados y promover la 
conformaciôn de microempresas.
Objetivos Générales de la Evaluaciôn
Esta evaluaciôn tiene dos propôsitos generates:
1) Medir hasta que punto se han cumplido los objetivos especfficos del proyecto 
mencionados, y
2) Proporcionar herramientas de evaluaciôn para el seguimiento y 
sistematizaciôn de este proyecto.^
' Secretariado de Pastoral Social D iocesis de Potosf -  Bolivia. “Continuaciôn del apoyo a la participacion 
ciudadana y a la economia solidaria en la Diocesis de Potosf -  Bolivia.” Agosto, 2002. Potosf, Bolivia.
 ̂De aquf en adelante se usarâ el término Proyecto para définir el ârea de Economfa Solidaria del proyecto 
de “Continuaciôn del apoyo a la participaciôn ciudadana y a la economfa solidaria en la Diôcesis de Potosf 
-  Bolivia.”
Es decir, este reporte no solo se enfocarâ en los resultados de la evaluaciôn y el 
anâlisis de estos, sino que también pretende proporcionar informaciôn metodolôgica que 
sirva en un futuro para la continuaciôn de la evaluaciôn del programa. De esta manera, la 
présente evaluaciôn es un estudio de ajuste.
Objetivos Especfficos 1
Para cumplir el Objetivo General 1, el estudio espera responder las siguientes 
preguntas:
1} Evaluaciôn de las Circunstancias de las Muieres
a. Informaciôn Demogrâfica
i. ^Quiénes son las Socias?
b. Sus Necesidades
i. ^En que actividad econômica trabajan?
ii. ^Qué quieren?
c. Sus Habilidades
i. ^Qué potencialidades tienen?
ii. ^Cômo pueden usar estas potencialidades?
d. Su Satisfacciôn
i. ^Estân contentas con el trabajo de SEPAS?
ii. ^Qué puede hacer SEPAS para mejorar el programa?
2} Evaluaciôn del Programa
a. Crédito
i. ^Es una herramienta util?
ii. ^Cuânto ha beneficiado a las socias?
b. Capacitaciôn
i. ^Ha sido suficiente?
ii. ^Ha sido en las areas adecuadas?
c. Participaciôn
i. ^Ha mejorado la autoestima de las socias?
ii. i  Han trabajado las cajas con su Junta Vecinal?
d. Micro-emprendimiento
i. ^Existe un espacio para que este ocurra?
ii. ^Qué se necesita para llegar a esta etapa?
Objetivos Especfficos 2
Para cumplir con el Objetivo General 2, este reporte pretende contestât las siguientes 
preguntas:
a. ^Cuâles son las limitaciones de este estudio?
b. ^Qué sugerencias se pueden hacer para futuras evaluaciones?
c. ^Qué propuestas prâcticas se pueden hacer para el seguimiento y 
sistematizaciôn de la experiencia de las cajas comunales?
Un proyecto como este, basado en principios econômicos como la nociôn del micro- 
crédito, tiene un gran reto. Este reto es el de medir costos econômicos en relaciôn a 
beneficios sociales que no pueden ser traducidos a Bolivianos. La tarea es entonces tratar 
de:
1) Encontrar métodos de evaluaciôn que tomen en cuenta este reto.
2) Considérât los beneficios sociales por si solos de manera que la evaluaciôn no 
sea economista.
SEPAS es una organizaciôn de iglesia sin fines de lucro con una visiôn social altamente 
progresiva. Por esto, cualquier evaluaciôn de sus programas o proyectos debe de tener en 
cuenta esta visiôn social, de manera que verdaderamente mida los beneficios 
y costos reales a sus clientes y a la instituciôn en si.
ASPECTOS METODOLOGICOS 
Metodologia Propuesta v Metodolopia Realizada
Esta evaluaciôn es el resultado de un estudio cualitativo y cuantitativo. La 
manera de que este estudio tuviera mérito y validez ha sido la realizaciôn de una 
investigaciôn comprensiva que se expandiera a través de las mas de 250 socias pero que 
al mismo tiempo indagara a profundidad los “porqués.”
En la metodologia propuesta originalmente durante el diseno de la evaluaciôn se 
trabajaria directamente con 5 de las 15 cajas a ser estudiadas. Este trabajo permitiria 
bacer un seguimiento profundo de 3 meses de las dinâmicas de las cajas comunales a 
través del método de investigaciôn de observaciôn participativa. De cada una de estas 5 
cajas, se escogeria a 6 socias con las que se llevaria a cabo entre vistas semi-estructuradas 
a profundidad, entrevistando un total de 30 mujeres. El objetivo de las entrevistas séria 
indagar las motivaciones, razones y circunstancias reales de las mujeres con relaciôn a su 
actividad econômica, el crédito y su experiencia en la caja comunal.
Al mismo tiempo se barfan alrededor de 250 encuestas con la gran mayorîa las 
socias de las 15 cajas comunales. Estas encuestas serf an llenadas por cada mujer de 
manera individual y confidencial. El objetivo de las encuestas serfa la recolecciôn de 
gran cantidad de informaciôn demogrâfica y econômica de las socias de las cajas asf 
como también informaciôn acerca de su satisfacciôn con el proyecto.
Al comienzo de la investigaciôn se decidiô trabajar con 4 cajas comunales y no 5, 
ya que de ésta manera se tendrfa mas tiempo para bacer un seguimiento real. Las cajas 
comunales eon las que se trabajô fueron: La Pastoral en Villa Venezuela, Nazareth en 
Villa Nazareth, Buena Vista en Villa Buena Vista y Virgen de Urkupina en Villa 
Copacabana. De la misma manera, se realizaron 24 entrevistas en vez de 30.
Con relaciôn a las encuestas, se bizo claro al comienzo del diseno de las encuestas 
que aquellas mujeres que no podfan leer y escribir o que no bablaran Espanol, no podrfan 
llenar las encuestas por sf mismas. Este problema combinado con la falta de tiempo para
hacer encuestas individuates llevo a la reflexion de que método séria el mas adecuado. 
Se decidiô hacer encuestas grupales^, en las que cada caja comunal se dividiera en grupos 
de 4 a 8 personas, que serian encuestadas oralmente por un/a encuestador/a.
En resumen, las principales diferencias entre la metodologia original y la llevada a 
cabo son:
Metodologia Propuesta Metodologia Realizada
Observaciôn Participativa de 5 Cajas Comunales Observaciôn Participativa de 4 Cajas Comunales
Entrevistas a 30 socias Entrevistas a 24 socias
Encuestas Individuales Escritas a 250 socias Encuestas Grupales Orales a 250 socias
Recursos v Retos
Afortunadamente la investigaciôn contô con el significativo apoyo de las très 
intégrantes del Equipo Urbano, quienes asistieron en el diseno de la investigaciôn y en las 
encuestas. También ha sido de gran ayuda el equipo del proyecto “Promociôn Humana 
Parroquial de la Parroquia La Candelaria en el distrito 12.” Este equipo integrado por 
Dayne Loayza, Martin Condex, y Jimena Choque colaboraron en la realizaciôn de las 
encuestas. En particular, Dayne Loayza y Jimena Choque asistieron en el vaciado de 
informaciôn a una base de datos y en la realizaciôn del anâlisis estadistico.
El mayor reto enfrentado durante la realizaciôn de la investigaciôn fue el ganar la 
confianza de las socias, siendo extranjera y de alguna manera relacionada a SEPAS, me 
tomô alrededor de un mes de constante presencia en sus reuniones y actividades para ser 
aceptada. El factor tiempo también jugô un papel importante, asi como también los 
sucesos a nivel nacional en el mes de Octobre.
' Gufas Entrevistas Grupales
MARCO TEORICO PARA EL ANALISIS DE LOS RESULTADOS DE LA 
EVALUACIÔN 
Alcance v Sostenibilidad del Proyecto
En principio, cualquier evaluaciôn compléta de una organizaciôn microfinanciera 
requiere un anâlisis de costos y beneficios ô costos y efectividad para comparar el valor 
social del programa de crédito contra su costo social. En prâctica, es muy dificil y 
costoso medir el valor y costo social. La mayorfa de las evaluaciones, entonces, usan dos 
medidas similares: Alcance y Sostenibilidad. Lo siguiente esta adaptado de la teoria de 
Mark Schreiner, de la Universidad de Washington, quien ha investigado extensivamente 
la microfinanza en Bolivia.
El Alcance es el valor social del producto de una organizaciôn microfinanciera en 
términos de seis factores: profundidad, beneficio a los usuarios, costo a los usuarios, 
amplitud, longevidad, y abarque. El Alcance es generalmente representado por el sexo y 
nivel de pobreza de los clientes, el tamano y duraciôn del préstamo, el numéro de 
usuarios, la fortaleza financiera y organizacional de la organizaciôn que presta, los costos 
que lleva el cliente, y el numéro de productos ofrecidos, incluyendo depôsitos."*
La Sostenibilidad es la permanencia de la organizaciôn. El objetivo a nivel social 
no es tener organizaciones sostenibles a nivel financiero, sino maximizar el valor social 
esperado menos el costo social descontado a través del tiempo. En principio, la 
sostenibilidad no es necesaria ni suficiente para la optimizaciôn social. Sin embargo, en 
prâctica, las organizaciones sostenibles tienden a mejorar mâs que las otras 
organizaciones las condiciones econômicas de sus clientes. La mayorfa de las 
organizaciones no-sostenibles transfieren sus costos a sus clientes en el futuro en excesos 
de las ganancias disfrutadas por sus clientes ahora. La sostenibilidad no es un objetivo en 
sf, sino es el medio para mejorar el bienestar social.
Schreiner, Mark et. al. Microcredit and the Poorest o f the Poor: Theory and Evidence from Bolivia. 
World Developm ent V ol.28. No. 2. p.p. 333-346, 2000.
En resumen, el Alcance es el valor social de los préstamos de una organizaciôn 
microfinanciera. La Sostenibilidad ayuda a maximizar este valor social esperado menos 
el costo social descontado a través del tiempo, incluyendo la ganancia neta a los usuarios, 
las ganancias o pérdidas de la organizaciôn, y el costo social de oportunidad de los 
recursos utilizados. La Sostenibilidad afecta al Alcance porque la permanencia tiende a 
crear estructuras de incentives y limitaciones que hacen que todos los grupos 
involucrados actûen de manera que aumenten la diferencia entre el valor y costo social.
• Profundidad
La Profundidad del Alcance es el valor que la sociedad le da a la ganancia neta 
del uso del microcrédito de un cliente. Ya que la sociedad le da mâs peso a la 
pobreza que a la riqueza, la pobreza es una buena aproximaciôn para la 
Profundidad. Por ejemplo, como sociedad, le damos mâs valor a las ganancias 
netas de un pequeno préstamo dado a una viuda que a las mismas ganancias 
netas de ese préstamo a un multimillonario. Es por eso que una organizaciôn 
tendrâ mayor profundidad mientras mâs pobres sean sus clientes.
• Beneficio para el Usuario
Es la percepciôn del cliente de su propio beneficio.
Costo al Usuario
Es el costo de un préstamo al usuario. Esto es distinto del costo de un 
préstamo a la sociedad o a la agencia prestataria. El costo al usuario incluye 
tanto el precio del préstamo como el costo de la transacciôn. El precio incluye 
el interés y cuotas. También incluye costos de oportunidades no monetarios 
como el valor del tiempo.
Amplitud
Es el numéro de usuarios. Cada organizaciôn tiene que encontrar el numéro 
ôptimo.
• Longevidad
Es el tiempo en el que una organizaciôn produce préstamos. La Longevidad 
importa porque a la sociedad le importa el bienestar del pobre no solo ahora 
sino también en el futuro.
Abarque
Es el numéro de servicios ofrecidos al cliente. Las organizaciones con mayor 
Alcance son aquellas que también ofrecen servicios de ahorro a los usuarios 
ademâs del crédito.
ANALISIS DE LOS RESULTADOS
Alcance -  Beneficios Netos a la Sociedad
1) Profundidad
Como se ha establecido anteriormente, la Profundidad es el nivel de pobreza de 
las clientes de la organizaciôn.^ En el estudio realizado se ha obtenido informaciôn 
sobre diferentes aspectos de las condiciones de las socias. Esta informaciôn ayuda a 
determinar aproximadamente el nivel de pobreza de las clientes del proyecto.
• Informaciôn Demogràfîca
La tipica cliente del proyecto tiene entre 25 y 46 anos (58%), esta casada 
(69%), tiene entre 1 y 3 hijos (36%) y sabe leer y escribir (80%). Lo mâs 
probable es que no baya nacido en Potosf (60%) y que tenga alrededor de 6 y 20 
anos viviendo en la ciudad (58%).
 ̂“El” cliente es referido como “la” cliente, porque solo 2 de las 241 personas encuestadas fueron hombres, 
representando el 0,08%.
• Ingresos
Este estudio midiô el total de los ingresos familiares de las socias (sus propios 
ingresos, mâs el de sus esposos -si tienen, mâs cualquier otro ingreso adicional 
que tenga su familia). La mayorîa de las socias tienen un ingreso total entre 301 y 
1500 Bolivianos (61%) al mes, con la mayor concentraciôn de socias teniendo un 
ingreso total de entre 901 y 1200 (18%). Esto nos indica que existen mâs clientes 
del programa con ingresos superiores, que socias sin o con muy pocos ingresos. 
De manera que el proyecto estâ trabajando con mujeres que estân en o sobre la 
Ifnea de pobreza.
Gastos
La mayorîa de las socias encuestadas gastan entre 301 y 600 Bolivianos al 
mes en mercado (49%), menos de 100 Bolivianos al mes en vivienda (61%), y 
entre 101 y 300 en los estudios de sus hijos al mes (37%). La mayorîa compran 
ropa para sus hijos 2 veces al ano (40%) gastando entre 301 y 600 Bolivianos 
(30%). Al ano también, la mayorîa gasta menos de 100 Bolivianos en salud 
(37%).
En relaciôn a la Profundidad, el proyecto no esta llegando a los sectores mâs 
pobres de la poblaciôn. Es necesario clarificar:
1) ^Cuâl es el sector de la poblaciôn al que se quiere llegar?
2) Es un objetivo del proyecto ofrecer crédito a las personas mâs pobres de la 
comunidad?
3) Si lo es, porqué no se estâ llegândo a este sector? Es la metodologia de la caja 
comunal la mâs apropiada para cumplir con este objetivo?
Las personas que tienden a beneficiarse mâs del microcrédito son aquellas que ya 
tienen algùn capital (por pequeno que sea). Por el contrario, para aquellas personas
que tienen muy pocos ingresos un préstamo con interés es de muy poca ayuda, y hasta 
puede empeorar su situaciôn econômica. El crédito es de mayor beneficio cuando es 
invertido en una actividad econômica, especialmente si es productiva.
2) Benefîcios a los Usuarios
Es necesario determinar si el proyecto en sf bénéficia a sus clientes o no. Existen 
dos medidas para determinar este beneficio. La primera es la satisfacciôn de las 
propias socias, y la segunda es a través de la recolecciôn objetiva de informaciôn que 
determine si el proyecto estâ cumpliendo con sus objetivos o no. El estudio realizado 
usô una mezcla de estas dos medidas.
• Crédito
En la propuesta del proyecto se plantea:
• El desarrollo, adaptaciôn y sistematizaciôn de la metodologia de cajas 
comunales: Crédito de libre disponibilidad a grupos de mujeres con 
garantfa solidaria mancomunada, en ciclos de 6 a 8 meses, con el objetivo 
de establecer un servicio local de crédito y ahorro.
• La sistematizaciôn de la experiencia de cajas comunales peri-urbanas para 
luego difundir la metodologia a otras jurisdicciones.
Estâ claro que el proyecto ha cumplido con el desarrollo y adaptaciôn del 
crédito. La sistematizaciôn de la experiencia todavia no se ha llevado a cabo.
Al ser preguntadas si el crédito habia mejorado su situaciôn econômica, un 
impresionante 97% de las socias dijo si. Una de las socias entrevistadas expresô: 
“Yo mantendria el programa porque la gente lo necesita, porque nadie nos quiere 
dar dinero en efectivo. Con este préstamo la gente aumenta [su capital], sin este 
préstamo no podriamos hacer nada porque todos nos prestan con mâs intereses. Y
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este interés estâ muy bueno, pero que no suba mâs. No queremos que suba el 
interés.”®
De la misma manera, 70% de las socias encuestadas han expresado que el 
interés estâ bien. En referencia a la implementaciôn del crédito: Al 65% de las 
socias le parece bien los montos de dinero prestados. En relaciôn al numéro y 
duraciôn de los ciclos, una vez mâs, la mayorfa de las socias pensô que éstos eran 
apropiados.
La metodologia parece ser la apropiada, aunque se recomienda mâs 
flexibilidad en los montos prestados ya que una proporciôn importante de las 
socias (30%) ha expresado su deseo de que éstos sean mâs altos. La gran mayorfa 
de las socias estâ de acuerdo con el que los ahorros sean obligatorios (92%), lo 
cual demuestra el interés de éstas de aumentar su capital no sôlo a través del 
endeudamiento pero también a través de sus propias contribuciones (sus ahorros). 
Muchas de las socias estân bajo la impresiôn de que sus ahorros son may ores, al 
explicarles que sôlo eran el 0,5% de sus préstamos, las socias se mostraban 
decepcionadas. El proyecto debe de dar mâs enfoque a los ahorros de las 
socias.
El crédito estâ cumpliendo con las necesidades de las socias. Una manera 
importante de medir si las socias perciben que el crédito las estâ beneficiando es si 
estas se prestan mâs de una vez. El 62% de las socias han solicitado crédito mâs 
de una vez.
Sin embargo, el crédito no es una herramienta para reducir la pobreza. La 
pobreza es un problema estructural, que debe ser tratado a través de medidas 
macro econômicas y sociales. Un préstamo de 1,500 Bs. puede facilitar una 
pequeha inversion econômica, el pago de otra deuda, o el mejoramiento de la 
vivienda familiar, pero en sf no va a reducir la vulnerabilidad de la socia y su 
familia, o incrementar el acceso de esta a la educaciôn o a servicios sociales. Es
’ Entrevista anônima realizada con una socia de la caja comunal La Pastoral en Septiembre 2003.
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por esto que se le debe de dar su lugar al microcrédito, es una herramienta util 
para proveer a personas pobres de capital, pero no es la soluciôn a la pobreza de 
Potosf o del pars.
Capacitaciôn
En la propuesta del proyecto se plantea:
• La realizaciôn de talleres de capacitaciôn en temas econômicos y 
organizativos por ciclos de crédito.
La colaboraciôn con otras organizaciones para satisfacer la demanda de 
capacitaciôn en salud, alfabetizaciôn, manualidades, etc.
La realizaciôn de talleres se ha llevado a cabo hasta cierto punto, 
principalmente en el ârea de manualidades. Sin embargo, poco ha sido la 
capacitaciôn en temas econômicos y organizativos.
El 63% de las socias encuestadas han recibido capacitaciôn, 40% de éstas sôlo 
han recibido durante el primer ciclo. La capacitaciôn recibida varia entre pintura 
en tela (29%), costura (18%), y capacitaciôn social (autoestima, contadurfa, etc.) 
(17%) entre otras.
El 99% de las socias encuestadas dijeron que querfan aûn mâs capacitaciôn, en 
particular quieren recibir entrenamiento en tejido (20%). Otras âreas populares 
de posible capacitaciôn entre las socias son costura y pintura. Se mostrô muy 
poco interés en capacitaciôn en el ârea social (7%). Sin embargo, una socia 
explicô en una entrevista su interés en recibir capacitaciôn en el ârea social: “Yo 
quisiera que hubiera capacitaciôn sobre economfa. O sea, a veces tenemos plata 
pero no sabemos como hacer nuestra economfa, porque se gasta y se gasta y no se 
sabe a donde se fué. Saber cuanto hemos gastado y cuanto tenemos que pagar. 
Por ejemplo, si yo tengo 100 Bolivianos cômo los puedo llevar.”^
 ̂Entrevista anônima realizada con socia de la caja comunal Nazareth en Septiembre 2003.
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Una preocupaciôn de las socias es la calidad de la capacitaciôn. Una socia 
expresô: “En este cuarto ciclo rccién cstamos rccibicndo capacitaciôn de pintura. 
Ah no, mâs antes en cl primer ciclo llcvamos muncqucria, pero tampoco nos han 
cnscnado bien, pero lo que hemos podido hemos aprendido.”*
Es importante définir los objetivos en relaciôn a la capacitaciôn, ya que las 
socias demuestran un alto interés en ésta. Es necesario contestar las siguientes 
preguntas:
• ^Cuanto tiempo y recursos se le quiere dedicar a la capacitaciôn? La 
capacitaciôn requiere tiempo y energia sumados a las actividades de las cajas. 
Es necesario decidir el nivel de prioridad dado a ésta.
• En que âreas se va a capacitar? Existe una contradicciôn entre la capacitaciôn 
que las socias quieren recibir, principalmente actividades manuales que no les 
ayudarân a generar ingresos, y los objetivos del proyecto de aumentar las 
fuentes generadoras de ingresos de las socias. Es fundamental decidir las 
Imeas del proyecto en este sentido.
Potencialidades de las Socias
En la propuesta del proyecto se plantea como meta que:
• Las potencialidades de las socias sean utilizadas en actividades 
productivas de manera organizada y sistemâtica, conformândose 3 
microemprendimientos.
• Organizaciôn y consolidaciôn de pequenas unidades productivas 
artesanales aprovechando las potencialidades de las socias.
Estas metas no se han cumplido, en gran parte por el desconocimiento real de 
las potencialidades y habilidades de las socias.
' Entrevista anônima realizada con socia de la caja comunal La Pastoral en Septiembre 2003.
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Una parte importante de esta investigaciôn se ha enfocado en el estudio de las 
habilidades de las socias y en la determinaciôn de si éstas usan sus 
potencialidades para aumentar sus ingresos.
91% de las socias sabe tejer, en su mayorfa crochet y palillo. De éstas socias, 
sôlo el 28% teje eomo actividad comercial o complementaria, el resto teje para sus 
propias familias. De la misma manera, 67% de las socias hace reposterfa, pero 
sôlo el 17% lo hace para vender. 69% de las socias hace costura, sôlo 14% para 
vender. Finalmente, 46% de las socias realizan actividades de producciôn 
agrfcola, sôlo el 33% vende.
La razôn por la que muy pocas de las socias usan sus potencialidades en 
actividades econômicas es porque no son rentables.
Es necesario:
• Determinar si las socias estân interesadas en usar sus potencialidades o 
aprender nuevas para aumentar su ingreso econômico. Si las socias estân 
dispuestas a aprender nuevas habilidades, es necesario saber cuânta 
energfa y tiempo pueden comprometer a éstas.
• Hacer un estudio de mercado donde se évalué cuâles productos tienen 
demandas. Una vez hecho este estudio, se puede determinar en qué âreas 
neeesitan entrenamiento las socias.
Las socias de éste proyecto, en su mayorîa, son mujeres que saben leer y 
escribir (80%), saben contabilidad bâsica (62%), poseen como minimo una 
habilidad manual, tienen experiencia en cargos administrativos (dentro de sus 
cajas) y tienen un gran deseo de capacitarse. Son éstas las potencialidades que 
se deben de aprovechar en este proyecto.
Participaciôn
En la propuesta del proyecto se plantea como meta que:
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El 80% de las cajas comunales hayan dcsarrollado accioncs concretas en 
bénéficie de sus juntas vecinales.
• Las socias de las cajas comunales participen activamente en sus juntas 
vecinales y que el 60% de las socias formen parte de las mesas directivas.
A partir de la formaciôn dentro de sus organizaciones las socias eleven su 
autoestima y participen en diferentes niveles.
El estudio indica que 64% de las socias participan en sus juntas vecinales, sin 
embargo sôlo 5% de éstas forman parte de las mesas directivas. Sôlo bay dos 
cajas comunales que participan activamente con sus juntas pero sin realizar 
accioncs concretas o proyectos en comûn. 58% de aquellas socias que no estân 
involucradas, al ser preguntadas si les interesan'a participar activamente en sus 
juntas, ban respondido que si. Esto demuestra la disposiciôn de las socias a 
participar en sus comunidades y a la necesidad de que SEPAS trabaje 
directamente con éstas mujeres para lograr este objetivo.
Aunque no se ba medido directamente, se puede ver a través del método de la 
observaciôn participativa en las cajas que las socias ban ganado confianza en sf 
mismas al desempenar cargos en las mesas directivas. Existen varios casos de 
tesoreras que no saben leer o escribir y que sin embargo realizan bien su trabajo.
Necesidades de las Socias
Al ser preguntadas para qué ban usado el crédito, el 64% de las socias lo ban 
invertido en su negocio, el 16% en la construcciôn de su casa, el 12% en compras 
personales y el resto en gastos de salud, estudios y pago de deudas. Esto indica 
que aunque el crédito es de libre disposiciôn, la mayorfa de las mujeres deciden 
usarlo en la inversion de actividades econômicas. La mayorfa de las mujeres 
(36%) tiene un capital de menos de 500 Bolivianos. Esto indica que las socias 
tienen negocios pequeffos dentro de la economfa informai, que es una economfa
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de competencia perfecta (un mercado donde la oferta es mayor que la demanda 
haciendo que existan productos uniformes, y por ende, mucha competencia). No 
existe una actividad econômica dominante entre las socias pero las actividades 
mâs comunes son tejido (14%), venta de comida y refrescos (10%), venta de ropa 
(8%) y tienda de barrio (6%).
Después de realizar este estudio se percibe la necesidad de las socias de 
obtener capacitaciôn de calidad sobre cômo decidir qué actividades econômicas 
hacer y cômo administrarlas.
Una necesidad tangible para las socias es aquella de tener una caja comunal en 
la que ellas se sientan duenas de su dinero, y que sientan que tienen control sobre 
el destino de éste.
3) Costos a los Usuarios
Ser parte de una caja comunal requiere el tiempo y energia de las socias, de la 
misma manera el recibir crédito les impone un costo econômico. Principalmente, los 
costos de las socias son tiempo e intereses (mâs cualquier otro costo de transacciôn), 
mâs el costo intrinsico de tener una deuda.
• Tiempo
El 50% de las socias trabaja en sus actividades econômicas entre 21 y 50 horas 
a la semana. De la misma manera, 40% de las socias trabaja en tareas del hogar 
entre 21 y 50 horas a la semana. Todas las socias son amas de casa ademâs de 
trabajar en sus actividades econômicas, de manera que cuentan con muy poco 
tiempo para reunirse en sus cajas, format parte de sus juntas vecinales y recibir 
capacitaciôn.
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En una entrevista, una de las socias ha expresado: “Muchas veces nos
reunimos a mirarnos las caras, nos aburrimos sin actividades...”'̂  De la misma 
manera, otras socias han comentado que desean que el tiempo usado en las 
reuniones de las cajas (las cuales duran 2 horas, una vez por semana) sea 
aprovechado en capacitaciôn, etc.
Es importante conocer las prioridades de las socias y realizar actividades de 
calidad que les sean utiles y no desperdicien su tiempo.
Intereses
Como se ha mencionado anteriormente, el 70% de las socias piensan que el 
interés esta bien, pero la mayorîa insiste en que no suba.
4) Amplitud
Existen mâs de 250 socias en el proyecto conformando 16 cajas. SEPAS tiene 3 
personas dedicadas a estas cajas, mâs dos personas del Centro Parroquial Virgen de la 
Candelaria. Sin embargo, las 3 intégrantes del Equipo Urbano también dedican su 
tiempo al ârea de Participaciôn Ciudadana, trabajando directamente con los lîderes de 
las juntas vecinales, ademâs de estar involucradas en comités, redes, etc. En realidad, 
el equipo urbano dedica alrededor de la mitad de su tiempo a las cajas comunales. 
Esto hace difîcil el cumplimiento de los objetivos de las cajas como mâs capacitaciôn 
y seguimiento. Es necesario définir:
• ^Se quiere aumentar el numéro de cajas o se prefiere mantener o reducir el 
numéro de éstas?
• ^Qué recursos se necesitarfan para cumplir con los objetivos propuestos con un 
mayor numéro de cajas?
' Entrevista anônima con socia de la caja comunal Nazareth en Septiembre, 2003.
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5) Longevidad
Este proyecto lleva 4 anos en los que ha funcionado con éxito (en términos de 
repago y ganancias). Muy pocas cajas estân en su primer ciclo (4 cajas), y la mayorfa 
estân en su 3er 6 4to ciclo (10 cajas). El proyecto estâ entrando en una fase 
interesante donde se van a comenzar a observar resultados tangibles. Es importante 
que el proyecto defina:
^Cuantos anos mâs se quiere continuar?
• ^Cuântos ciclos se quiere que duren las cajas? (8 6 9 ciclos)
• ^Qué tipo de indicadores se quieren usar al final del proyecto para evaluarlo y qué 
tipo de indicadores se quiere usar después del proyecto para medir su impacto?
6) Abarque (Numéro de Servicios Ofrecidos al Cliente)
Hasta abora el proyecto ba ofrecido crédito grupal a través de la metodologia de la 
caja comunal, siendo éste el unico tipo de servicio ofrecido a sus clientes. Ha babido 
cierta demanda para crédites individuales, pero no ba sido significativa. Esta 
estrategia (un solo tipo de servicio) parece funcionar bien, ya que SEPAS no tiene la 
capacidad institucional para administrar mâs de un tipo de préstamos. En este caso, el 
ofrecer un solo tipo de servicio es lo eficiente.
Sostenibilidad
1) Beneficios Netos Al Cliente
Los beneficios para las clientes son:






Me: Apoyo al Microemprendimiento
Los costos para las clientes son:




Ct: Costos de Transacciôn
Cd: Costo de tener Deuda
La siguiente es una propuesta sencilla para medir el Beneficio Neto de las socias 
de manera matemâtica:
Cr: La cantidad del crédito prestado (por ejemplo 1.200 Bs en un ciclo)
C: El precio que costarfa tomar la misma capacitaciôn con una organizaciôn
privada (por ejemplo, un curso de reposterfa, 200 Bs en un ciclo)
P: Un numéro dummy (representativo). Si la socia se siente involucrada en
su junta vecinal o en su caja y quiere seguir, se le asigna una cantidad x
positiva, si no esta involucrada en su junta o en su caja, se le asigna una
cantidad x  negativa. (Por ejemplo, en este caso 100, porque la socia esta 
participando). Si el nivel de participaciôn es neutro, se le asigna 0.
Me: Las ganancias de la microempresa (por ejemplo una organizaciôn que
produce tejidos, y gana 3.000 Bs. por ciclo).
T: Se calcula cuanto deja de ganar la socia en un ciclo por atender a las
reuniones, a la capacitaciôn y a las actividades de microemprendimiento. 
(Por ejemplo, una socia que gana 30 Bs al dfa, gana 2.5 Bs la hora (30/12), 
si estâ involucrada 5 horas a la semana en su caja, capacitaciôn, etc., 
pierde 12,50 Bs a la semana y 400 Bs. en un ciclo de 8 meses).
I: Los intereses pagados sobre los 1.200 (288Bs).
Ct: Gastos en fotocopias, taxis, etc. (Por ejemplo 20 Bs.)
Cd: Este numéro va en proporciôn al tamano de la deuda, mientras mâs grande
ésta, mâs grande es el costo de tener la deuda. Una vez mâs se asigna un 
numéro dummy o peso. Este costo depende de cada socia, pero en éste 
caso le designaremos 0,1. El Costo de deuda es 0,1 multiplicado por el 
crédito.
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Beneficios Netos = Beneficios -  Costos
= (Cr + C + P + Me) -  (T + 1 + Ct+Cd)
= (1200+200+X+3000) -  [400+288+20+(0,l x 1200)]
= (4400+%) -  (828)
= 3,692 + %
%=100
= 3,572
Se puede observar que la socia en este caso es beneficiada. Pero supongamos que 
la misma socia ha recibido muy poca capacitaciôn (50Bs), no participa en su caja o en 
su comunidad (0), y no ha sido apoyada en su microemprendimiento de manera que 
éste no ha funcionado (0):
Benefîcios Netos = Benefîcios -  Costos
= (Cr + C + P + Me) -  (T + 1 + Ct+Cd)
= (1200+50+%+0) -  [400+288+20+(0,l x  1200)]
= (1250+%) -  (828)
= 422 + %
-100
= 322
Esta socia todavia es beneficiada por el proyecto, porque el crédito es lo 
suficientemente significativo. Sin embargo, su beneficio neto es pequeno.
En este proyecto el beneficio de las socias siempre es mayor que su costo. Es 
decir, todas las socias obtienen ganancias netas. Esto es demostrado por su 
continuada participaciôn en el proyecto. La pregunta clave es cômo hacer que ésta 
diferencia sea la mayor posible.
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2) Ganancias o Pérdidas del Proyecto
El siguiente es un anâlisis superficial del estado de la cartera del proyecto ya que 
la informaciôn ha sido dificil de obtener. Actualmente"*, el monto de la cartera es 
232.274,38 Bs., y el interés ganado hasta ahora en este ano ha sido 31.961,32 Bs. 
SEPAS tiene ademâs 156.325,62 Bs. (el resto de los 50.000 USD prestados por PEAP 
FONCRESOL Nacional en Mayo)."
A partir de Mayo, los intereses han pagado el sueldo de una trabajadora a tiempo 
completo, aportes al seguro, y gastos administrativos relacionados a PEAP como 
correspondencia, asistencia a talleres, materiales, y teléfono. Antes de Mayo, estos 
gastos eran cubiertos en parte por los intereses y en parte por el capital.
De esta manera, a partir de Mayo el proyecto ha sido autosuficiente ya que de sus 
propias ganancias (intereses) se han pagado parte de los insumos. Es importante 
définir en qué se va a usar los restantes 156.325,62 Bs. Si este dinero no es usado en 
las cajas comunales, es importante que se mantenga productive.
3) Costo de Oportunidad de los Recursos Usados
En cualquier proyecto se debe medir el costo de oportunidad de los recursos 
utilizados. No solamente a nivel de los clientes sino a nivel institucional. Ya se han 
visto los beneficios y ganancias netas a las socias y del proyecto en si. Estâ claro que 
los beneficios netos de las socias son positivos. De igual manera, a nivel institucional 
se estâ relativamente ganando con este proyecto.
En este caso, la pregunta no es si el crédito es mejor que nada para las socias, 
sino, si el crédito es mejor que otro proyecto de desarrollo para la zona. Al hacer esta 
pregunta a las socias en las entrevistas, la mayorfa ha expresado su interés en que éste 
proyecto siga en vez de que se comience algùn otro. Los elementos de este proyecto
Principios de Noviembre.
" Datos provistos por Jenny Pairo.
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que les atrae a las socias son: la autosuficiencia en vez de la asistencia y el acceso no 
solo al capital sino también a la capacitaciôn.
Va mas alla de este estudio decir si este proyecto vale la pena mas que otro 
proyecto de desarrollo; esto es algo que SEP AS debe de définir. Sin embargo, este 
proyecto:
1) Provee un beneficio neto a las socias
2) Es relativamente econômico (bajos costos); y
3) Es relativamente auto-suficiente
Alcance v Sostenibllidad de! Proyecto
El modelo de “Alcance y la Sostenibllidad” ha sido usado como medida arbitraria para 
evaluar el proyecto. En realidad provee una estructura para organizar toda la informacion 
obtenida en este estudio. La idea principal de esta secciôn ha sido evaluar todos los 
elementos que conforman el Alcance (Profundidad, Beneficios y Costos a los Usuarios, 
Amplitud, Longevidad y Abarque) y la Sostenibllidad (Beneficios Netos a los Usuarios, 
Ganancias o Pérdidas del Proyecto y Costo de Oportunidad de los Recursos Usados). El 
objetivo de este anâlisis ha sido contestar las preguntas propuestas en la introducciôn:
Informacion Demogrâfica 
^Quiénes son las Socias?
Son mujeres entre 25 y 46 anos (58%), casadas (69%) que tienen entre 1 y 3 hijos 
(36%) y que saben leer y escribir (80%). La mayorfa no han nacido en Potosf (60%) y 
tienen akededor de 6 y 20 anos viviendo en la ciudad (58%).
Sus Necesidades
^En que actividad econômica trabajan?
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No existe una acti vidad economica dominante entre las socias pero las actividades 
mas comunes son tejido (14%), venta de comida y refrescos (10%), venta de ropa (8%) y 
tienda de barrio (6%).
^Qué quieren?
• Seguir teniendo acceso al erédito
• Obtener capacitaciôn de ealidad tanto social como técnica
• Sentir sc duenas y parte de su caja comunal
Sus Habilidades
^Qué potencialidades tienen?
Son mujeres que saben leer y escribir (80%), saben contabilidad basica (62%), 
poseen eomo mmimo una habilidad manual, tienen experiencia en cargos administrativos 
(dentro de sus cajas) y tienen un gran deseo de capacitarse.
^Como pueden usar estas potencialidades?
Muy pocas de las socias usan sus potencialidades en actividades economicas 
porque no son rentables. Es necesario determinar si las socias estan interesadas en usar 
sus potencialidades o aprender nuevas para aumentar su ingreso econômico.
Crédito
^Es una herramienta util?
Si. El 97% de las socias encuestadas han expresado que el crédito ha mejorado su 
situaciôn econômica.
^Cuânto ha beneficiado a las socias?
El beneficio dépende de cada socia, pero en general el beneficio neto ha sido positivo.
Capacitaciôn 
^Ha sido suficiente?
No. 99% de las socias quiere recibir aùn mas capacitaciôn.
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^Ha sido en las areas adecuadas?
Hasta cierto punto si, pero existe una contradiccion entre la capacitaciôn que las 
socias quieren recibir, principalmente actividades manuales que no les ayudaran a generar 
ingresos, y los objetivos del proyecto de aumentar las fuentes generadoras de ingresos de 
las socias. Es fundamental decidir las Imeas del proyecto en este sentido.
Participacion
^Ha mejorado la autoestima de las socias?
Este aspecto no se ha medido cuantitativamente, pero a través de la observaciôn 
participativa de las cajas se ha determinado que la autoestima de las socias es mas alta 
después de estar involucradas en su caja por un tiempo.
I Han trabajado las cajas con su Junta Vecinal?
Solo dos cajas han trabajado directamente con su Junta Vecinal.
Micro-emprendimiento
^Existe un espacio para que este ocurra?
Es dificil decir, el 64% de las socias encuestadas no quiere asociarse. Sin embargo, 
muchas de las cajas quieren realizar una actividad productiva en conjunto.
^Qué se necesita para llegar a esta etapa?
Se necesita realizar un estudio de mercado para determinar la demanda. También 
se necesita hacer una evaluaciôn de las cajas para decidir cuâles cumplirian los requisitos 
para formar una microempresa.
Satisfacciôn de las Socias
^Estân contentas con el trabajo de SEPAS?
Si. Quieren que el programa continue.
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De acuerdo a las socias, iQué puede hacer SEPAS a nivel practice para mejorar el 
programa?
En general, estas han sido las sugerencias de las socias;
• Proveer mas capacitaciôn de mayor calidad.
Tener mas flexibilidad en los montes del préstamo ofrecidos.
• Mantener los intereses en 2.5%.
• Que se distribuya el dinero, o parte de este, de la cuenta interna entre las socias al 
final de cada ciclo, y que estas deeidan que hacer eon este dinero.
• Que cada socia tenga su propia libreta de transaceiones.
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HERRAMIENTAS PARA EL FUTURO 
Limitaciones de este Estudio
La realizaciôn de este estudio ha representado una experiencia de aprendizaje tanto para 
las socias como para las trabajadoras del equipo urbano y los asistentes de investigaciôn, 
pero en particular, para mi persona como investigadora. En este proceso, se ban 
reconocido vacfos metodolôgicos y limitaciones que se espera puedan superarse en el 
siguiente estudio de evaluaciôn.
Algunas limitaciones son:
• Tiempo: La investigaciôn, en sus cuatro fases (diseno, implementaciôn, anâlisis y 
elaboraciôn del informe), se ba realizado en 4.5 meses. De éstos, se ban dedicado 
2.5 meses a la realizaciôn del trabajo de campo (implementaciôn), y 2 meses al 
diseno, anâlisis y elaboraciôn del informe. Aunque esta cantidad de tiempo ba 
sido adecuada, se recomienda a investigaciones futuras a durar por lo menos 6 
meses, en particular si la evaluaciôn es de mayor abarque.
• Conocimiento General de la Instituciôn: El que el investigador sea una persona 
no sôlo de afuera de la instituciôn sino también de otro pais, impide que este 
tenga toda la informaciôn posible sobre la instituciôn y el contexto. Es necesario 
que cualquier investigador reciba informaciôn por adelantado, y que esta persona 
lea y estudie de antemano la informaciôn de la instituciôn, en especial, si esta 
persona es extranjera.
Vacfos Metodolôgicos:
• Diseno de las encuestas:
Las preguntas en referenda a la pobreza no ban ido mâs allâ de ingresos y 
gastos. Una encuesta compléta tendria que incluir, por ejemplo, preguntas 
sobre: el acceso a la educaciôn y la salud, el nivel de educaciôn de las
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socias (mâs allâ del alfabetismo), el tipo de vivienda en el que radican, y el 
aeeeso a electricidad y agua, etc. Esta informaciôn darfa una vision mâs 
Clara del nivel de pobreza de las socias no sôlo en la dimensiôn econômica 
sino también social, en particular en termines de acceso a servicios 
bâsicos, su vulnerabilidad, y su poder de toma de decisiôn (opciones).
En termines de los Beneficios a los Usuarios, existe un vacio en las 
encuestas de preguntas directas en relaciôn a cômo ha beneficiado el 
programa a las socias. Séria muy util en este sentido el tener informaciôn 
descriptiva que explique de manera tangible el impacto real del crédito y la 
capacitaciôn.
• Es importante définir el asunto del anonimato. En las encuestas realizadas 
para éste estudio aunque se usô el método de Gufa Entrevista Grupal 
(encuestas grupales), se mantuvo el anonimato de las socias. La idea es 
que a través de la eneuesta en grupo las socias socialicen sus condiciones 
econômicas y sociales las unas con las otras. Pero a la hora de hacer el 
anâlisis el investigador no tiene acceso a los nombres de las socias. Esto 
ha funcionado bien, sin embargo en relaeiôn a la elaboraciôn de una base 
de datos, el haber hecho la investigaciôn de manera anônima ha prevenido 
el acceso a informaciôn de cada una de las socias. Es necesario en 
evaluaciones futuras, définir las prioridades de SEPAS (anonimato versus 
informaeiôn util).
Otros Aspectos:
No se ha indagado la percepciôn de las socias akededor de la competencia, 
es deeir, las razones por las euales deciden hacer cierta actividad 
econômica y no otra. La mayorfa de las socias realizan actividades 
econômicas en las que existe competeneia perfecta.'^ Esto hace que sus 
ganancias sean mfnimas, sin embargo las socias siguen entrando a estos
■ Este término ha sido explicado anteriormente.
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mercados. Sena importante conocer las razones por las cuales las socias 
entran y se mantienen en estos mercados.
• De gran importancia es el que no se haya preguntado las percepciones de 
las socias en relaciôn al micro-emprendimiento. Esta informaciôn es clave 
en determinar las Imeas del proyecto en esta Area.
Reauerimientos Para Una Nueva Evaluaciôn
Esta es una evaluaciôn piloto que tiene como un objetivo secundario servir de prueba 
para futuras evaluaciones. La idea es que este estudio no solamente provea resultados y 
conclusiones con recomendaciones para mejorar el proyecto, sino que también provea 
sugerencias y herramientas para otros estudios.
Las siguientes son sugerencias para una nueva evaluaciôn:
Antes de realizar cualquier evaluaciôn es necesario tener una base de datos 
vigente y compléta.
• Définir elaramente los objetivos générales y especificos de la evaluaciôn. Es 
importante usar el tiempo que sea necesario para determinar estos objetivos, 
ya que mientras mâs claros sean éstos, mejor sera la evaluaciôn. Estos 
objetivos también determinarân la metodologia a usarse en la investigaciôn.
• La nueva evaluaciôn debe de abarcar todas las cajas comunales, no sôlo las del 
Distrito No. 12.
Se debe obtener informaciôn del resto de los Distritos estudiados o de todo 
Potosi para poder hacer comparaciones con el grupo estudiado. Algunos 
estudios usan el método de comparaciôn para evaluar, usando un grupo 
control (por ejemplo la poblaciôn femenina de Potosf o del Distrito No. 12) 
que se compare con el grupo a ser estudiado (las socias de las cajas 
comunales).
• Serf a muy util utilizar la informaciôn cruda de esta investigaciôn para hacer 
una comparaciôn longitudinal (a través del tiempo).
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Si la evaluaciôn no se hace anônima, la informaciôn obtenida se puede utilizar 
para expandir la base de datos existente.
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Algunas Herramientas Prâcticas para el Seguimiento de las Caias Comunales
Las siguientes son algunas ideas prâcticas a corto plazo para la mejor implementaciôn 
del proyecto.
Nivel Institucional
• Crear una base de datos con informaciôn econômica y social de las socias. De 
manera que se puedan identificar las socias o los grupos de socias con 
diferentes necesidades (capacitaciôn, apoyo al microemprendimiento, etc.).
Trabajo con las Cajas
• Realizar capacitaciôn de manera mâs general. Ofrecer diferentes cursos en 
artesamas, contadurfa, salud, etc., a los cuales se invite a todas las socias 
interesadas, sin importar de que cajas sean. De esta manera se eliminarân 
cursos duplicados en diferentes cajas y también se asegurarâ que sôlo las 
socias realmente interesadas asistan a cursos especificos
• Ofrecer mâs privilégies a las directivas de las cajas, como por ejemplo que 
reciban el mismo tipo de capacitaciôn que los lideres de las juntas vecinales. 
De esta manera habrâ mâs motivaciôn de las socias a formar parte de sus 
juntas directivas. Obviamente, esto también capacitarâ mejor a las lideres a 
que realicen un mejor trabajo en sus cajas.
Utilizar la Crônica Grupal'^ como instrumente de sistematizaciôn de las 
actividades, capacitaciôn, retos y experiencias de las cajas comunales.
• Rotar a las facilitadoras/promotoras por cajas cada ano. De esta manera las 
socias no crean dependencia con una facilitadora y también pueden 
familiarizarse con los diferentes estilos de cada una.
La Crônica Grupal es un método que consiste en llevar un libro (como un diario) donde se anotan las 
experiencias y percepciones de las socias. Este libro es llevado por la facilitadora/promotora.
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Metodologia del Préstamo
Dar fichas o libretas de préstamo individuales a cada socia. La manera en que 
esto funciona actualmente es que la presidenta tiene una copia de la hoja de 
seguimiento con la informaciôn de cada socia. Si una socia quiere revisar su 
informaciôn, necesita pedirle la hoja a la presidenta. El que cada socia tenga 
su libreta individual darfa mayor independencia a las socias en el control de 
sus transaceiones.
• Redisenar las Fichas de Seguimiento.
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CONCLUSIONES GENERALES Y RECOMENDACIONES 
Resumen de los Resultados de la Investigaciôn
• Las socias de este programa estân en o sobre la Imea de pobreza, de manera que 
no son el sector mâs pobre de la poblaciôn.
• No existe una actividad econômica dominante entre las socias pero las actividades 
mâs comunes son tejido (14%), venta de comida y refrescos (10%), venta de ropa 
(8%) y tienda de barrio (6%).
• La mayorfa de las socias saben tejer, hacer reposterfa y costura, y realizar 
actividades de producciôn agrfcola. Sin embargo muy pocas de estas lo hacen 
para vender.
• El estudio indica que 64% de las socias participan en sus juntas vecinales, sin 
embargo sôlo 5% de estas forman parte de las mesas directivas.
• Al ser preguntadas para que han usado el crédito, el 64% de las socias lo han 
invertido en su negocio, el 16% en la construcciôn de su casa, el 12% en compras 
personales y el resto en gastos de salud, estudios y pago de deudas. Esto indica 
que aunque el crédito es de libre disposiciôn, la mayorfa de las mujeres deciden 
usarlo en la inversiôn de actividades econômicas.
• El 50% de las socias trabaja en sus actividades econômicas entre 21 y 50 horas a 
la semana. De la misma manera, 40% de las socias trabaja en tareas del hogar 
entre 21 y 50 horas a la semana. Todas las socias son amas de casa ademâs de 
trabajar en sus actividades econômicas, de manera que cuentan con muy poco 
tiempo para reunirse en sus cajas, formar parte de sus juntas vecinales y recibir 
capacitaciôn.
• El crédito estâ cumpliendo con las necesidades de las socias aunque no ha tenido 
un impacto real en la reducciôn de su pobreza. Al ser preguntadas si el crédito
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habia mejorado su situaciôn econômica, un imprcsionantc 97% de las socias dijo
SL
La realizaciôn de tallcrcs sc ha llevado a cabo hasta cicrto punto, principalmente 
en el ârea de manualidades. Sin embargo, poca ha sido la capacitaciôn en temas 
econômicos y organizativos. El 99% de las socias encuestadas dijeron que 
querian aùn mâs capacitaciôn, en particular quieren recibir entrenamiento en 
tejido (20%).
Recomendaciones
SEPAS necesita définir con que sector de la poblaciôn quiere trabajar en este 
proyecto. Esta evaluaciôn recomienda que se continue trabajando con el sector 
actual ya que las personas que tienden a beneficiarse mâs de un proyecto como 
éste son aquellas que ya tienen algûn capital. El crédito es de mayor beneficio 
cuando es invertido en una actividad econômica, especialmente si es productiva.
Se recomienda mâs flexibilidad en los montos prestados ya que una proporciôn 
importante de las socias (30%) ha expresado su deseo de que éstos sean mâs altos. 
Se recomienda que SEPAS defina las âreas de capacitaciôn y el tiempo y recursos 
que se van a emplear en ésta para asegurar que sea de calidad y utilidad.
Se sugiere que SEPAS realice un estudio de mercado donde se évalué cuâles 
productos tienen demandas. Una vez hecho este estudio, se puede determinar en 
qué âreas necesitan entrenamiento las socias. Al mismo tiempo se debe 
determinar si las socias estân interesadas en usar sus potencialidades o aprender 
nuevas para aumentar su ingreso econômico. Si las socias estân dispuestas a 
aprender nuevas habilidades, es necesario saber euânta energia y tiempo pueden 
eomprometer a éstas.
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• Se recomienda mantener o disminuir el mismo numéro de cajas para mantener la 
calidad del proyecto. También se es sugerido que el mimero de socias que 
participan en cada caja no sea mayor de 25, ya que a través de éste estudio se ha 
observado que aquellas cajas con mâs de 25 socias son las mâs propensas a tener 
problemas internos.
Reflexion
A nivel del diseno y planificaciôn se puede observar una falta de vision de “hacia 
donde vamos” o “hacia donde queremos llegar” en este proyecto. Como se ha 
mencionado anteriormente, el proyecto estâ entrando en una fase importante en el que las 
cajas estân madurando y comenzândose a preguntar “y ahora qué?”. A través de este 
estudio se ha notado en las cajas comunales una falta de identidad como grupo y por ende 
de cohesion. Quizâs este sea el reflejo de la falta de misiôn del proyecto en general. Es 
necesario que SEPAS defina elaramente las Imeas de acciôn y objetivos para el futuro 
para que se trabaje con esta vision en mente.
Un proyecto o programa no puede tener una vision sin tener una estrategia de 
como llegar a esta. El documente de la propuesta actual del proyecto no es lo 
suficientemente especifico para ser una herramienta util en la realizaciôn de este. Es 
necesario disenar no sôlo cronogramas de actividades, sino también matrices de 
resultados esperados, indicadores verificables, medios de verificaciôn de estos, anâlisis de 
riesgos, recursos a ser utilizados, etc. Una vez disenado este documente en consenso, 
éste debe seguirse fielmente, respetando las fechas y usândolo como medio de referenda 
durante el proceso de realizaciôn.
Un aspecto crucial en la realizaciôn de cualquier proyecto es el trabajo de las 
personas involucradas. En este sentido es elemental que el equipo urbano defina sus 
Imeas de trabajo y centralice sus prioridades. Se sugiere una reuniôn o taller de dos o
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très dfas completos, sin interrupciôn, en los que el equipo pueda négociai' sus diferencias, 
establecer sus necesidades y concertar la acciôn.
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